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Chapter 1: Income Inequality, Government Welfare Effort, and Subjective 




People’s own assessment of their well-being provides direct insight into how they 
experience the quality of their lives. This information is important to policy makers as they 
design and evaluate policies. The subjective assessment of well-being varies by individuals and 
on an aggregate national level and there is a great interest in identifying the dimensions that 
explain this variation. Two important dimensions pertain to the level of income inequality and to 
government welfare efforts in the form of public expenditures and services. 
The relations of income inequality and government welfare effort with subjective well-
being have been widely explored in high-income countries in the West. But limited research has 
been carried out in low- and middle-income countries (or high-income countries outside of 
Europe and the United States for that matter). Due to this gap, important questions remain. For 
example, is the association between income inequality and subjective well-being and that 
between government welfare effort and subjective well-being similar in rich and poor countries 
alike? Are the patterns similar or very different across low- and middle-income countries, often 
referred to as developing countries? How is government welfare effort related to subjective well-
being in the context of conflict-affected and/or natural resource-rich developing countries?  
In order to answer these questions, it is important to have a solid understanding of the 
existing literature. This essay provides this informative background and discusses the relevance 
of subjective well-being metrics in policy and research; introduces the main concepts in the 
literature; and reviews the literature linking income inequality to subjective well-being and that 
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linking government welfare effort to subjective well-being. The paper finds that the relationship 
between income inequality and subjective well-being is determined by how inequality is defined 
and what it signals. Similarly, the relationship between government welfare effort and subjective 
well-being is determined by factors such as ideology, quality of governance, and the magnitude 
of social assistance “stigma.”  
 
1.2 Subjective Well-Being Metrics  
 
1.2.1 Relevance of Subjective Well-being Metrics 
 
Is “happiness” or “life satisfaction” a good measure of human welfare? And are there any 
benefits to using subjective well-being metrics in the development and evaluation of economic 
and social policy? While psychologists have used subjective well-being surveys to study 
happiness for a long time, economists have only recently ventured into this arena (Graham, 
2005b). Early economists and philosophers such as Aristotle, Bentham, Mill, and Smith 
incorporated the concept of happiness and their distinct definitions of it in their work. Yet, over 
time, the field of economics grew more rigorous and quantitative, leading to a focus on income 
as the primary measure of “utility” (Graham, 2005b; Graham, 2009).  
Income and gross national product (GNP) continue to be the most widely used welfare 
indicators. However, scholars and practitioners have come to agree that human welfare is a 
multi-dimensional concept that cannot be understood through the lens of income alone. Amartya 
Sen (1999), for example, promotes a development and welfare approach that is focused on the 
expansion of human freedoms. This theory, also referred to as the “capability approach,” 
promotes the idea that development is not solely about economic growth but encompasses social 
3 
 
opportunities as well. It is argued that education, health, equality, and political freedoms are 
equally important measures of welfare and development. The capability approach has inspired 
the development of such measures as the Human Development Index, an indicator that is used 
widely to evaluate development progress.   
There are others who, like Amartya Sen, oppose the one-dimensional view of human 
welfare. Some suggest that human rights, including security rights, due process rights, liberty 
rights, political rights, equality rights, social rights, and group rights, are integral to well-being 
(Nickel, 2003; Uvin, 2004). As an example, a person imprisoned for expressing his/her opinion 
in a rich authoritarian country is not necessarily better off than a person who is free to think, 
speak, and vote in a poor democratic country. Or a country that enjoys a high level of 
GDP/capita but deprives women of equal rights and persecutes minorities is not necessarily a 
better model for development than a poor country that respects the equal rights of women and 
minorities. 
In a similar fashion, the subjective well-being approach complements other views of 
development and human welfare. It is argued that happiness is appreciated as a social value 
across the world (Veenhoven, 1984; Ott, 2010; Oswald & Wu, 2010), even though the degree to 
which it is valued or viewed as an end goal may differ across cultures. Subjective well-being 
surveys enable individuals to directly express their level of well-being rather than being placed in 
different welfare categories based on their performance on objective indicators. As a result, it is 
possible to measure directly the welfare output rather than focus on inputs that are presumed to 
improve welfare such as economic growth, education, and democracy (Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 
1995; Flavin et al., 2011).  
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There are many benefits in incorporating subjective well-being metrics in the 
development and assessment of policy. Research shows that subjective well-being is linked to 
actual and/or perceived capabilities (Graham & Nikolova, 2015) and that it has positive effects 
on other welfare dimensions such as health, productivity, constructive behavior, and social 
capital (Veenhoven, 2008; Guven, 2011; Ott, 2010). Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
there is no conflict between happiness and alternative values such as personal autonomy, justice, 
solidarity, and freedom (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Layard, 2005; Duncan, 2010; Ott, 2010). 
Therefore, subjective well-being metrics are unlikely to conflict with other welfare metrics.   
Incorporating subjective well-being metrics in economic policy research helps to move 
away from the assumption that individuals always act in rational ways and that individual 
preferences can be determined solely through revealed preferences in the form of choice and 
behavior (Graham, 2009). Relying on revealed preferences alone limits the type and amount of 
information that can be gathered and analyzed. For example, individuals do not always have the 
capability to make optimal choices or take desired actions (Sen, 1999). An individual may prefer 
X to Y but choose Y because of certain constraints. Furthermore, individuals are not always able 
to reveal their preferences about policies or institutional arrangements that they are powerless to 
change (Graham, 2009). For example, how can a poor peasant in a developing country, who is 
made unhappy by inequality, reveal his or her preference short of emigrating or protesting 
(Graham, 2010)?  There are also instances, such as with addictive behavior, where choice is not 
the best indicator of utility (Graham, 2009). And choices and behaviors are often influenced by 





1.2.2 Feasibility of Using Subjective Well-being Metrics 
 
While it is evident that subjective well-being is relevant to policy, one may wonder about 
the validity and reliability of the metrics and the practicality of using them in policy research. On 
the one hand, subjective well-being questions are easy to understand (thereby resulting in high 
response rates), easy to measure, and consist of only one or a few survey questions that don’t 
require extensive follow up questions (Clark & Senik, 2011).   
On the other hand, and not unlike other metrics, subjective well-being metrics come with 
certain validity and reliability concerns. One concern is that individuals may not be able or 
willing to provide an answer that represents their actual well-being. To elaborate, individuals 
may not have an opinion, be unable to assess their level of well-being, interpret the question 
differently, answer according to what society expects of someone of their socioeconomic 
background, and/or be influenced by social desirability. Interestingly, researchers who have 
investigated these concerns have found little empirical evidence to support them (Veenhoven, 
1997; Clark & Senik, 2011; Kacapyr, 2008). It appears that individuals are very good at 
reporting their own level of happiness and that this level is predicted well by those around them 
(Watson & Clark, 1991; Sandvik et al., 1993; Lepper, 1998; Clark & Senik, 2011; Layard, 2010).  
Furthermore, social desirability effects are small (Veenhoven, 1997). And individual behavior as 
well as physical and neurological measures such as the amount of smiling, health status, and 
brain activity are consistently correlated to self-reported well-being (Layard, 2010; Ekman et al., 
1990). Also, reported well-being and objective measures such as marital and employment status 
have the type of relationship that would be expected (Clark & Senik, 2011; Layard, 2010; Di 
Tella et al., 2003).  
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A second concern is that contextual factors as well as the ordering of survey questions 
can seriously affect subjective well-being question responses. While these are common survey 
methodology concerns, they are particularly serious for subjective well-being questions. For 
example, subjective well-being question responses are very sensitive to the mode of the 
interview. Similarly, they are sensitive to the questions asked before the subjective well-being 
questions. Research shows that the use of “buffer questions” and other careful survey design 
methods can significantly minimize these issues (National Research Council, 2013).  Further 
research on these effects and how to mitigate them is important if subjective well-being is to be 
integrated more extensively in policy research. 
A third concern is whether individual answers can be compared across countries. The 
objection is rooted in the view that culture, language, and religion influence the understanding of 
the concept of happiness. For example, individuals are more likely to overstate their happiness in 
cultures where happiness is valued highly and less likely to report being “very happy” in cultures 
where modesty is important. This is a valid concern and there is a need for greater examination 
of the role of culture in influencing reported well-being (National Research Council, 2013). It is 
important to note, however, that individuals across countries and cultures appear to be fairly 
good at predicting each other’s level of happiness. Moreover, data across countries and over time 
find consistent patterns in terms of the determinants of happiness (Graham, 2009; Layard, 2010; 
Graafland & Compen, 2012). For example, age, health status, marital status, employment status, 
and income are consistently found to be predictive of subjective well-being across the world 
(Graham, 2009, p. 48).  While the role of culture in explaining some of the cross-country 
variation in reported well-being cannot be negated, social and economic factors may explain an 
even larger part of this variation (Kacapyr, 2008).  
7 
 
Another concern about using self-reported well-being in policy research relates to the 
effects of adaptation. For example, people who live under very harsh conditions may adopt a 
survival strategy whereby they learn to take pleasure in very small things and suppress negative 
feelings (Graham, 2009, p. 221; Sen, 1999, p. 62-63). Therefore, they may report a happier state 
than individuals who live under much better conditions (Graham, 2009, p. 221). This makes it 
challenging to determine how contextual factors affect subjective well-being. Research shows 
that adaptation may be a greater issue for certain dimensions of subjective well-being than 
others. For example, in Afghanistan, individuals report high levels of experienced happiness 
while they are aware that life could be much better, and hence, score lower on evaluative 
happiness (Graham, 2009). 
A final concern is rooted in the “set point” of happiness theory, the idea that an 
individual’s happiness is fixed around a certain point (as determined by his/her personality) and 
remains stable through life. Albuquerque et al. (2012) note that neuroticism, extraversion, and 
conscientiousness explain a large portion of the variance in positive affect, negative affect, and 
life satisfaction. If this is accurate, then there is a serious risk that personal characteristics, rather 
than external circumstances, would drive subjective well-being research results, and 
consequently, policy (Graham, 2009). Some researchers have examined this issue and found that 
reported well-being is in fact sensitive to changing life circumstances, even though it tends to be 
fairly stable (Veenhoven, 1997; Diener et al. 1999; Diener et al., 2003; Frey & Stutzer, 2002). 
For example, changes in income or employment status are found to affect subjective well-being. 
So, while personality is important to subjective well-being, contextual factors are not irrelevant.  
As discussed above, happiness is a complex concept. And similar to other welfare 
measures, the use of subjective well-being metrics in policy analysis requires attention to some 
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methodological issues. Noteworthy, however, many concerns regarding the validity and 
reliability of subjective well-being metrics are not supported by empirical evidence. And some of 
the remaining issues can be minimized through better survey design and further research.  
It is important to underline the usefulness of subjective well-being metrics as inputs to 
inform policy design and analysis rather than as goals for policy and government efforts 
(Graham, 2009, p.227). Subjective well-being metrics are increasingly used in policy analysis. 
For example, the UK has incorporated subjective well-being in its national statistics efforts 
(Graham & Nikolova, 2015), Bhutan uses national happiness product (GHP) as one of the 
measures of progress, and the OECD has issued “best practice guidelines” for statistics offices 
around the world interested in incorporating reported well-being indicators (Graham, in press). 
Having discussed the relevance and feasibility of using subjective well-being metrics in 
policy design and evaluation, I proceed to define the concepts that are important to my research.  
I explain in greater detail the concepts of subjective well-being, income inequality, and 
government welfare effort.  
 
1.3 Definition of Concepts 
 
1.3.1 Subjective Well-Being 
 
Subjective well-being consists of several distinct, albeit interrelated, dimensions.  The 
dimensions can be broadly classified as the evaluative, hedonic, and eudaimonic (Graham, 2011; 
Graham & Nikolova, 2015).  The evaluative approach to well-being, which is close to the 
"Aristotelian" concept of welfare, is focused on how people evaluate or feel about their lives as a 
whole or with different life domains such as health and work (Graham, 2011). The survey 
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questions used to measure evaluated happiness include those on "life satisfaction” as well as the 
"ladder-of life" questions where respondents are asked to compare their lives to the best possible 
life that they can imagine (Graham, 2011).   
The hedonic approach is focused on the affective or emotional angle of well-being 
(Graham, 2009). Closer to Bentham's definition of well-being as pleasure and absence of pain, 
this approach focuses on experienced happiness, that is, individuals’ emotional state and their 
day-to-day positive and negative experiences. The survey questions that measure this include 
those that ask about experiencing joy, stress, worry, smiling, and so forth.  
Noteworthy is the fact that individuals tend to distinguish between evaluative and 
hedonic happiness. For example, a very destitute person may report experiencing positive 
emotions while simultaneously reporting low satisfaction with life (Helliwell et al., 2013, as 
cited in Graham & Nikolova, 2015). In other words, while adaptation and coping mechanisms 
may enable day-to-day experienced happiness, individuals are still aware that life could be much 
better. This distinction is important from a public policy perspective as it helps policy makers to 
design the right policies for poverty and deprivation (Graham & Nikolova, 2015). Research finds 
that caregiving, social ties, and respect better predict hedonic well-being (or its absence) while 
income, education, and employment are more important for evaluative well-being (Graham & 
Nikolova, 2015). 
A third concept is Eudaimonic well-being.  Eudaimonic well-being focuses on 
individuals’ perception of meaning and purpose in life. This approach, which is possibly the 
most relevant from a development perspective, captures the realization of human potential or 
having the means and freedom to fulfill one’s life purpose or purposes (Graham & Nikolova, 
2015). It is best captured in evaluative questions but can also be reflected in hedonic constructs.  
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While there is overall consensus about the measurement, reliability, and validity of hedonic and 
evaluative well-being, the conceptual framework for eudaimonic well-being is not as well-
established (OECD, 2013, as cited in Graham & Nikolova, 2015).  
  
1.3.2 Income Inequality 
 
Income inequality is defined and measured in different ways. Researchers use objective 
measures at the macro and micro levels as well as subjective (perception-based) measures at both 
levels. At the macro level, objective indicators such as the Gini index and the proportion of 
income held by different income deciles/quintiles are used to assess the overall income 
distribution in society. At the micro level, an individual’s income is compared to the average of 
his/her reference group to determine inequality in terms of the distance from this average. The 
reference group may be based on geographic location, age, education level, and so forth. In 
addition to the objective inequality indicators, there are subjective measures of inequality, which 
are based on perceived inequality or perceived income mobility.    
A few additional points about how income inequality is defined and measured are worth 
highlighting. First, there is an important distinction between relative and absolute income 
inequality. A measure of relative differences focuses on the proportional shares of the income 
distribution held by different groups. Absolute differences, on the other hand, account for income 
differences between cohorts in absolute terms. For example, if the incomes of two individuals, 
one rich and one poor, is doubled, their relative income shares remain constant while the 
absolute income difference between them increases (Graham, in press). 
Another important distinction is between a stagnant and a changing income distribution. 
Metrics such as the Gini index provide a snapshot or “one point in time” view of inequality. 
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They do not provide any information about opportunity and mobility (Graham, in press). The 
well-being effects of static income inequality are likely to differ from the welfare effects of a 
changing income distribution (Graham, in press). 
Finally, there is a distinction between comparative and normative inequality. The 
comparative view reflects self-interest while the normative view reflects ethical principles such 
as fairness and justice. Hence, from a comparative view, an individual evaluates income 
inequality based on his/her position relative to others. In the normative view, on the other hand, 
an individual evaluates income inequality independently of where he/she is in the income 
distribution, for example, behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” (Clark & D’Ambrosio, 2015; 
Rawls, 1971).  
 
1.3.3 Government Welfare Effort  
 
Different measures are used to determine the size and quality of the “welfare state” or 
government welfare efforts. The predominant method is through public finance data. In a broad 
definition of government welfare effort, researchers observe the rate of progressive taxation or 
the size of social expenditures, a category that encompasses spending on education, health, 
housing, and social protection. In a narrow definition, they focus on public expenditures on 
social protection which consists of social insurance (benefits related to old age, disability, 
unemployment, work-related injury, sickness, survivor, and maternity), social assistance (cash 
and in-kind transfers), and social services (such as health clinics).    
Beyond expenditures, researchers have examined aspects that could be broadly defined as 
the quality of the welfare state or government welfare efforts. These include legal provisions 
regarding welfare services as well as the accessibility and generosity of benefits. For example, 
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Estes's Welfare Index (Estes, 1984) uses the adoption year of the first welfare laws as an 
indication of the level of welfare state development in a country. Similarly, Esping-Andersen's 
Decommodification Score (Esping-Andersen, 1990) reflects rules governing access and 
eligibility, income replacement levels, and the range of protections against social risks. And 
building on Esping-Andersen’s Decommodification Score, Scrugg’s Benefit Generosity Index 
(Scruggs & Allan, 2006) measures the scope and generosity of social insurance programs. 
Occasionally, researchers use the ideological leaning, left- or right-wing, of the government as a 
measure of the size/quality of the government’s welfare efforts.  
In addition to the objective measures above, there are also subjective measures of 
government welfare effort. These are based on perceptions about the provision and quality of 
public goods. Having clarified the concepts that are relevant to my research, I proceed to 
reviewing the literature and highlighting research gaps.  
 
1.4 Income Inequality and Subjective Well-being: Literature Review 
 
There is an extensive literature on the effects of income inequality on a variety of 
development objectives such as income growth, health outcomes, education outcomes, good 
governance, and social cohesion. An interesting question is whether income equality is as 
relevant to subjective well-being as it is to objective well-being. Intuitively, there are a few 
reasons why income inequality could affect subjective well-being. The first is that individuals 
may be innately opposed to systems that are unequal because it is viewed as an injustice. Or they 
may dislike inequality because it is viewed as a social harm (Alesina et al., 2004). Another 
reason is rooted in self-interest; a person may be affected positively or negatively by inequality 
depending on where he/she finds himself in the socioeconomic ladder. As expressed by Karl 
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Marx, “a house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it 
satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace rises beside the little house, the little 
house shrinks into a hut” (as quoted in Easterlin, 1974).   
There are other reasons why income inequality may be relevant to subjective well-being. 
One reason relates to the distribution of power; income inequality may strengthen the power of 
the rich and provide them with the means to control the lives of others (Scanlon, 2014). 
Similarly, income inequality may undermine democratic political processes (Scanlon, 2014). The 
issue of campaign finance in the United States is a good example. In addition, while individuals 
are mostly averse to inequality of opportunity rather than inequality of outcome, by default, 
inequality of outcome reinforces a cycle that undermines equality of opportunity. To illustrate, 
an individual who starts off with few assets is less likely to obtain financing from a bank versus a 
person who already has many assets (Scanlon, 2014). Finally, income inequality may result in 
increased frustration, crime, and violence, all of which have adverse consequences for happiness 
(Senik, 2009a).  The above are some of the intuitive reasons why income inequality may be 
predictive of subjective well-being. But are they supported by empirical evidence?  
 
1.4.1 Empirical Evidence and Discussion 
 
There is a growing literature on the link between income inequality and subjective well-
being. When examining income distribution as a whole, whether this is at the national or sub-
national levels, researchers have not been able to find any consistent patterns in terms of its 
relationship with subjective well-being. Cross-country studies as well as cross-region within-
country studies find that the association between income inequality and subjective well-being 
can be negative (Morawetz et al., 1977; Hagerty, 2000; O'Connell, 2004; Haller & Hadler, 2006; 
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Verme, 2007; Sanfey & Teksos, 2007; Jiang et al., 2008; Oshio & Kobayashi 2009a, 2009b,  
2010, 2011; Hanssen, 2011; Verme, 2011; Oishi et al., 2011; Muffels et al. 2012; Wu et al. 2013; 
Hajdu & Hajdu, 2013; Easterlin et al., 2013), positive (Tomes, 1986; Clark, 2003; Ohtake & 
Tomikoa, 2004; Berg & Veenhoven, 2010; Jiang et al., 2012; Rozer & Kraaykamp, 2013), or not 
significant at all (Verme, 2007; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008; Bjornskov et al., 2008b; Knutsen, 
2011; Kim, 2011; Rodriguez-Pose & Maslauskaite, 2012; Zagorski et al., 2014). 
This empirical inconsistency points to the fact that there may be specific channels 
through which income inequality is related to subjective well-being. With over one hundred 
studies on the topic, most studies fall under one of four categories of channels through which 
income inequality influences subjective well-being: belief system/ideology; social 
comparisons/relative income; signals; and adaptation. Each of these is explained in greater detail 
below.  
The first channel through which income inequality is allegedly related to subjective well-
being is Belief System/Ideology. This idea is straightforward. How an individual identifies human 
progress and values concepts such as solidarity, fairness, equality of opportunity, equality of 
outcome, freedom, and independence influences how he/she feels about income inequality 
(Biancotti & D’Alessio, 2008; Georgellis et al., 2009; Hajdu & Hajdu, 2013; Rozer & 
Kraykaamp, 2013). Applied to politics, the effect of income inequality on well-being is 
influenced by a person’s party affiliation or his/her position on the political spectrum (Alesina et 
al., 2004; Jiang et al. 2008; Verme, 2007; Oshio & Kobayashi, 2009a, 2009b). For example, in a 
study of Europe and the United States, Alesina et al. (2004) found that the only individuals 
unhappy about income inequality were those who placed themselves “left” on the political 
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spectrum. Of course, these liberal/conservative or left/right categories are neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive. 
Similar to ideology, religiosity is likely to affect the level of inequality aversion. More 
specifically, religion may moderate the adverse effects of income inequality (Joshanloo & 
Weijers, 2016); those with strong religious beliefs may find income inequality less stressful or 
depressing because of the belief that God will either correct this problem or has permitted it for 
an important reason. Alternatively, religiosity may strengthen the desire for justice and economic 
equality. Since both political/egalitarian ideology and religious beliefs influence the level of 
inequality aversion, it follows that, on an aggregate level, the cross-country variation in 
inequality aversion is partly explained by the “collective” level of egalitarianism or religiosity. 
For example, Europeans may prefer more equal societies than Americans, and hence, inequality 
may be a greater part of their “utility function” than that of Americans (Alesina et al., 2004).   
A second channel through which income inequality influences subjective well-being is 
broadly defined as “social comparisons” or “relative income.” This category requires special 
attention as it occupies a very large segment in the literature.  In 1974, Richard Easterlin 
published a study that gave rise to what has come to be known as the “Easterlin Paradox.” In this 
study, Easterlin concluded that there are no substantial differences between poor and rich 
countries in terms of the level of happiness. But within countries, those with higher incomes tend 
to be happier than those with lower incomes (Easterlin, 1974). This finding was in line with the 
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and the relative income hypothesis (Duesenberry, 
1949), two theories that stress the importance of comparisons and relative standings as a basis for 
self-evaluation and consumption/saving behavior. Applied to subjective well-being and income 
inequality, these theories suggest that the effect of income inequality on an individual’s 
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happiness is determined by his/her position in relation to the average income of his/her reference 
group.  
Many cross-country studies find support for the social comparison/relative income theory 
(Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Caporale et al., 2009; Ball & Chernova, 2008; Böhnke & Kohler, 2010; 
Georgellis et al., 2009; Barrington-Leigh, 2010; Graham & Pettinato, 1999; Graham & Felton, 
2005, 2006). Similar evidence has been found in country studies in various parts of the world 
such as in North America and Europe (Hagerty, 2000; McBride, 2001; Blanchflower & Oswald, 
2004; Luttmer, 2005; Dynan & Ravina, 2007; Layard et al., 2009; Clark & Oswald, 1996; Clark, 
2003; Brown et al., 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Stutzer, 2004), in Latin America (Gori-Maia, 
2013; Graham & Pettinato, 2002; Castilla, 2012; Stark & Taylor, 1991; Kuegler, 2009), and in 
Asia  (Tao & Chiu, 2009; Oshio et al., 2011; Smyth & Qian, 2008; Mishra et al., 2010; Appleton 
& Song, 2008; Gao & Smyth, 2010; Cojocaru, 2012; Carlsson et al., 2009; Brockmann et al., 
2009; Easterlin et al., 2013).  
Income comparisons may result in very different aggregate happiness levels across 
countries. For example, a low average happiness level may be indicative of a society where most 
individuals are worse off than the average income. Similarly, the same level of economic growth 
across countries may result in different levels of average happiness depending on whether the 
growth is pro-poor, pro-middle class, or pro-rich (Brockmann et al., 2009; Baggio & Papyrakis, 
2014).  
One interesting question is whether comparisons with people who are higher (lower) on 
the income ladder always have negative (positive) effects. This moves us to a discussion of the 
third channel, signaling effects, that mediates the link between income inequality and subjective 
well-being. This is the channel through which income inequality perhaps has the most direct 
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effects on individual welfare (Graham, in press).  It is based on what income inequality signals to 
individuals, that is, the prospect of getting ahead or an inherently unfair system. A theory 
prevalent in the literature is that of Hirschman’s “tunnel” effect (Hirschman, 1973). The “tunnel” 
metaphor is that if a car is stuck in a traffic jam in a tunnel, and the other lane of cars start to 
move forward, this movement may be interpreted as a positive signal about the stationary car’s 
own progress in the near future. Therefore, in contrast to social comparisons/relative income, 
which views “others as negatives,” this theory is centered on “others as positives” (Luttmer, 
2005; Senik, 2009a).  Studies on China, Eastern Europe, Russia, Great Britain, and others, find 
evidence of the tunnel effect (Clark, 2003; Senik, 2004; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010; Caporale et 
al., 2009). Noteworthy, the tunnel effect is quite common in transition countries, at least in the 
beginning of the transition (Grosfeld & Senik, 2008).   
While the tunnel effect indicates positive perceptions of income mobility, the opposite 
scenario is when individuals do not believe there are any prospects for upward mobility. To 
them, existing and increasing inequalities signal injustice. A well-cited research paper by Alesina 
et al. (2004), contrasting Europe and the United States, showed that income inequality had a 
large and negative effect on happiness in Europe while this was not the case in the United States. 
The reason cited was that Americans believed they lived in a mobile society where individual 
effort determined movement along the income ladder while Europeans believed there was little 
prospect for mobility. This research has been followed by a number of cross-country and within-
country studies which confirm that perceived fairness of the income generation process 
significantly affects the income inequality-subjective well-being relationship (Graham & Felton, 
2005, 2006; Bjornskov et al. 2009; Grosfeld & Senik, 2008; Oishi et al., 2011; Schneider, 2012; 
Bjornskov et al., 2013). 
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The final channel through which income inequality is related to subjective well-being can 
be broadly defined as Adaptation. A few concepts are relevant to this debate. The first is the 
concept of “hedonic treadmill” which is the idea that individuals adapt to changes in their lives 
relatively quickly and that their aspirations adjust to the new conditions (Easterlin, 1995; 
O’Connell, 2004; Stutzer, 2004). For example, as a person’s income increases, the material 
norms on which he/she judges his/her level of well-being rise as well (Easterlin, 1995). Another 
concept is that of the “happy peasants and frustrated achievers” paradox (Graham, 2011). This is 
the idea that individuals with low income/wealth and limited opportunity, the “happy peasants,” 
have lowered their expectations and adapted to their difficult conditions so that the conditions 
cease to affect their happiness. The “frustrated achievers” (and/or millionaires), on the other 
hand, are miserable because of high expectations and aspirations. In contrast to the hedonic 
treadmill, where happiness remains constant as aspirations rise with higher income, the 
“frustrated achievers” actually experience lower happiness due to rising expectations and 
aspirations (Graham, 2011; Stutzer, 2004; Brockmann et al., 2009). 
Adaptation mechanisms can shape the relationship between income inequality and 
subjective well-being in different ways. As people move up and down the socioeconomic ladder, 
their expectations may simply adjust to the new circumstances, and thereby, leave their level of 
happiness unchanged. It follows that income inequality or changes in inequality would not have 
any significant long-term effects on subjective well-being. A few studies support this reasoning. 
For example, a study on China showed that increased income inequality during the reform era 
initially depressed self-reported well-being but its effect diminished over time, possibly because 
people adapted to the rising inequality and became less affected by it (Tang, 2014).  It is also 
plausible that adaptation mechanisms could result in higher or lower inequality aversion. As an 
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example, if the incomes of the poor increase, thereby lowering income inequality, overall 
happiness may decline as the “happy peasants” have now become “frustrated achievers.” 
Alternatively, the “frustrated achievers” that experience a significant loss of income may adapt to 
the new circumstances and become “happy peasants.”    
While research has focused predominantly on the aforementioned four channels through 
which income inequality is related to subjective well-being, that is, belief system and ideology, 
social comparisons/relative income, signals, and adaptation, the literature highlights many other 
considerations. These include the extent of income inequality (Beja, 2011), the visibility of 
inequality (Nishi et al., 2015), and the prominence of income in the happiness function, that is 
the “economic gradient of well-being” (Barrington-Leigh, 2010). 
  
1.4.2 Income Inequality and “Happiness Inequality” 
 
So far, the discussion has focused on the relationship between income inequality and 
subjective well-being at the individual and aggregate national levels. Policy-makers also benefit 
from knowing the effect of income inequality on the distribution of happiness/life satisfaction in 
countries. This information is not only important for the purposes of justice but also because of 
its implications for stability and peace within communities. Two societies with the same level of 
average happiness may have very different distributions in happiness. For example, in one 
society individuals may be equally happy, while in another, some may be extremely happy while 
others are extremely unhappy.   
Since factors such as egalitarian/political ideology and relative income influence the level 
of inequality aversion, income inequality is likely to create “winners” and “losers” in terms of 
subjective well-being. Hence, it is plausible that income inequality and happiness inequality are 
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related and move in the same direction. In fact, many studies find that countries that have a more 
unequal distribution of income also have a more unequal distribution of happiness. And as 
income inequality increases over time, happiness inequality is likely to follow suit (Veenhoven, 
1990; Rousseau, 2009; Delhey & Kohler, 2011; Lam & Liu, 2014; Easterlin et al., 2013). One 
study attempts to quantify this relationship and concludes that for every one-unit increase in 
income inequality, there is a half-a-unit increase in happiness inequality (Gandelman & 
Porzecanski, 2013).   
Certain individual-level characteristics appear to be relevant for predicting income 
inequality effects. As the relative income theory would predict, the effect of income inequality 
on happiness varies by income group with the poor being adversely affected (Alesina et al., 
2004; Oshio & Koyabashi, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Hajdu & Hajdu, 2013; Easterlin et al., 2013; 
Lam & Liu, 2014; Graham & Felton, 2005; Oishi et al., 2011). Furthermore, the subjective well-
being effect of income inequality differs by education level (Lam & Liu, 2014; Oshio & 
Koyabashi, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), gender (Oshio & Koyabashi, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), age (Oshio 
& Koyabashi, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), employment status (Oshio & Koyabashi, 2009a, 2009b, 
2010), and region of residence or immigration status (Jiang et al., 2008).  
Having discussed the income inequality-subjective well-being literature, I now move to 
discuss the literature linking government welfare effort to subjective well-being. 
 
1.5 Government Welfare Effort and Subjective Well-being: Literature 
Review 
 
 Scholars have long debated the role of government in the economy and whether large 
government is conducive or detrimental to well-being and to desired social and economic goals.  
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An important component of this debate is focused on the objectives and behaviors of politicians 
and decision-makers. A few theories dominate the debate. On the one hand is the welfare 
economics perspective, which views the role of government in a positive way; the government 
responds to market failures and is a provider of public goods and a regulator of externalities and 
monopolies (Pigou, 1920; Baumol, 1952; Bator, 1958; Samuelson, 1954; Besley & Coate, 2003). 
This view assumes a “benevolent” social planner who seeks to maximize the social welfare 
function, that is, the well-being of everyone (Hessami, 2010). The welfare economics view is 
challenged by public choice theory, an approach that is centered on government, rather than 
market, failure. One of the main ideas of public choice theory is that politicians and bureaucrats 
act according to personal interest and expand budgets beyond their optimal levels because of the 
power and prestige it gives them with the electorate. Furthermore, they make budget decisions in 
accordance with special interest group agendas even when this is to the detriment of overall 
efficiency and well-being. (Buchanan, 1962; Niskanen, 1971; Mueller, 2003; Bjornskov et al., 
2007; Hessami, 2010; Perovic & Golem, 2010).  
Going beyond the role of government in general, there are also differing viewpoints about 
the “welfare state” and whether its policies are conducive to well-being. By definition, the 
welfare state is a system in which government takes responsibility for the well-being of citizens 
by ensuring that they are provided with public goods to fulfill basic needs. The positive view of 
the welfare state holds that such a system protects individuals from market failures and protects 
against economic uncertainty and income fluctuations. Furthermore, it promotes income 
equality, reduces poverty, improves health and education outcomes, and creates social solidarity 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Schram, 1991; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Kenworthy, 1999; Kenworthy & 
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Pontusson 2005; Rivera, 2001; Gupta et al., 2002; Haller & Hadler, 2006; Di Tella & 
McCollough, 2008; Pacek & Radcliff, 2008b; Graham, 2011).   
The negative view of the welfare state, on the other hand, holds that government 
protection throughout life appears to be comfortable but is not very conducive to well-being and 
agency. The argument is that such a system creates a culture of dependency on the state, which 
challenges individuals’ sense of autonomy, purpose, self-worth, creativity, and accomplishment. 
Furthermore, it unintentionally creates new inequality by reinforcing the discrimination and 
stigmatization of already excluded groups and by keeping them in “poverty traps.” Other adverse 
effects include increased budget deficits (as large bureaucratic institutions provide the wrong 
services in larger quantities than is desired), slower economic growth and competitiveness (as 
public employment is favored at the expense of an efficient private sector), and the weakening of 
inter-personal support within communities (as civil society is crowded out and families and the 
church undermined) (Murray, 1984; Gilder, 1993; Kalil & Danziger, 2000; Saunders, 2000; 
Veenhoven, 1992; Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 1995).  
 In addition to the above theories and viewpoints about why government welfare efforts 
and public expenditures may be conducive or harmful to subjective well-being, a few standard 
assumptions in economics shed further light on the debate. A basic assumption in economics is 
that income increases utility because it translates into potential for consumption. Applying this to 
public finance and subjective well-being, economic theory predicts that, holding all else 
constant, taxes and fees levied on individuals decreases their income, and hence utility, while 
increased public spending increases utility (Wassmer et al., 2009). Based on this logic, 
increasing the income of the poor (through increased public spending) without making any 
changes to the income of the rich (by keeping taxes constant and not spending any less on this 
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group) improves overall happiness. However, the redistribution of income may have both 
positive and negative effects as it increases the consumption power of some at the expense of 
others. In this case, the government simply “redistributes” happiness while the aggregate 
happiness level remains unchanged. Another concept in economics, the concept of “marginal 
utility of income,” is equally important in understanding how government tax and expenditure 
policies may influence overall happiness. Assuming that the marginal utility of income decreases 
as income goes up, a one-unit increase in the income of a poor person combined with an equal 
one-unit decrease in the income of a rich person leads to an improvement in overall happiness.  
 As discussed above, there are many ideas about why public expenditures and government 
welfare efforts may affect subjective well-being in the same way that they affect objective well-
being. I review the literature to see whether these theories are supported by empirical evidence.  
 
1.5.1 Empirical Evidence and Discussion 
 
In contrast to income inequality, there has been much less research on the relations of 
subjective well-being with public expenditures/government welfare effort. Starting with public 
expenditures as a whole (which includes all government expenditures including defense 
expenditures), the empirical evidence is inconclusive; the relationship between overall 
government expenditure and subjective well-being has been found to be positive (Ram, 2009; 
Flavin et al., 2011; Xie et al., 2012), negative (Bjornskov et al., 2007; Bjornskov et al., 2008b; 
Rodriguez-Pose & Maslauskaite, 2012), inversely U-shaped (Hessami, 2010; Perovic & Golem, 
2010), or non-existent (Di Tella et al., 2003; Graafland & Compen, 2012; Wassmer et al. 2009; 
Oishi et al., 2012).   
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 The empirical findings are also inconclusive when looking specifically at government 
welfare effort or public social expenditures. A large number of cross-country as well as country 
studies find a positive link between subjective well-being and government welfare effort whether 
this is measured through progressive taxation, public spending on education, health, and social 
protection, or through qualitative features of welfare programs (Radcliff, 2001; Pacek & 
Radcliff, 2008a, 2008b; Haller & Hadler, 2006; Flavin et al., 2011; Di Tella et al., 2003; Di Tella 
& McCollough, 2008; Hajdu & Hajdu, 2013; Oishi et al., 2012; Switek, 2012; Rodriquez-Pose & 
Maslauskaite, 2012; Kotakorpi & Laamanen, 2010; Alvarez-Diaz et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2012; 
Easterlin, 2013; Easterlin et al., 2013).  On the other hand, a notable number of cross-country 
and country studies are not able to identify any significant relationship between the two 
(Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 1995; Veenhoven, 2000; Bjornskov et al., 2007; Ouweneel, 2002; 
Schwarpe & Harpfer, 2007; Wong et al., 2006; Ono & Lee, 2013) and a few even find a negative 
one (Swenson, 2015; Chung & Bemak, 1996; Chindarkar, 2012).   
As evidenced by the literature, there are no consistent patterns in terms of how overall 
public expenditures and government welfare effort are related to subjective well-being. 
Seemingly, various factors mediate the relationship. A few, including egalitarian/political 
ideology, the quality of governance, and stigma, stand out. Each of these is explained in greater 
detail below.  
The strength of egalitarian ideology as well as viewpoints about whether government 
plays a conducive or harmful role for development and human welfare shapes the relationship 
between public (social) expenditures and subjective well-being. In a study of the United States, 
Wassmer et al. (2009) find that liberals and conservatives are affected differently by public 
expenditures; liberals are affected positively while moderates and conservatives are not affected.  
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Similarly, in Europe, the main “happiness beneficiaries” of income redistribution and large 
public sectors are “left-wing” voters (Hessami, 2010; Hajdu & Hajdu, 2013). In Finland, 
specifically, Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2010) find that the life satisfaction effect of publicly 
provided health care is positive for “left-wing” voters while it is not significant for “right-wing” 
voters.  
 Another factor that mediates the association between public expenditures/government 
welfare efforts and subjective well-being is the quality of governance. The quality with which 
the government works is very influential in determining whether large government enhances or 
hurts subjective well-being (Ott, 2010; Rothstein, 2010a). For example, Hessami (2010) finds 
that government size has a more positive effect on subjective well-being when corruption is low. 
Similarly, Oishi et al. (2012) find that the positive association between progressive taxation and 
life satisfaction is mediated by citizen satisfaction with public goods such as education and 
public transportation. And Bjornskov et al. (2007) conclude that the adverse effect of 
government consumption on life satisfaction weakens for some groups when the government is 
perceived to be effective.  
Finally, “stigma” is an important concept in the literature, particularly that linking social 
assistance and subjective well-being. This concept rests on the idea that the bureaucratic 
processes involved in the application process for welfare are not user-friendly and result in 
“stigma” or feelings of shame for applicants or recipients (Chindarkar, 2012; Swenson, 2015; 
Graham & Swenson, 2015). It is further argued that government assistance may result in a 
feeling of “disempowerment” where – given that the recipient is the “passive recipient” of a 
state’s development scheme – the recipient’s sense of autonomy, self-worth, and 
accomplishment is undermined, all of which have adverse consequences for happiness.  A 
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number of country studies find evidence of this social assistance stigma. For example, Swenson 
(2015) finds that receiving public transfers in the United States is associated negatively with 
subjective well-being. Similarly, Chung and Bemak (1996) conclude that, among Southeast 
Asian refugees in the Unites States, those that have been “touched by welfare” at any point in 
their lives are at risk of developing psychological stress (although this finding does not hold for 
all refugee groups). And in Peru, Chindarkar (2012) finds that receiving social transfers is 
associated negatively with subjective economic well-being. It is important to note that stigma 
effects are likely to differ by income level. For example, for a person who lives in extreme 
poverty, the welfare stigma effect may be non-existent or very small (Chindarkar, 2012; 
Swenson, 2015). 
The concept of stigma is in line with the procedural utility hypothesis outlined by Frey et 
al. (2004). This hypothesis underlines the importance of procedures that lead to certain outcomes 
rather than the outcomes per se. Applied to the context of social protection spending, individuals 
do not only care about additions to their income but they also value the procedures that lead to 
the additional income.  
There are many other considerations in the literature linking public expenditures and 
government welfare effort to subjective well-being. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
them in detail but a short summary is useful. For example, the effect of public expenditures may 
be influenced by the level of government at which public expenditures are carried out, that is 
national or sub-national (Bjornskov et al., 2008a; Hessami, 2010; Diaz-Serrano & Rodriguez-
Pose, 2012; Gao et al., 2014), or by the sector of spending (Switek, 2012; Kiya, 2013; Xie et al., 
2012; Rodriguez-Pose & Maslauskaite, 2012). Interestingly, the nature of welfare efforts, that is, 
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whether they are universal or targeted in nature (Rothstein 2010a), may also influence their 
effect on subjective well-being.  
 
1.5.2 Government Welfare Effort and “Happiness Inequality” 
 
In addition to the relationship between government welfare effort and subjective well-
being at the individual and aggregate national levels, policy-makers benefit from knowing 
whether government welfare efforts affect the distribution of happiness within countries and 
societies. Welfare efforts are generally focused on the young (through child care and education 
expenditure), the elderly (through pensions and old age care and health expenditure), and 
vulnerable groups (such as the poor, the unemployed, and the disabled). Since public 
expenditures are generally financed through taxes and other forms of revenue, it is plausible that 
they create “winners” and “losers” and, as a result, reduce the gap in happiness. A few studies 
find that this is indeed the case. It appears that the distribution of happiness in societies closely 
reflects their distribution of resources (Ono & Lee, 2013), and the more nations spend on social 
security, the more equally happiness is distributed in the population (Veenhoven, 1990). 
However, there is no consensus on this as these findings are contested by other studies 
(Veenhoven, 1992, 2000).  
 So who is really gaining or losing from public social spending and redistributive 
policies? Research shows that the subjective well-being effects of government welfare efforts 
generally differ by income, gender, marital status, employment status, and residency status. As 
predicted, low-income earners tend to benefit more (or are not as adversely affected) than high-
income earners from large government, social spending, and redistributive policies (Hessami, 
2010; Ono & Lee, 2013; Hajdu & Hajdu, 2013; Chindarkar, 2012; Swenson, 2015; Kiya, 2013). 
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Others add middle-income earners to this group (Kiya, 2013; Kotakorpi & Laamanen, 2010) 
although the benefit to middle-income earners is negated in other studies (Bjornskov et al., 2007; 
Bjornskov et al., 2008b; Schwarze & Harpfer, 2007). In addition, females as well as individuals 
who are married and have children are possibly more positively/less adversely affected by social 
spending than males and single individuals who do not have any children (Ono & Lee, 2013). 
The evidence for the unemployed is mixed (Lapinski et al., 1998; Ouweneel, 2002). 
 
1.6 Gaps in the literature  
 
After an extensive review of the income inequality, government welfare effort, and 
subjective well-being literatures, it is evident that there are some important research gaps. These 
include research on developing countries as well as research on mediating factors (such as 
governance) that shape the relationship between subjective well-being and income 
inequality/government welfare efforts.  
 
1.6.1 Income Inequality and Subjective Well-being 
 
While there are arguably many research gaps, in this section, I focus only on a few areas 
that are relevant to international development policy. The literature linking income inequality to 
subjective well-being is predominantly focused on developed countries and regions, particularly 
the United States and the European Union. There is a dearth of studies in other parts of the 
world; a limited number have examined the relationship in regions such as Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and East Asia. While the contrast between developed and developing countries 
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will be discussed in greater detail in the second paper, a short summary here is useful.  It appears 
that the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being may differ by country 
income level. Particularly, the aversion to inequality may be stronger in developed countries than 
in developing countries (Berg & Veenhoven, 2010; Ott, 2005; Beja, 2011; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & 
Ramos, 2014; Evans & Kelley, 2014). Since the relationship between income inequality and 
subjective well-being is determined by how inequality is defined and by mediating factors such 
as political/egalitarian ideology and signaling effects, the strength of these various influences 
possibly explain the variation between developed and developing countries in terms of inequality 
aversion. With significant improvement in data availability for developing countries, there is a 
great opportunity to understand better the inequality-subjective well-being link in the context of 
low- and middle-income countries.  
 Another area that deserves greater attention is the role of governance in mediating the 
relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being. This includes the role of 
actual and perceived government effectiveness, the prevalence of corruption, and the extent of 
political freedoms. For example, the adverse effects of inequality may be weaker in democracies 
than in authoritarian systems. Individuals who live in democracies have a greater say in 
government policies as well as greater access to mechanisms to change policies that they are not 
satisfied with.  Therefore, the distribution of income may be more reflective of citizen 
preferences in democratic societies, thereby resulting in higher levels of happiness. Similarly, 
inequality aversion may be lower in places that have efficient, accountable, and transparent 
institutions that provide for people in need. Alternatively, inequality aversion may in fact be 
higher, not lower, in places that have good governance. This is because individuals who trust 
their country’s institutions and leaders may be less tolerant of inequality – at least when it gets 
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over a certain level – as they expect the government not to let it happen or to do more about it 
(Rozer & Kraaykamp, 2013; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos, 2014; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).   
 
1.6.2 Government Welfare Effort and Subjective Well-being   
 
Similar to income inequality, the literature on government welfare effort and subjective 
well-being in developing countries is quite limited. I provide a short summary here and discuss 
the developing country findings in greater detail in the second paper. Cross-country research 
does not provide a clear picture of whether the relationship between public expenditures or 
government welfare effort and subjective well-being differs by country income level. Some have 
suggested that the relationship is more negative in developing countries than in developed 
countries (Ott, 2005; Yamamura, 2011; Kiya, 2013) while others have not found any evidence of 
this (Graafland & Compen, 2012; Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 1995; Ouweneel, 2002). Since the 
relationship between public social expenditures and subjective well-being is determined by 
factors such as ideology, the quality of governance, and the magnitude of social assistance 
stigma, how these factors play out in developing versus developed countries may explain any 
potential differences between them. 
 
1.7 Methodological Considerations 
 
One thing that is evident from the literature is that the methodology used is essential to 
the research outcome. It is important to keep in mind a few factors when choosing a research 
methodology to answer important questions about how income inequality and government 
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welfare effort are linked to subjective well-being. These factors include the type of analysis, the 
level of analysis, and the definition of concepts. 
Verme (2007) underlines the distinction between static and dynamic analysis in 
determining research results; for example, he finds that cross-section analysis at the country level 
shows no significant relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being while a 
longitudinal analysis at the country level and over time shows a significant and negative 
relationship between the two. Most existing studies on income inequality, government welfare 
effort, and subjective well-being are cross-sectional. This is due to data limitations as subjective 
well-being data has not been collected for the same individuals (or countries) over a long time 
span. Inevitably, longitudinal studies may better detect the real effect of income inequality and 
government welfare effort by controlling for unobservable variables such as personality, culture, 
and history.  
The next consideration is the level of analysis, that is, macro versus micro. The income 
inequality-subjective well-being and government welfare effort-subjective well-being literatures 
consist of a good mixture of cross-country and within-country studies. In cross-country studies, 
researchers have either aggregated variables at the country-level or pooled individual-level data 
from different countries and years into one large dataset (which in some cases also include one or 
a few macro-level indicators). The within-country studies have most frequently used individual-
level or family-level data but a few have also aggregated variables at the regional (province or 
city) level. When contrasting micro- and macro-level analysis, it is evident that the former can 
better detect trends and associations as it has more data points and one can also control for a 
variety of individual-level observable variables that affect subjective well-being such as age, 
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gender, education, income, marital status, health, employment status etc. The findings of macro-
level research have not been as consistent or conclusive (Bjornskov et al., 2008b).   
Another consideration in subjective well-being research is the definition of concepts. For 
example, it is important to be clear about the dimension of subjective well-being (hedonic, 
evaluative, and so forth) that the research is focused on, particularly as the different dimensions 
tend to be related differently to various demographic, social, and economic indicators. Generally, 
the research question determines the selection of subjective well-being dimension. Scholars have 
suggested that a person’s micro-social embedding and socio-cultural integration is more relevant 
for day-to-day hedonic happiness while social and institutional indicators such as national 
income, income distribution, the size of the welfare state, and political freedoms tend to be more 
relevant for evaluative happiness (Haller & Hadler, 2006). Similarly, personality and character 
traits are more relevant for hedonic than evaluative happiness (Graham, 2011). This does not 
imply that different factors are related to one dimension of subjective well-being and not the 
other. It simply means that they are related to evaluative and hedonic happiness in different 
ways. For example, income has a limited effect on hedonic happiness after a certain threshold 
while its effect on evaluative happiness tends to be linear (Graham & Nikolova, 2015).  
Similarly, how income inequality is defined matters for how it is related to subjective 
well-being. As discussed previously, the overall income distribution, reference group income, 
and perceived inequality are related differently with subjective well-being. Inequality measures 
such as the national-level Gini coefficient pick up many differences across countries and do not 
provide any information on income mobility or what inequality signals to individuals. Hence, the 
Gini coefficient is likely to have a more complex relationship to subjective well-being than 
relative income or inequality that signals opportunity/injustice. Similarly, inequality of 
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opportunity and inequality of effort do not have similar effects on subjective well-being (Clark, 
2003; Hopkins, 2008).  
Also, perceptions are important. An individual's perceived relative income status or the 
perceived level of income inequality may be as influential, if not more influential, for happiness, 
than objective inequality (Beja, 2011; Kim, 2011). The perceived income distribution is not 
always reflective of the actual income distribution, as studies from the United States and Europe 
have shown (Norton & Ariely, 2011; Niehues, 2014). Also, perceptions are “sticky” and do not 
change at the same pace as objective changes in income inequality (Graham, in press). For 
example, the United States now has the second highest level of income inequality among OECD 
countries and one of the lowest rates of income mobility in this group.  Despite this, until very 
recently, a significant share of Americans viewed inequality as a reflection of individual effort.  
This is an interesting contrast to Latin America where public frustration with inequality has 
remained high even as inequality has fallen and income mobility increased (Graham, in press). 
Many researchers find evidence of this type of a “perception gap,” that is, a gap between the 
objective situation and the subjective evaluation of it (Beja, 2011; Schneider, 2012; Graham & 
Pettinato, 1999; Verme et al., 2014).  Furthermore, perceptions are also partly driven by 
personality traits such as optimism/pessimism (Graham, 2009, p.82). For example, a person who 
is optimistic is also more likely to be satisfied with life and also see economic conditions in a 
positive way.    
Similar to subjective well-being and income inequality, how government welfare effort is 
defined and measured has a great influence on research findings. As discussed previously, 
scholars have used a variety of indices accounting for the size of public social expenditures, 
welfare entitlements, and the coverage and generosity of benefits. Each of these indices provides 
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information about a different aspect of government welfare effort. For example, Estes’ welfare 
index is based on the assumption that the earlier a country has adopted its welfare laws, the 
stronger that country’s welfare system is likely to be today. This is not always the case. For 
example, Sweden was a laggard in its welfare state development but now has one of the world’s 
most developed welfare systems (Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 1995). Similarly, while Esping-
Andersen’s decommodification score is very useful, its data on legal entitlements are limited and 
the package of welfare services is not identical in all states. This makes it challenging to compare 
across countries.  Financial indicators seem to be the most straightforward. However, they have 
limitations as well, particularly as public expenditures are influenced significantly by country 
specific contexts.  For instance, public expenditure on pensions depends heavily on the age 
composition of the population and may not reflect the real quantity and quality of government 
welfare effort (Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 1995). In addition, the effect of perceptions (versus 
objective) does not always equate actual trends. For example, the perceived government 
provision of services or social spending levels may be as influential as, if not more than, 




 In this paper, I provided a thorough background for research on income inequality, 
government welfare effort, and subjective well-being. I discussed the relevance of subjective 
well-being to policy and the validity/reliability of subjective well-being metrics, clarified 
concepts in the literature, reviewed and discussed the empirical evidence, highlighted research 
gaps, and underlined methodological considerations.  
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The literature review shows that the relationship between income inequality and 
subjective well-being is determined by how income inequality is defined and what it signals. In a 
similar fashion, the relationship between government welfare effort and subjective well-being is 
influenced by factors such as political ideology, the quality of governance, and/or the magnitude 
of “stigma” and “disempowerment” effects attached to receiving public transfers.    
As highlighted in the paper, there are some important research gaps. One area that has not 
been examined very well is how income inequality and government welfare efforts are related to 
subjective well-being in the context of developing countries and whether this is similar to 
patterns observed in high-income countries. The factors or channels through which income 
inequality and government welfare effort are related to subjective well-being are likely to 
determine similarities and differences between developed and developing countries. For 
example, if inequality signals injustice in one place and opportunities for the future in another, 
then the level of inequality aversion is likely to differ between these two places. Similarly, if the 
quality of governance is better in one context than another, then public expenditures are likely to 
have different effects on subjective well-being in these two contexts. Another area that has not 
been examined very well in the literature is the role of governance in mediating the relationship 
between income inequality and subjective well-being.   
Based on this background review, I intend to answer a few important policy-relevant 
questions through cross-country analysis as well as a country study on Iraq. I use both subjective 
and objective data for the analysis. In the second paper, I examine, by country income group, the 
relationship between subjective well-being and income inequality, using perceived inequality as 
a proxy. More specifically, I examine whether signals about inequality and perceived income 
mobility are equally predictive of life satisfaction in low-income, middle-income, and high-
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income countries. I also provide some insight into the role of perceived governance in mediating 
the relationship between perceived inequality and subjective well-being. Moreover, I examine, 
by country income group, the relationship between subjective well-being and government 
welfare effort, using perceived government effort to reduce poverty and provide for all as a 
proxy. In the third paper, I focus on objective social protection spending and how it is related to 
subjective well-being in Iraq, a conflict-affected and natural resource-rich developing country. I 
examine this relationship for vulnerable groups based on income, gender of the household head, 
and region of residence.  
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Chapter 2: Income Inequality, Government Welfare Effort, and Subjective 




This paper examines whether the association between income inequality and subjective 
well-being differs by countries’ level of economic development. The association may differ 
because inequality may signal different things in developing versus developed countries. 
Furthermore, the size of reference groups is likely to differ, and relative income effects may not 
be equally strong in poor and rich countries alike. On the other hand, individuals across the 
world may be similarly averse to inequality when it is perceived as or signals the same thing, that 
is, inherent injustice rather than future opportunities.  
This paper also contrasts the relationship between government welfare effort and 
subjective well-being in developing and developed countries. This relationship may differ as the 
transparency and efficiency with which the government works is different in these two contexts. 
Furthermore, government expenditures may interact differently with economic growth at 
different stages of economic development. On the other hand, individuals across the world may 
be influenced in a similar way by perceived government welfare effort. 
Finally, this paper provides some insight into the role of perceived governance in 
influencing the association between inequality and life satisfaction. The adverse effects of 
inequality may be weaker in countries that espouse democratic values and have efficient, 
accountable, and transparent governance mechanisms in place to protect the poor and most 
vulnerable. Alternatively, the adverse effects of inequality may be stronger in places where 
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individuals have confidence in government institutions and leaders as they expect the existing 
institutions and leaders to address issues of inequality.  
 
2.2 Background and Literature Review 
 
Mainly driven by data availability, most research on income inequality, government 
welfare effort, and subjective well-being has thus far been conducted in the context of 
economically advanced countries. The research in developing countries is relatively new and 
limited to specific regions. The field is thus wide open to explore and to learn more. In this 
paper, I make use of World Values Survey data to examine the relations of income inequality 
and government welfare effort with subjective well-being in developed versus developing 
countries. I also go one step further and examine potential differences within the developing 
world, that is, in low-income (LIC), lower middle-income (LMI), and upper middle-income 
(UMI) countries. Finally, I provide some insight into the role of governance in influencing the 
level of inequality aversion as this has not been explored well in general and almost not at all in 
developing countries. Understanding the relationship between subjective well-being and income 
inequality/government welfare effort is important from a development policy perspective as it 
helps to design more effective policies and prioritize areas for investment. 
 
2.2.1 Income Inequality and Subjective Well-Being by Level of Economic 
Development 
 
As discussed before, there is a limited literature contrasting the income inequality-
subjective well-being nexus in developing countries with that in developed countries. This 
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literature, which predominantly uses macro-level inequality indicators such as the Gini index, 
suggests that the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being is likely to 
differ by the level of economic development. More specifically, it is suggested to be 
predominantly irrelevant or negative in high-income countries, less negative or even positive in 
developing countries, and positive in emerging economies (Berg & Veenhoven, 2010; Ott, 2005; 
Beja, 2011; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos, 2014; Evans & Kelley, 2014).   
As a background to my main research questions, it is useful to see whether these prior 
findings are confirmed by the more recent and comprehensive data. Using World Values Survey 
(WVS) and Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) data from 1981 through 
2014, I explore how the national-level Gini index is associated with life satisfaction across 
country income groups (see Appendix 2.A). The analysis confirms the findings of previous 
research; the association between the Gini index and life satisfaction differs across country 
income groups and appears to be more positive in low- and middle-income countries than in 
high-income countries. National-level measured inequality variables (such as the Gini index) 
pick many observable and unobservable differences between countries, and hence, make it 
challenging to draw any firm conclusions. 
There are various explanations to why the association between measured national-level 
income inequality and subjective well-being may differ across country income groups, and 
seemingly, be less negative (more positive) in poor countries than in rich countries. Many 
mechanisms that mediate the relationship between inequality and subjective well-being, 
including signaling effects, relative income effects, reference group size effects, and other 
differences across countries explain these differences. Below is a brief explanation. 
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 First, inequality may signal different things in changing versus stable contexts. It is not 
unusual for inequality to signal future opportunities in changing environments while serving as a 
basis for social comparison in stable contexts (Caporale et al., 2009). As discussed in the first 
paper, Hirschman’s “tunnel effect” is quite common in transition countries (Rodriguez-Pose & 
Maslauskaite, 2012; Senik, 2004; Grosfeld & Senik, 2008; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010; Caporale 
et al., 2009).  In a study of ten Central and Eastern European countries, Rodriguez-Pose and 
Maslauskaite (2012) find that the economic boom of the 2000s and the rise of a dynamic 
entrepreneurial class increased the tolerance for rising inequality. Evidence of the “tunnel effect” 
has also been found in countries such as Russia and China (Senik, 2004; Knight & Gunatilaka, 
2010). The stage of the transition process appears to be an important factor. In Poland, for 
example, the effect of income inequality on happiness changed through the transition process; 
inequality was interpreted as a signal of wider opportunities in the initial stage while it became a 
source of frustration in the later stages (Grosfeld & Senik, 2008). 
The role of signals in shaping the relationship between income inequality and subjective 
well-being is also visible in middle-income countries that are not transition economies. In a study 
of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Arampatzi et al. (2015) find perceived 
inequality to be one of the main reasons for the declining life satisfaction in the run up to the 
Arab Spring; perceptions that people cannot get ahead by working hard became more prevalent 
during this time period. Similarly, in Latin America, the nature of income inequality influences 
its effect on subjective well-being; during the 1990s and 2000s, individuals were averse to 
inequality as it was viewed as a sign of persistent advantage for the rich and disadvantage for the 
poor (Graham & Felton, 2006; Graham, 2009, p.163).   
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 Another explanation to why the aversion to inequality may be stronger in high-income 
countries is that relative income effects generally strengthen as a country’s income rises. The 
argument is that individuals don’t care much about relative differences until basic needs are met 
(Graham, 2009, p. 158).  Hence, absolute income is possibly more important to happiness in poor 
than rich countries while relative income becomes more important in rich countries. This theory 
is supported by various cross-country studies. For example, Graham and Nikolova (2015) find 
that individuals in the wealthier EU-15 place a smaller emphasis on absolute income than 
individuals in Latin America and in transition countries. And Corazzini et al. (2012), who 
explore the absolutist and relativist perception of well-being in eight countries - four developing 
and four high-income - find that relativism is stronger in high-income countries.  
Regional and country studies largely confirm these cross-country findings. Studies on 
low-income countries, particularly those conducted in contexts of extreme poverty, provide great 
insight. Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) find that in Malawi, a country where fulfilling basic needs 
is a challenge, most respondents do not show concern for relative income. Similarly, the life 
satisfaction of the very poor in Ethiopia is not affected by reference group income (Akay & 
Martinson, 2011) and the choices of most Ethiopian subsistence farmers are based on absolute 
income alone and not driven by relative concerns (Akay et al., 2012).  
Relative income effects appear to strengthen in middle-income regions and countries.  
They are visible in Latin American countries (Castilla, 2012; Stark & Taylor, 1991; Gori-Maia, 
2013; Kuegler, 2009; Graham & Pettinato, 1999, 2001, 2002; Graham & Felton, 2005, 2006) and 
may matter even more for happiness than absolute income (Rojas, 2010; Graham, 2009, p. 161). 
Relative income effects are also visible in middle- and high-income countries in Asia such as 
China, Japan, Korea, Tajikistan, and India (Oshio et al., 2011; Mishra et al., 2010; Smyth & 
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Qian, 2008; Appleton & Song, 2008; Gao & Smyth, 2010; Cojocaru, 2012; Carlsson et al., 
2009). In India, for example, slightly more than half of the marginal utility of income comes 
from some kind of relative income effect (Carlsson et al., 2009). And in China, where the 
country’s rapid growth was followed by increased income inequality, researchers have 
predominantly found the positive subjective well-being effects of absolute income to be 
overshadowed, and perhaps even cancelled out, by the negative well-being effects of increased 
inequality (Easterlin et al., 2013; Brockmann et al., 2009; Tang, 2014; Wu & Li, 2013). While 
there are exceptions (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008; Kingdon & Knight, 2007), relative concerns 
seem to become stronger as a country’s income rises. This explains why the aversion to 
inequality may be stronger in high-income countries than in poor countries.  
A third explanation to why the relationship between income inequality and subjective 
well-being may differ by country income level is the size of reference groups. Graham (in press) 
explains that positive signaling effects are more likely in smaller reference groups, such as in 
neighborhoods and small towns, possibly because schools and other public goods are shared at 
this level. However, in larger reference groups, such as in cities, comparison effects are more 
likely as inequalities are more visible and income mobility may seem much harder (Graham, in 
press). In China, for example, rural residents confine their reference group mainly to the village. 
So even though they are much poorer than their urban counterparts, they are not affected in the 
same way because the lack of information confines their reference group to the immediate 
surrounding. This also explains why the happiness level of rural migrants drops as they move to 
cities and their reference group changes (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010). Considering the level of 
urbanization in poor versus rich countries (World Bank WDI, 2016), it is plausible that people 
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would be more averse to inequality in high-income countries as the higher level of urbanization 
would result in larger reference groups and more visibility of inequality. 
In addition to signals, relative income, and reference group size, a variety of country-
specific factors explain why the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-
being may differ across countries, even those within the same country income group. History, 
culture, and norms are all relevant. For example, norms about the level of inequality that is 
tolerable is likely to differ across countries. Similarly, the scope of inequality matters – 
inequality with respect to whom and whether it is based on race, ethnicity, and religion.  This is 
very much tied into a country’s history, ethnic and racial diversity, and culture.  In South Africa, 
for example, income comparisons have a different effect when the reference group is the local 
community than when it is the same racial group (Kingdon & Knight, 2007) and the effect of 
relative income differs by race (Bookwalter & Dalenberg, 2010). In the Middle East and North 
Africa, inequality between different ethnic and sectarian groups seems to be a source of great 
grievance (World Bank, 2015d). In China, the income disparity between migrants and urban 
residents is cause for unhappiness (Jiang et al., 2012). And in India, caste is important; an 
individual’s utility is higher if his/her own caste’s average income is higher than the income of 
other castes (Carlsson et al., 2009).  
To conclude, research shows that the relationship between objective national-level 
income inequality and subjective well-being may differ by the level of economic development. 
These differences can be explained by several mechanisms that are often at play simultaneously. 
First, inequality signals different things in changing versus stable contexts. Second, relative 
income matters in both developing and developed countries but its effects tend to become 
stronger as a country’s income rises. Third, due to the level of urbanization, reference groups are 
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often larger in developed countries than in developing countries. Large reference groups, such as 
in cities, are more likely to trigger comparison effects since inequalities are more visible and 
income mobility may seem much harder. Finally, history, culture, and norms about what is 
tolerable vary across countries, and hence, affect the relationship between income inequality and 
subjective well-being differently across countries.  
As discussed in the first paper, what inequality signals is perhaps the most direct channel 
through which income inequality is related to subjective well-being. Therefore, I focus on this 
channel alone in my research. It is plausible that when inequality signals the same thing – that is, 
inherent injustice rather than future opportunity – individuals across all country income groups 
are affected by it in a similar way. This is an interesting question which will be explored in 
greater detail in this paper.  
 
2.2.2 Government Welfare Effort and Subjective Well-Being by Level of Economic 
Development 
 
A limited number of cross-country studies have examined whether public expenditures or 
government welfare efforts affect subjective well-being differently in developed versus 
developing countries. The overall size of government is possibly unrelated to subjective well-
being in both rich and poor countries alike (Graafland & Compen, 2012), or perhaps, associated 
negatively to subjective well-being in developing countries and positively in OECD countries 
(Kiya, 2013). The evidence is also inconclusive when looking specifically at government welfare 
effort. Ott (2005) splits up countries into two groups – poor and rich – and finds that social 
security spending is correlated negatively to subjective well-being in poor nations while it is 
correlated positively to subjective well-being in rich nations. Others negate this and argue that 
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the “welfare state” does not increase self-reported well-being in developed or developing 
countries (Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 1995; Ouweneel, 2002).  
As a background to my research, I run a few regressions to examine how objective 
national-level public expenditures are related to life satisfaction across country income groups 
(See Appendix 2.B). Once again, I use life satisfaction data from the World Values Survey as 
well as public expenditure data from the World Development Indicators Database (WDI). The 
analysis confirms the inconsistency that previous research has pointed to; the patterns in terms of 
how public (social) expenditures are related to life satisfaction differ across country income 
groups.  
There are various explanations to why the relationship between national-level public 
expenditures, including social expenditures, and subjective well-being may differ across country 
income groups. One explanation is that the transparency and efficiency with which the 
government works is different in low-income, middle-income, and high-income countries. As 
discussed in the first paper, the quality of governance is one of the mediating factors that shapes 
the relationship between subjective well-being and government size/government welfare efforts 
(Bjornskov et al., 2007; Hessami, 2010; Oishi et al., 2012; Rodriguez-Pose & Maslauskaite, 
2012). Developing countries tend to perform worse than developed countries in many areas of 
governance including accountability, transparency, government effectiveness, and corruption 
(World Bank WGI, 2016). One illustrative example is a study from Uganda showing that schools 
received only 13 percent of the education grants disbursed by the central government (Reinikka 
& Svensson 2004). Due to the lower quality of governance, it is plausible that the subjective 
well-being effect of public (social) expenditures is more complex in poor countries when 
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compared to rich countries, especially as official expenditure data do not reflect how much 
citizens actually benefit from or are perhaps even aware that the government is spending.   
In addition to the quality of governance, government expenditures may interact 
differently with economic growth at different stages of economic development. For example, a 
study on Japan shows that government size has a detrimental effect on life satisfaction during the 
economic development stage as it tends to impede economic growth. But the adverse effect 
decreases in the developed stage when government size is no longer associated with economic 
growth (Yamamura, 2011).   
Finally, history, culture, and norms about the role of government influence the effect of 
public (social) expenditures on subjective well-being. This makes it challenging to establish clear 
patterns, even when the comparison is among developing countries alone. Regional and country 
studies in low- and middle-income regions have found public spending and government welfare 
effort to have a positive (Xie et al., 2012; Easterlin, 2013; Easterlin et al., 2013; Switek, 2012), 
negative (Rodriguez-Pose & Maslauskaite, 2012; Chindarkar, 2012), U-shaped (Perovic & 
Golem, 2010), or insignificant relationship with subjective well-being (Wong et al., 2006).  
In conclusion, a variety of factors explain why the relationship between public 
expenditures/government welfare effort and subjective well-being may differ across country 
income groups. The quality of governance, the interaction of government size with economic 
growth, and country-specific factors explain these cross-country variations.  
One may wonder where individuals across the world are affected in a similar way when 
they perceive the government to be providing for citizens and doing enough for the poor. In other 
words, does experiencing and being aware of government welfare efforts affect subjective well-
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being in a similar way in poor and rich countries? This question will be examined in greater 
detail in this paper.  
 
2.2.3 Income Inequality and Subjective Well-being: the Mediating Role of 
Governance 
 
The quality of governance, whether objective or perceived, is likely to play a role in how 
income inequality is related to subjective well-being. For example, the adverse effects of 
inequality may be weaker in countries that are democratic and have good governance 
mechanisms in place to protect the poor and most vulnerable. Or alternatively, the adverse 
effects of inequality may be stronger in places where individuals have high confidence in 
government institutions and leaders as they expect the existing institutions and leaders to address 
issues of inequality.  
Few studies have examined the role of objective or perceived governance in mediating 
the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being. In fact, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Ramos (2014), who conducted a comprehensive review of the income inequality-subjective 
well-being literature, highlight that trust in institutions may be an important factor shaping the 
relationship between the two. The limited literature provides some insight. In a cross-country 
study, Rozer and Kraaykamp (2013) find that the association between income inequality and 
subjective well-being is less positive when individuals express more social and institutional trust. 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) reach a similar conclusion. They note that a high level of trust in 
government and institutions leads to dissatisfaction when little is done by those institutions to 
reduce inequality. On the other end of the spectrum, Grosfeld and Senik (2008) contend that 
reduced trust in the political system leads to stronger inequality aversion.  
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This paper provides insight into the role of perceived governance in shaping the income 
inequality-life satisfaction link across country income groups.  
 
2.3 Methodology  
 
Informed by the current base of knowledge, my research aims to answer specific 
questions about the relationship between income inequality or government welfare effort and life 
satisfaction across country income groups, that is, low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-
middle-income, and high-income. I focus on perceived inequality and perceived government 
welfare effort as well as the evaluative dimension of well-being, particularly satisfaction with 
life. I choose evaluative well-being as it is a more well-established and tested concept than 
eudaimonic well-being. And it is more closely linked to social and institutional indicators such as 
national income, income distribution, and welfare state development than hedonic well-being 




Hypothesis 1:  The association between life satisfaction and income inequality is similar across 
country income groups when income inequality signals inherent unfairness. 
The relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction is likely to be similar in 
low-, middle-, and high-income countries when income inequality signals the same thing, that is, 
an inherently unfair system, or alternatively, future opportunity and mobility.   
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Hypothesis 2: The association between life satisfaction and perceived government 
welfare effort is similar across country income groups. 
The relationship is likely to be similar across income levels of countries when the 
government is perceived to be providing for citizen and doing enough for the poor.  
 
 In addition to the above two hypotheses, I provide insight into the role of governance in 
mediating the relationship between life satisfaction and income inequality. The question that I 
ask is: Does confidence in public institutions and satisfaction with national leaders moderate the 
negative association between income inequality and life satisfaction?  
 
 
2.3.2  Empirical model 
 
I use a standard model that has been used by most researchers when working with a 
pooled sample of individual observations from different countries and years. The model is as 
follows:  
Yict = α + β1Xict + βnRict + C + T + εict 
 
where Y is life satisfaction (individual level); X is perceived income inequality/perceived 
government welfare effort (individual level); R is a vector of control variables for individual 
characteristics including sex, age, health status, marital status, income, education level, and 
unemployment status (all individual level); C is the country dummy; T is the year dummy; and ε 
is the error term. Lower case letters signify individual i living in country c in year t. 
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This is a pooled cross-section because it combines data for individuals from 54 countries. 
The year dummy controls for time-specific factors, that is, things common to all countries in 
each year. The country dummy controls for country-specific factors that vary across countries 
but not across time. It accounts for the distinct historical, cultural, and institutional influences 
and the fact that life satisfaction may not be internationally comparable. The model includes 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors are used to address 
heteroscedasticity and country clustering is introduced because observations are likely to be 
rather homogeneous within countries. Weights are included to account for the variability in 
country sample size. In this way, all countries count equally and no country drives the results 
because of its larger sample size. 
Estimations are made both with the ordered logit method as well as with OLS. Ordered 
logit is used because the life satisfaction variable is ordinal and based on a ten-point scale. It 
appears that using OLS, or alternatively, ordered logit has little effect on the results (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell & Frijters, 2004). As noted by Barrington-Leigh (2010), considerable confidence has 
been gained in comparing subjective well-being reports as though they were cardinal measures. 
This is based on finding consistent patterns across countries and on comparing estimation 
methods that relax the cardinality assumption with those that rely on it. Furthermore, using 
robust standard errors corrects for heteroscedasticity that may result from using OLS with 
ordinal dependent variables. And OLS is appropriate in situations when the objective is to 
explore patterns (particularly when the main interest is to observe the direction and significance 
of coefficients) rather than to establish exact predictions.  
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The shortcoming of a cross-section (in contrast to panel) is that it has a higher chance of 
suffering from issues of endogeneity. Causality cannot be established in the same way since it is 
not possible to observe changes in the variables over time.  
 
2.3.3 Data description 
 
I use World Values Survey (WVS) data for my analysis. WVS data have been collected 
in six waves over the 1981-2014 time period.1 The quality of the survey data vary significantly 
across waves. In order to take account of this, I use only data from Wave 3 which extends from 
year 1994 through 1999. In total, 77,129 individuals from 54 countries were surveyed in Wave 3 
of the WVS (see Appendix 2.C for a list of countries). The country samples are nationally 
representative and reflect the population in terms of characteristics such as age and gender 
composition. Table 2.1 lists the number of countries and individuals by country income groups.  
 
Table 2.1: Number of Countries and Individuals by Country Income Group 





No. of Countries 8 21 12 13 
No. of Individuals 12780 32020 15790 16539 
Note: Data from World Values Survey Wave 3 
 
I use WVS data to assess the relations of life satisfaction (dependent variable) with 
perceived inequality/perceived government welfare effort (independent variable), while 
                                                 
1 World Values Survey samples are drawn from the entire population of 18 years and older in the participating 
countries. The minimum sample is 1000. In most countries, no upper age limit is imposed and some form of 
stratified random sampling is used to obtain representative national samples. The survey is carried out by 
professional organizations using face-to-face interviews or phone interviews for remote areas. Each country has a 
Principal Investigator (social scientists working in academic institutions) who is responsible for conducting the 
survey in accordance with the fixed rules and procedures (WVS website). 
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controlling for individual-level variables, including sex, age, marital status, health status, 
education level, employment status, and income.2  The following is a more detailed description 
of the variables.  
 
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction  
i. Life satisfaction (Individual Level – World Values Survey)  
 
The question is: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days?” 
 
Independent variable: Perceived Income Inequality/Perceived Government Welfare Effort  
i. Perceived Income Inequality 
a. Hard work brings success or not (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
b. Poverty due to laziness or unfair society (Individual Level – World Values 
Survey) 
c. The poor can escape poverty or not (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
d. People can only get rich at the expense of others (Individual Level – World 
Values Survey) 
 
ii. Perceived Government Welfare Effort 
a. Government doing enough for poor or not (Individual Level – World Values 
Survey) 
b. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves or Government 
should take more responsibility to provide for everyone (Individual Level – 
World Values Survey) 
 
Control Variables:  Individual Characteristics 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that macro-level control variables such as national-level income are not included as control 
variables. This is because the analysis is carried out by country income group, and hence, only countries at similar 
income levels are included in each regression. This division also addresses other factors that generally differ 
between countries at different income levels, such as the quality of institutions. 
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i. Sex (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
ii. Age (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
iii. Marital status (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
iv. Health status (Individual Level – World Values Survey 
v. Education level (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
vi. Employment status (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
vii. Income (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
 
When providing insight into the role of perceived governance in mediating the 
relationship between perceived inequality and life satisfaction, I use the same empirical model as 
listed above. However, I run the regressions separately for two groups: for individuals who have 
confidence in their country’s institutions and national leaders versus those who do not. The first 
group includes individuals who say that they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in 
institutions and are “very” or “fairly” satisfied with national leaders while the second group 
includes individuals who say that they have “not at all” or “not very much” confidence in 
institutions and are “very” or “fairly” dissatisfied with national leaders.  
 
The following are the perceived governance variables that I use:  
i. Confidence in Parliament (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
ii. Confidence in Government (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
iii. Confidence in Justice System (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
iv. Satisfaction with National Leaders (Individual Level – World Values Survey) 
 
Only regression results using the variables listed above are presented in the paper. 
However, I have analyzed additional variables for which the regression results are presented in 
the Appendix. A complete summary of all variables can be viewed in Appendix 2.D.  Below is a 
description and summary of the main variables in this paper (see Table 2.2).  
54 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
Life Satisfaction and Control Variables 















76950 41.24 16.04 15 95 Continuous 
Marital Status 
(Control Variable) 
73947 0.66 0.47 0 1 0-1; 1-Married or living 
together as married 
Education Level  
(Control Variable) 
 
74252 1.87 0.74 1 3 1-3; 1-Lower, 2-Middle, 3-
Upper 
Employment Status  
(Control Variable) 
 
73234 0.09 0.28 0 1 0-1; 1-Unemployed 
Health Status  
(Control Variable) 
 
72816 2.33 0.94 1 5 1-5; 1-very good, 2-good, 3-
fair, 4-poor, 5-very poor 
Income Decile  
(Control Variable) 
66818 4.58 2.58 1 10 1-10; 1 the lowest decile and 
10 the highest decile.    
 
Perceived Inequality Variables (Independent Variable) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Values 




67175 4.42 2.88 1 10 1-10; 1-In the long run, hard 
work usually brings a better 
life, 10-hard work doesn't 
generally bring success- it's 
more a matter of luck and 
connections 






62228 0.69 0.46 0 1 0-1;0- Poor because of 
laziness and lack of 
willpower, 1-poor because of 
an unfair society 
Poor have chance of 











64154 4.63 2.79 1 10 1-10; 1-wealth can grow so 
there is enough for everyone, 
10- people can only get rich 
at the expense of others 
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Perceived Government Welfare Effort Variables (Independent Variable) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Values 
Government doing 





64614 0.27 0.44 0 1 0-1; 0-Government doing too 
little for people in poverty,  
1-Government doing about 
the right amount or too much 




provide for people 
(Independent 
Variable) 
70452 4.66 3.00 1 10 1-10; 1- government should 
take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is 
provided for  10-Individuals 
should take more 




2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the findings on the relations of life satisfaction with perceived 
inequality as well as perceived government welfare effort in low-income, lower middle-income, 
upper middle-income, and high-income countries. Since the OLS and ordered logit analysis 
reached similar results (in terms of the direction and significance of the coefficients) and OLS 
results are easier to interpret, I present only those in the paper while including the ordered logit 
results for all regressions in the Appendix. It is important to note that I am taking a cautious 
approach by analyzing only the data from Wave 3 of the World Values Survey. This is to 
account for the variability in sampling quality across the different waves. When using all six 
waves of the WVS, the findings become even stronger (almost all results are significant at 1%). 
The regression results based on all six waves are included in Appendix 2.E and 2.F.
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2.4.1 Perceived Inequality and Life satisfaction 
 
Data on perceived inequality allows for deeper exploration into what income inequality 
signals to individuals and how this is related to their satisfaction with life. This section addresses 
hypothesis 1, that is, the association between income inequality and life satisfaction is similar 
across country income groups when inequality signals unfairness. This hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that when inequality signals the same thing, individuals across the world are 
similarly tolerant of or averse to it.  
As a start, it is useful to know about the significance of absolute income and whether it is 
associated differently with life satisfaction in developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries. 
The regression results show that, consistent with the literature, absolute income is associated 
positively with life satisfaction in all country income groups and the magnitude of the association 
is greater for individuals in developing countries than for individuals in high-income countries 
(see Table 2.3). For example, in a low-income country, the life satisfaction of individuals in the 
highest income decile is, on average, 1.62 points higher (0.180 *9) than the life satisfaction of 
individuals in the lowest income decile. In a high-income country, the life satisfaction difference 
between the top and bottom income deciles is only 0.49 points (0.054*9).  
Now moving to the main question, is the aversion to inequality similar across country 
income groups if inequality signals the same thing?  A few questions in the World Values 
surveys capture perceptions about the fairness of the income generation process and income 
mobility prospects. I use these questions as proxies for perceived unfairness. Overall, the 
regression results (see Table 2.3 and Appendix 2.E) are significant and show that the life 
satisfaction of individuals in rich and poor countries alike is associated negatively with systems 
that are perceived to be unfair.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.132*** 0.180* 0.161*** 0.142*** 0.0540** 
(0.0157) (0.0752) (0.0177) (0.0252) (0.0173) 
     
54,406 10,367 22,938 9,965 11,136 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.463*** -0.661*** -0.587*** -0.291*** -0.219*** 
(0.0577) (0.161) (0.0997) (0.0712) (0.0419) 
     
47,029 9,240 20,625 8,849 8,315 





Little chance of 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.454*** -0.627*** -0.542*** -0.366*** -0.266*** 
(0.0552) (0.159) (0.100) (0.0900) (0.0335) 
     
49,659 9,578 20,732 9,546 9,803 





Hard work does not 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0427*** -0.0223 -0.0507*** -0.0401* -0.0553*** 
(0.00566) (0.0159) (0.00737) (0.0179) (0.00901) 
     
50,230 10,143 19,316 9,803 10,968 





People only rich at 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0692*** -0.0510* -0.0621*** -0.0885*** -0.0721*** 
(0.00719) (0.0230) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.00576) 
     
47,996 9,664 17,944 9,615 10,773 
0.311 0.276 0.221 0.192 0.202 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, 
employment status, income, and health status. Country and time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered 
at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability.
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For example, one question asks whether poverty exists because the poor are lazy and lack 
willpower, or alternatively, because society is unfair. The results show that believing that poverty 
is due to unfairness in society is associated negatively with life satisfaction for individuals in 
low-, middle-, and high-income countries alike. Interestingly, the magnitude of the negative 
association is greatest for individuals in low-income countries and reduces with the level of 
economic development. For example, in low-income countries, the life satisfaction of an 
individual who believes that poverty is caused by unfairness in society is 0.66 points lower than 
the life satisfaction of an individual who believes the poor are lazy and lack willpower. In high-
income countries, the life satisfaction difference between two individuals with these opposing 
perceptions is only 0.22 points.   
Similar results are reached when using a question on whether the poor can escape 
poverty. Believing that the poor have very little chance of escaping poverty is associated 
negatively with life satisfaction in all country income groups. The magnitude of this negative 
association is greater for individuals who live in developing countries. For example, the 
difference in life satisfaction between those who believe that the poor have a chance of escaping 
poverty and those who don’t is, on average, 0.63 points in LIC, 0.54 in LMI, 0.37 in UMI, and 
0.27 in HIC. It appears that fairness of the income generation process, especially for the most 
vulnerable members of society, is particularly important for individuals living in poor countries.  
This is possibly because the poor live under very dire conditions in developing countries while 
this is not necessarily the case in high-income countries.   
Another question, which is focused on overall income mobility (not necessarily as it 
relates to the poor), asks survey participants whether they believe that hard work brings a better 
life, or alternatively, that hard work doesn't bring success and it is more a matter of luck and 
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connections. The scale is from 1-10, with 10 being that hard work does not bring success and it is 
more a matter or luck and connections. Believing that hard work does not bring success is 
associated negatively with life satisfaction in developing and developed countries alike. For 
example, in lower middle-income countries, individuals who believe that hard work doesn’t 
bring success are likely to be, on average, 0.46 points less satisfied with life (-0.0507*9) than 
individuals who believe that hard work brings a better life. A similar negative association is 
observed in UMI and HIC countries, albeit with different magnitudes. The result for low-income 
countries is not significant when using OLS but it is significant when using ordered logit (see 
Appendix 2.E).  
A final question asks whether respondents believe that wealth can grow so that there is 
enough for everyone or whether people can only get rich at the expense of others. The scale is 1-
10 with 10 being that people can only get rich at the expense of others. This question captures 
views about the process by which inequality has come about and whether the rich have attained 
their status at the expense of the poor. Once again, as shown in Table 2.3, believing that people 
can only get rich at the expense of others is associated negatively with life satisfaction in all 
country income groups.  
It should be noted that I tested the robustness of all my results by including a control 
variable to account for political ideology.3 Including this control variable did not change the 
findings about the relations of perceived inequality with life satisfaction. I also ran the 
regressions in other forms such as with age squared as a control variable (particularly as this is 
very common in the literature). The regression results remain the same, that is, the association is 
negative and significant. 
                                                 
3 I used a question in the WVS that asks: “In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would 
you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” The scale ranges from 1(left) to 10 (right).  
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To conclude, hypothesis 1 is supported by the data. The analysis shows that individuals 
are averse to inequality when it signals injustice, irrespective of whether they live in a low-
income, lower middle-income, upper middle-income, or high-income country. The inequality 
aversion may be stronger in poor countries, especially when it relates to income mobility 
prospects for the poor. As noted previously, the results are even stronger when using data from 
all six waves of the WVS – most results are significant at 1% (see Appendix 2.E).  In drawing 
conclusions about these results, it is important to note that individual characteristics do play a 
role in explaining some of the similarity across country income groups. For example, an 
individual who is pessimistic is more likely than an optimistic person to be less satisfied with life 
and also perceive society to be unfair. In this case, pessimism is influencing both life satisfaction 
and perceptions. Since I do not have panel data, I am not able to control for these personality 
characteristics.  
Having analyzed perceived inequality, I move to the next hypothesis, which concerns 
perceived government welfare effort.  
 
2.4.2 Perceived Government Welfare Effort and Life Satisfaction 
 
This section examines hypothesis 2: the association between life satisfaction and 
perceived government welfare effort is similar across country income groups.  The World Values 
survey contains a few questions on perceived government effort to reduce poverty and to provide 
for all. I use these questions as proxies for government welfare effort.   
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 2.4 (ordered logit results as well as 
regression results using all six waves of the WVS are presented in Appendix 2.F).  The first 
question asks survey participants if they believe that the government is doing too little, the right 
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amount, or too much for the poor; with 1 being “the right amount” or “too much.” As the results 
show, the life satisfaction of those who believe that the government is doing enough or too much 
for the poor is, on average, higher than the life satisfaction of those who believe that the 
government is not doing enough. The association is similar, that is positive and significant, in all 
country income groups. However, it is greater in magnitude in developing countries than in high-
income countries, possibly due to the dire conditions that the poor in developing countries live 
under. This is most visible in LMI countries, where there is a 0.56 point difference between the 
life satisfaction of an individual who believes the government is doing too little for the poor 
versus an individual who thinks that the government is doing the right amount or too much.  
 





Govt doing enough/too 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.316*** 0.311* 0.557*** 0.235* 0.112** 
(0.0551) (0.150) (0.0970) (0.116) (0.0472) 
     
     
49,823 9,637 21,026 9,531 9,629 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0626*** 0.0573 0.0595*** 0.0635** 0.0626*** 
(0.0104) (0.0313) (0.0173) (0.0196) (0.0140) 
     
     
53,355 10,143 22,430 9,795 10,987 
0.319 0.273 0.289 0.190 0.203 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, 
employment status, income, and health status. Country and time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered 
at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability.
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Another question captures indirectly whether survey respondents believe the government 
is ensuring the economic well-being of citizens. This question asks whether the government 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for or whether people should 
take more responsibility to provide for themselves, with the scale ranging from 1 to 10 (10 being 
that people should take more responsibility). While this question may be better suited to capture 
beliefs about the role that the government should play, in using it, I am assuming that an 
individual who believes that the government is not doing enough would respond that the 
government should take more responsibility, and alternatively, a person who believes that the 
government is doing enough would respond that people should take more responsibility.  
As seen in Table 2.4, the pattern is similar (positive and significant) across country 
income groups except for in low-income countries where it is not significant. However, when 
using ordered logit, the result in low-income countries is significant (it is also significant at 1% 
when using all six waves of the WVS - see Annex 2.F). To interpret the findings, individuals 
who live in high-income countries and believe fully that people should take more responsibility 
to provide for themselves (that is, select 10 on the 1-10 scale) are, on average, 0.56 (9 * 0.0626) 
points higher on the life satisfaction scale than individuals who believe that government should 
take more responsibility. 
The analysis and findings above support hypothesis 2. Perceived government welfare 
effort is associated similarly with life satisfaction across country income groups. It is important 
to keep in mind, however, that just as in the case of perceived inequality, perceptions do carry 
elements of personality characteristics which are in turn correlated with life satisfaction. For 
example, perceiving that the government is doing enough for the poor may be driven partly by 
optimism, which in turn is also associated with life satisfaction. 
63 
 
2.4.3 Perceived Inequality and Life Satisfaction: The Mediating Role of 
Institutional Confidence and Leadership Satisfaction  
 
This section provides insight, rather than answers, to questions concerning the role of 
governance in mediating the relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction. To 
clarify, I examine how perceived governance influences the relationship between perceived 
inequality and life satisfaction. I focus on a few specific dimensions of governance including 
confidence in institutions and satisfaction with people in national office. I divide up individuals 
into two groups – those who have some or a lot of confidence in their country’s institutions and 
leaders versus those who have little or no confidence. I run the regressions (using the same 
empirical model as before) for three different samples: one containing only low-income countries 
(LIC), the second combining low-income and middle-income countries (LIC/LMI/UMI), and a 
third consisting of high-income countries (HIC) alone. This is to explore the nuances that exist 
within the developing world and how they compare with high-income countries.  
For perceived inequality (the independent variable), I use the WVS question that asks 
whether the respondent believes that poverty exists because society is unfair (versus because of 
laziness). The dependent variable is life satisfaction. The results are presented in Table 2.5 
(ordered logit results in Appendix 2.G). As noted previously, believing that poverty is caused by 
injustice in society is associated negatively with life satisfaction across the world. Interestingly, 
however, the magnitude of this negative association is smaller for the group of individuals who 
have confidence in their country’s institutions and national leaders. This is true in all country 
income group samples (that is, in low-income countries, in developing countries as a whole, and 
in high-income countries) but is most visible in low-income countries. For example, in LIC 
countries, the association between perceived inequality and life satisfaction is -0.754 for the 
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group that has low confidence in parliament and -0.516 for the group that has high confidence in 
parliament. In high-income countries, the associations for the same two groups are -0.204 and -
0.180 respectively. Similar patterns hold for confidence in government and the justice system as 
well as satisfaction with national leaders. It should be noted that I examined the role of perceived 
in different ways4 and reached similar results. 
 
Table 2.5: Perceived Governance, Perceived Inequality, and Life Satisfaction  






Confidence in Justice 
System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 




LIC -0.754*** -0.516* -0.650*** -0.568** -0.800** -0.459* -0.760*** -0.400 
LIC/LMI/UMI -0.510*** -0.435*** -0.510*** -0.440*** -0.525*** -0.440*** 
-0.490*** -0.388*** 
HIC 
-0.204** -0.180** -0.256*** -0.100 -0.300*** -0.124* -0.219*** -0.144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, 
employment status, income, and health status. Country and time dummies are included. The robust standard errors are clustered 
at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability. 
 
My analysis supports the findings of Grosfeld and Senik (2008) and suggests that good 
governance may mitigate the adverse effects of inequality on life satisfaction. There is much to 
learn in this area and future research should examine this in greater detail.
                                                 
4 For example, I created and included an interaction term (with the perceived governance and perceived inequality 
variables) as a control variable. I did this as an alternative to running the regressions separately for people who have 
high confidence in government versus those who have low confidence. As a second option, I constructed a 
“perceived governance” variable which combined the four perceived governance variables rather than analyzing 
each of them (justice system, parliament, government, as well as satisfaction with national leaders) separately. 
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2.5 Policy Implications 
 
 These research findings have several policy implications. First, equality of opportunity is 
as, if not more, predictive of life satisfaction in low- and middle-income countries as it is in high-
income countries. Therefore, policies and programs to reduce inequality of opportunity are as 
important (if not more important) in developing countries.   
Second, perceptions of inequality should not be disregarded or discredited. In many 
cases, perceived inequality provides a more accurate picture of opportunity and income mobility 
than measured inequality. Individuals perceive inequality to be higher than it may be if there is 
“process” inequality and they experience injustice. Also, perceptions of inequality/injustice 
matter more to (political) behavior than do objective trends. As an example, the social discontent 
which led to the Arab Spring could not be detected in measured development data; poverty, 
inequality, and human capital data showed progress. Yet, the perception that it was hard to get 
ahead without connections became more prevalent in the run up to the uprisings (Arampatzi et 
al., 2015; World Bank, 2015d).   
Even when perceptions do not accurately reflect reality, it is important for political and 
policy reasons to pay as much attention to them as to measured inequality. This is because 
perceptions may be more influential for well-being than objective trends. Moreover, perceived 
inequality, especially when it is deeply entrenched in the psyche of people, can affect 
individuals’ motivations and aspirations and undermine their ability to transform their lives (Hoff 
& Pandey, 2006; Krishnan et al., 2016). In addition, perceived inequality can have profound 
effects on social harmony and trust in public institutions (Krishnan et al 2016), and hence, 
adverse consequences for development. Finally, perceived inequality, even when it does not 
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reflect the actual income distribution, could interact with political incentives and produce 
distortionary economic policies that slow down growth and development (Krishnan et al., 2016).  
Since perceptions are important, one policy prescription is that as governments design 
policies and roll out programs aimed at reducing inequality of opportunity, they should also 
invest in information campaigns about the policies and programs. Public awareness of these 
programs is likely to be as important as establishing them. 
Some of the policy implications discussed above are also applicable to government 
welfare efforts. Individuals in low- and middle-income countries are just as likely as individuals 
in high-income countries to want for their governments to protect people against poverty. Thus, 
effective social protection programs to protect the poor are just as, if not more, crucial in 
developing countries. Moreover, public awareness of the social protection programs may be as 
important as their implementation. 
Similarly, it is important to pay as much attention to perceptions of government welfare 
effort as to objective trends. This is not only for political purposes but also because perceptions 
may provide a more accurate picture of actual (or experienced) government welfare effort. For 
example, objective public expenditures do not reveal how much individuals actually receive in 
the end; corruption and other factors may distort the disbursements and their intended effect. 
Also, measured public expenditures may be a better reflection of society’s needs rather than 
actual government welfare effort. For example, some countries may have high social protection 
spending because of their age distributions (for example, a large proportion of senior citizens) as 
opposed to their effective efforts to provide for the poor. 
Finally, as the analysis on governance showed, there are substantial benefits for 
governments that invest in improved governance, specifically in reducing corruption and 
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increasing the transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of institutions. Good governance 
may provide some space for individuals to tolerate temporary injustices while knowing that 




This research is of great policy significance as it examines and contrasts the potential 
effects of perceived inequality and government welfare effort on human welfare in developing 
and developed countries as well as by country income group as the patterns may be very 
different in low-income countries than in middle-income countries.   
The analysis confirmed the main theories in the inequality-subjective well-being 
literature. The association between income inequality and life satisfaction is similar across 
countries when inequality signals the same thing. For example, when inequality signals injustice 
rather than future opportunities, it is associated negatively with life satisfaction in all country 
income groups. And interestingly, the negative association is greatest in magnitude in the poorest 
countries.  
Similarly, my research shows that perceived government welfare effort is associated 
positively with life satisfaction in all country income groups. Noteworthy, the magnitude of this 
positive association is greater in developing countries than in developed countries, particularly as 
it relates to government efforts to alleviate poverty. This is possibly because the poor live under 
very dire conditions in developing countries while this is not necessarily the case in high-income 
countries.   
Finally, the analysis shows that governance cannot be left out of the inequality-life 
satisfaction debate. It appears that individuals who have confidence in their country’s institutions 
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and national leaders are less averse to inequality. This is possibly because of their belief that 
there are some elements of security and hope, even in the midst of injustice.   
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This essay examines the relations of public spending on social protection with subjective 
well-being in Iraq. In the context of the country’s recent history of violent conflict and everyday 
uncertainties in civic life, public transfers can potentially be strongly predictive of subjective 
well-being, and even play a crucial role in the very survival of Iraqi citizens. This association 
may be stronger in parts of Iraq where security is a greater challenge.  
In addition, government assistance may influence the subjective well-being of vulnerable 
families differently than those that are not so vulnerable. For example, public transfers may have 
a stronger and more positive association with subjective well-being for poorer families. Also, 
public transfers may affect female-headed households differently than male-headed households; 
in a context where lack of jobs is a challenge for all, and women face even greater barriers, 
female-headed households may be much more dependent on government help for survival and 
overall well-being.  
This essay also examines how financial assistance from private sources may differently 
influence subjective well-being. Receiving financial assistance from private sources may have a 
more positive effect on well-being as recipients feel cared for on a more personal level. On the 
other hand, receiving help from private sources may also lead to greater feelings of shame or 
discomfort that one is burdening other families or the community. In other words, “stigma” or 
“disempowerment” effects may in fact be more visible in the case of private assistance than 
public assistance. This is especially pertinent to a country like Iraq where government assistance 
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is often viewed as an entitlement due to the country’s rich natural resource endowments 
(Alzobaidee, 2015).  
Finally, different sources of income – capital income versus assistance – may influence 
the subjective well-being of individuals differently. It is plausible that income received from 
property ownership and assets has a more positive relationship with subjective well-being than 
public/private assistance as it is likely to result in a greater sense of empowerment. 
 
3.2 Motivation  
 
This research adds to the current base of knowledge on how public expenditures and 
government social protection policies influence individuals’ sense of well-being. It contributes to 
the debate between the two main theoretical camps; the welfare economics view and the 
proponents of the welfare state on the one end of the spectrum and the public choice view and 
the critics of the welfare state on the other. Also, it goes beyond the “large versus small 
government” debate and contributes to debates on the types of government programs that best 
promote wellbeing, that is, income transfers versus agency-enhancing initiatives. 
The study is unique in several ways. First, the analysis is conducted in the context of a 
developing country that is both resource-rich and conflict-affected; since many developing 
countries are in a similar context, the findings of this study have broader relevance. While 
limited research has been conducted in developing countries on social spending and subjective 
well-being, few are focused on social protection specifically, and to my knowledge, there is no 
country-level research in conflict-affected and resource-rich developing countries.   
Furthermore, since this study exploits micro data on public transfers, it can more robustly 
identify its relationship with subjective welfare. This type of data helps mitigate concerns that 
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factors such as corruption may distort the influence of social spending at the national level on life 
satisfaction at the individual level – something that is of particular relevance to studies of 
developing countries. This analysis looks at what individuals and families actually receive, i.e. 
after all the leakages that may take place until the assistance reaches the recipients.  
There is also a dearth of studies on subjective well-being in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). Considering the volatility of the region as well as the recently demonstrated 
dissatisfaction with government policies (through civic uprisings), it is important to gain a better 
understanding of the factors that influence individuals’ sense of well-being. This knowledge 
could inform the design of policies that increase citizen satisfaction and in turn promote social 
cohesion and stability.   
Finally, the government of Iraq is considering various reforms and has attempted to 
improve the efficiency of its social protection system. For example, the public distribution 
system involves universal transfers that benefit both the poor and non-poor. This represents a 
great fiscal burden (World Bank, 2011, p. 72). One of the considerations for reform has been to 
move to a more targeted system that benefits predominantly the poor. In this way, the poor 
would continue to benefit from such programs while freed up resources could be used to design 
programs to promote employment, education, and housing for the poor and non-poor alike 
(World Bank, 2014b). The feasibility of such reforms would hinge to a large degree on citizens’ 
assessment of their own well-being under the different programs. Therefore, it is of crucial 
importance to know the relationship between existing programs and subjective welfare in order 





Given Iraq’s unique circumstances and the number of major developments each year, I 
will focus the background review on the few years leading up to 2012, the survey year. This time 
period was relatively stable in the highly unstable Iraqi context - it signifies the significant 
reduction of sectarian violence in 2007/2008 and the relative stability through 2012,5 after which 
developments such as the militancy and insurgency again led to heightened instability (World 
Bank, 2015b). 
 
3.3.1 Historical Context 
 
Iraq has a very rich history and it would be impossible to account for all its complexities 
in this paper. For the purposes of my research, I intend to cover only a few events that have 
significantly affected the country’s development until 2012 as well as the role of the state in 
promoting the well-being of Iraqi citizens. 
In the 1970s, the increase in the price of oil helped the government to play a prominent 
role in the provision of infrastructure and social services. Despite the usual shortcomings of a 
natural resource-driven economy, the oil-financed development during this time worked well. 
However, the changing nature of the Iraqi regime toward greater authoritarianism coupled with 
the Iranian revolution in 1979 changed the geopolitics of the region and led to a new 
development path for Iraq (World Bank, 2014a, p.3).  
                                                 
5 In 2007, the Iraqi civilian fatalities were estimated to be 25501(by the Iraq Body Count) and 23600 (by the US 
Department of Defense). In 2012, the fatalities were estimated to be 4573 (by the Iraq Body Count), and 1317 (by 
the US Department of Defense) (Brookings Institution, 2013) 
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Since the early 1980s, Iraq has been at the center of various types of conflict including 
international war, insurgency, sectarian violence, terrorism, regional fragmentation, and 
spillovers from conflict in other countries (World Bank, 2015b).  First, the1980-88 war with Iran 
was very costly and led to significant destruction. The oil-financed development of the 1970s 
was no longer feasible during this time; while Iraq had tacit foreign support, and was still able to 
export oil and benefit from global trade, defense and food imports became the main priorities of 
economic activity. And while many other developing countries carried out structural reforms and 
reduced state control of the economy during time, in Iraq, the allocative role of the state was 
further centralized (World Bank, 2014a, p.4). 
The second conflict, the invasion of Kuwait, had even more damaging consequences for 
Iraq, particularly as the Arab countries aligned against Iraq and a US-led force intervened. More 
importantly, the invasion of Kuwait led to stringent UN sanctions whereby Iraqi oil export 
revenues had to be paid into a designated bank account, with revenue released only to finance 
approved imports, predominantly food and medicine (World Bank, 2014a, p.5). The Public 
Distribution System (PDS), which was introduced in 1990 and expanded under the Oil-for-Food 
Program, delivered a monthly subsistence ration to most Iraqis (World Bank, 2011, p.72).  
Noteworthy, an unintended consequence of the sanctions was that it further enhanced the state’s 
role as the provider of goods (World Bank, 2014a, p.5). 
The next major conflict was the 2003 US-led war, which was followed by insurgency and 
the 2005/2006 sectarian civil war.  During this time, government spending was focused on 
security as well as on increasing public employment and salaries in order to maintain public 
loyalty (World Bank, 2014a, p.6). Gradually, with restored oil production and higher oil prices, 
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the government’s revenue and spending increased significantly. And there was a relative decline 
in insurgency and sectarian violence from 2008 through 2011/2012.  
 
3.3.2 Economic Growth and Poverty  
 
Between 2007 and 2012, the Iraqi economy grew at an annual rate of 7 percent. This 
growth was driven mainly by the oil sector which accounts for approximately half of Iraq’s GDP 
(World Bank, 2015a). Despite the removal of sanctions in 2003, insecurity and unstable 
relationships with neighboring countries prevented potential growth in trade (World Bank, 
2014a, p.8) and the state remained the main source of economic activity and income. Currently, 
Iraq has one of the largest public sectors in MENA – the public spending to GDP ratio is 61 
percent and half of all employment is in the public sector (World Bank, 2014a, p.8). 
While the economic growth during 2007-2012 resulted in more public sector jobs and 
increased salaries, the poverty rate decreased by only 3.8 percentage points (World Bank, 
2015a). In 2012, approximately 20 percent of Iraqis lived under the poverty line. And a large 
proportion of people remained vulnerable to falling into poverty; if the cost of basic needs such 
as food, fuel, clothing and shelter increased by 10 percent, poverty would increase by more than 
30 percent (World Bank, 2015c).  
So who are the poor in Iraq? One group that may come to mind is female-headed 
households. In 2012, approximately 12 percent of all households were headed by women (of 
which the great majority were widows).6 Surprisingly, female-headed households were not 
poorer than male-headed households; the poverty rate for female-headed households was 16 
percent compared to 20 percent for male-headed households in 2012 (World Bank, 2014a, p.30). 
                                                 
6 Based on my calculation from the household survey data 
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And a smaller proportion of female-headed households were in the lowest income quintiles when 
compared to the proportion of male-headed households in the same quintiles. Of course, this may 
be due to the additional assistance that female-headed households receive from various sources. 
My analysis of the household survey data as well as previous research confirms that this is in fact 
the case; female-headed household are more likely to receive assistance (World Bank, 2011, p. 
79).   
The poverty incidence varies significantly across regions. In 2012, the headcount poverty 
rates in the Kurdish region, Baghdad, and the rest of the country were 12.35, 18.04, and 22.1 
percent respectively (World Bank, 2014b).  
 
3.3.3 Gender Equality and Economic Opportunities 
 
While Iraq is struggling with its overall job creation agenda, the challenge to create 
economic opportunities for women is even greater. The female labor force participation rate in 
Iraq is one of the lowest in the Middle East, a region that already has some of the lowest female 
labor force participation rates in the world. In 2012, the labor force participation rate of Iraqi 
women was 16 percent while that of Iraqi men was 70 percent. Despite this low participation, the 
unemployment rate was much higher for women than men; 23 percent versus 14 percent (World 
Bank WDI, 2016).  
Conflict settings generally restrict women’s access to work as issues of security make it 
challenging to be present and active in the public sphere. The challenges are even greater in Iraq 
where socio-cultural reasons as well as lack of jobs for the population at large lead to a 
preference for providing jobs to men first. Furthermore, job segregation is prevalent and 
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women’s entrance into male-dominated professions, including business and political leadership, 
is forbidden in certain communities (USAID, 2010).  
 
3.3.4 Public Expenditures and Social Protection System 
 
While the Iraqi Constitution designates the country as a federal state, sub-national powers 
are limited (with the exception of the Kurdish region which has more autonomy). Public finance 
policies are established in the capital, Baghdad, and implemented through de-concentrated 
agencies of central ministries in the governorates and municipalities. Over 90 percent of total 
public expenditure is executed through the federal government and its de-concentrated agencies 
(World Bank, 2014a, p.10). This level of centralization may change as a result of power politics 
as well as a revised provincial powers law passed in 2013. However, in 2012 (the year of the 
survey), the system was still predominantly centralized.  
 The nature and size of public expenditures shows the leverage that a state may have in 
affecting citizen welfare. During 2005-2012, total government expenditure accounted for 
approximately half of GDP (Kulaksiz et al., 2014c). Over 20 percent of public expenditures 
consist of transfers and subsidies (see Figure 3.1). Noteworthy, government expenditure in Iraq 
is not dependent on tax revenue in the same way that it is in many other countries; during 2005-
2012, 80 percent of Iraq’s fiscal revenue came from oil receipts while only 2 percent were from 
taxes (Kulaksiz et al., 2014). 
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Figure 3.1: Composition of Public Expenditure, 2005-10 
 
Source: Kulaksiz et.al 2014. The average for years 2005-10 
Note: The social benefits category consists of the PDS, the social protection network, allowances for military employees, and 
expenses for relief and aid for refugees. 
 
The government’s financial assistance to Iraqi citizens consists of many different 
programs. One of these programs is the Public Distribution System (PDS). Iraq’s PDS is the 
world’s largest publicly subsidized food distribution system and has almost universal coverage; it 
covers 99.1 percent of households below the national poverty line and 98.2 percent of 
households above the national poverty line (see Figure 3.2).7 Ration items under this program 
include, among others, wheat flour, rice, sugar, vegetable oil/fat, and infant formula. The 
government is considering reforms of the PDS toward a more targeted system, thereby increasing 
the beneficiary impact in relation to costs (Kulaksiz et al., 2014c). However, since the PDS is of 
a universal nature, and other efficient safety nets are lacking, any major one-shot reform will 
inevitably have adverse welfare effects (World Bank, 2015c). 
                                                 
7 Of families who do not receive rations, the reasons are: household name was removed; household never had a 
ration card; and other (from 2012 household survey) 
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Figure 3.2: Receipt of Different Types of Non-Labor Income  
 
Source: Figure based on my calculation from the 2012 household survey.  
Note: In this figure, poor refers to households under the national poverty line.  
 
 
The other large program is the pension system - among the largest in the MENA region. 
In 2003, as part of other emergency policies, regular pensions were replaced by emergency “flat” 
payments paid directly from the Ministry of Finance budget, with very limited contributions 
from employers and employees (World Bank, 2014a, p.7). Only a quarter of the total labor force 
(most of them public sector workers) in Iraq is covered by the mandatory pension system (World 
Bank, 2014a, p.7). The inefficiency of the pension system has resulted in calls for reform to 
ensure its adequacy, affordability, and fiscal sustainability (World Bank, 2014a, p.7). Currently, 
17.8 percent of all poor households and 26.9 percent of households above the poverty line 
receive pension income (see Figure 3.2).  
 In addition to the ration card system and pensions, the government provides other 
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the social protection network, a cash-based program which was introduced in 2004 and targets 
the poor specifically (World Bank, 2011, p.75). The targeting has not been very efficient and the 
program does not have much coverage; 10.5 percent of poor households and 6.7 percent non-
poor households received transfers from the social protection network. However, the average 
transfer amount from the social protection network is on par with rations and is much greater 
than the other types of cash and in-kind transfers.  
Outside of public assistance, a sizeable number of families receive income assistance 
from private sources. For example, 30.5 percent of families below the poverty line and 33.8 
percent of families above the poverty line receive assistance through zakat (alms) or gifts and 
assistance from other families inside or outside of Iraq. In addition to assistance from private 
sources, three quarters of households, whether poor or not, receive some type of capital income, 
that is, income from assets or property ownership (see Figure 3.2).  The main source of this 
income is rent of residential buildings.  
 While it is useful to know the coverage rate of the various transfers or income sources, 
it is perhaps more informative to know the extent to which they contribute to family income, and 
hence, potentially to subjective well-being. Table 3.1 gives an overall view of the main sources 
of income for Iraqi families. Overall, non-labor income accounts for 32 percent of total income. 
For the poorest income decile, it is significantly higher at 51 percent.  
 
Table 3.1: Income Sources as Share of Total and Non-Labor Income  
 
Share in Total Income (%) Share of Non-Labor Income (%) 
Labor 





Overall 68% 32% 39% 26% 14% 8% 
Lowest 
Decile 49% 51% 60% 13% 11% 3% 
Source: Table based on data in the 2014 World Bank Iraq Poverty Assessment. Data is for year 2012.
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The importance of rations for family income is clear. In 2012, rations accounted for 
approximately 39 percent of families’ non-labor income. This share is as high as 60 percent for 
families in the lowest income decile. Pensions also account for a sizeable portion of family 
income. The significance of public assistance to non-labor income vis-à-vis income from private 
sources is evident. 
 
3.3.5 Subjective Well-Being in Iraq 
 
Iraqis appear to be more dissatisfied with certain aspects of life than others. For example, 
satisfaction with income, housing, work, and education tends to be much lower than satisfaction 
with food or health or freedom of choice and control (see Figure 3.3). However, within each 
category, the level of satisfaction with life varies by region. For example, satisfaction levels in all 
categories are generally lower in Baghdad and the rest of the country than in the Kurdish region.  
 
Figure 3.3: Satisfaction with Different Aspects of Life (% fairly or very satisfied) 
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To get an idea of the factors that may influence life satisfaction the most, I used the 
survey data to examine the correlation between satisfaction with life overall and satisfaction with 
specific aspects of life as shown in Figure 3.3. Satisfaction with food, income, and work are the 
most strongly correlated with life satisfaction. Hence, the food subsidy program (PDS) and other 
public transfers may be influential for life satisfaction.  
3.3.6 Social Protection and Subjective Well-Being in Developing Countries 
 
Social protection programs have addressed issues of poverty and vulnerability by 
supporting higher consumption and improving health, education, employment, and gender 
equality outcomes in developing countries.8 One may wonder whether social protection 
programs are relevant to individuals’ own assessment of their lives in the same way that they are 
to objective poverty, health, and education goals achievements. As discussed in the second 
paper, the association between public spending or government welfare effort and subjective well-
being is not straightforward and can be very country-specific. However, the limited literature 
suggests that the subjective well-being of the poorest and most vulnerable is associated 
positively with social protection spending while the association for the middle-class or rich may 
be non-existent or even negative. Interestingly, stigma effects have been found in developing and 
developed countries alike (Chindarkar, 2012; Swenson, 2015). And it appears that the stigma 
                                                 
8 Examples of programs include Mexico’s Oportunidades and Progresa, Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Human, 
India’s Maharashtra Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, Bangladesh’s Cash for Education and Challenging the Frontiers of 
Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor Programme, Colombia’s Familias en Acción, Peru’s Juntos, Chile’s 
Chile Solidario, Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social, South Africa’s Old Age and Disability Grant and Child 
Support Grant, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Child Labour Eradication Programme, Costa Rica’s Superémonos, 
Mongolia’s Child Money Programme (ILO, 2010) 
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effects of income assistance from private sources are just as strong as the stigma effects of 
income assistance from government programs (Swenson, 2015).   
It is important to keep in mind that when we speak of “stigma” in Iraq, this term is 
defined a little differently than how it is generally conceptualized in developed countries like the 
United States. While the feeling of “shame” involved in the application process for government 
assistance is a component of it, the bureaucratic procedures as well as the “disempowerment” 
effects, whereby the recipient’s sense of autonomy, self-worth, and accomplishment is 
undermined, are likely to account for a greater portion of this stigma. This is because public 
assistance is often viewed as an entitlement in the Iraqi context due to the country’s rich natural 
resource endowments (Alzobaidee, 2015), and therefore, feelings of “shame” for receiving such 
aid may not be as strong in Iraq as they are in other country contexts. 
3.4 Methodology 
 
3.4.1 Research Questions  
 
1. How is public assistance (cash and/or in-kind) associated with life satisfaction?  
 
2. Is this association different by income level, gender of the household head, and region of 
residence?9  
3. How is income assistance from private sources (cash and/or in-kind) associated with life 
satisfaction in comparison to income assistance from public sources? 
 
                                                 
9 My research is focused only on how income, gender, and security affect the social protection spending-life 
satisfaction link. There are other interesting dimensions, such as how the relationship between social spending and 
life satisfaction may vary for different religious groups, such as Sunni versus Shia Muslims. These are important 
nuances that may be explored in greater detail in future research.  
83 
 
4. How is capital income associated with life satisfaction in comparison to public and 
private assistance? 
3.4.2 Empirical Model  
 
The basic model used is the following: 
 
Y = α + ß1Assistance + ß2Assistance*Quintile1+ ß3Assistance*Quintile2+ ß4Assistance* 
Quintile3 + ß5Assistance*Quintile4 + ßnC + G + ε 
 
  
Where Y is life satisfaction (individual level); Assistance is a dummy variable for living 
in a household that is the recipient of public assistance/private assistance/capital income 
(household level); Assistance*Quintile is a dummy for living in a household that is in a certain 
income quintile (determined through per capita household consumption expenditure) and is the 
recipient of public assistance/private assistance/capital income (household level); C is a vector of 
control variables including log of per capita household consumption expenditure, gender, age, 
marital status, health status, household size, education, and unemployment (individual level); G 
is the governorate dummy; and ε is the error term.  The choice of control variables is based on 
what is generally used in subjective well-being research.   
Estimations are based on the OLS and ordered logistics methods. Ordered logit is used 
because the life satisfaction variable is ordinal and based on a 1 to 4 scale. As discussed in the 
second paper, using OLS or alternatively ordered logit appears to have little effect on the results 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004), particularly when observing the direction and significance 
of coefficients. Furthermore, using robust standard errors corrects for heteroscedasticity that may 
result from using OLS with ordinal dependent variables. Therefore, for ease of interpretation and 
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discussion, I present the OLS results in the paper while including all ordered logit results in 
Appendix 3.C. Both types of estimations are weighted to better represent the population in each 
Qadha (district). Furthermore, robust standard errors are used. The analysis is conducted for all 
households but also by the gender of the household head as well as by region of residence. The 
regions are the Kurdish region (3 governorates)10 and the rest of Iraq including Baghdad (15 
governorates). 
3.4.3 Data Description 
 
The analysis is based on data from the 2012 Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey, the 
second household socio-economic survey carried out in the country. The survey, conducted by 
the Government of Iraq and the World Bank, is representative of the Iraqi population and 
includes 25,146 households and 176,042 individuals across Iraq’s 18 governorates and 118 
districts. The survey is the most comprehensive ever carried out in Iraq and contains information 
on, among other things, household consumption expenditure, life satisfaction, demographics, 
education, health, anthropometrics, housing and living conditions, migration, income sources, 
household shocks and coping strategies, rations, employment, access to justice, and time use. It 
is also the first household survey in the Middle East region to contain subjective well-being 
questions.   
Table 3.2 contains summary statistics of all variables. A detailed description of all 
variables and survey questions can be found in Appendix 3.A. The dependent variable, life 
satisfaction, is based on a survey question that asks: “In general, how satisfied or unsatisfied are 
                                                 
10 Duhok, Sulaimaniya, and Erbil. 
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you with your life overall?” Respondents have the options “very satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” 
“not very satisfied,” and “not at all satisfied.”  
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
Dependent Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Values 
Life Satisfaction 100582 2.918 .755 1 4 1-4; 1-very dissatisfied, 2-fairly 
dissatisfied, 3-fairly satisfied, 4-very 
satisfied 
Independent Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Values 
Received Any Assistance 
 
175925 
.565 .496 0 1 




.988 .111 0 1 
0-1; 1= household received ration 
Received Pension  
 
71062 .476 .499 0 1 0-1; 1= household received pension 
 
Received Social Protection 
Network Transfer  
 
176042 .082 .274 0 1 0-1; 1= household received a transfer 
from the social protection network 
 
Received Private Assistance  
 
176042 .312 .463 0 1 0-1; 1= household received private 
assistance 
Received Capital Income  
 
176042 .800 .400 0 1 0-1; 1= household received income from 
assets and property ownership 
Control Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Values 
Gender 
 
176042 .503 .500 0 1 0-1; 1-Female 
Age  
 
176041 23.143 18.706 0 120 Continuous  
Marital Status 
 
114336 .540 .498 0 1 0-1; 1-Married 
Health Status 
 
176038 .884 .320 0 1 0-1; 1-Healthy 
Education Status 
 
143764 .857 .350 0 1 0-1; 1-is attending/has attended school  
Employment Status 
 
90787 .091 .287 0 1 0-1; 1-unemployed 
Household Consumption 
Expenditure/Capita  












174863 5.106 .520 2.946 8.083 Continuous 
 




The “received” of a particular income variable is based on survey questions that ask 
whether anyone in the household received a particular type of income. The public assistance 
categories include rations, pensions, and social protection network transfers. The private income 
sources include cash and in-kind transfers from other families and religious institutions as well as 
capital income. The details of each income category are in Appendix 3.A. Most variables are 
straightforward but a few require additional explanation. “Received Any Assistance” is based on 
a survey question that asks whether the household received any assistance, cash or other than 
cash, during the past 12 months. This includes assistance from any public or private sources. For 
the variable “Received Pension” I included only two types of households in the analysis; those 
where at least one person is above the age of retirement and those in which at least one member 
is a widow. This is because it wouldn’t make sense to include in the analysis households that 
should not be receiving a pension (for example household where all members are young and/or 
no one has a deceased spouse for which they receive a pension), thereby comparing non-
comparable groups. Private assistance includes traditional zakat (alms) as well as cash and in-
kind assistance from other families inside and outside of Iraq. Capital income includes all 
income from assets and property ownership. It should be noted that my research looks only at 
whether assistance (or other types of income) is received or not, not how much is received in 
monetary terms. This is particularly beneficial since individuals are generally more hesitant to 
report on amounts than on whether they receive a certain type of income or not. Therefore, the 
likelihood of getting truthful and accurate answers is higher.  
For health status, I used a question that asked whether the household member had a 
chronic illness or not. For education, I used a question that asked whether a household member 
was attending/had ever attended school or not. There was also a question on the literacy of 
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household members but there were significantly fewer observations for that than for the school 
attendance question. For employment status, two questions were used to determine 
unemployment according to ILO criteria. The questions asked how many hours the person 




Based on the literature linking government welfare effort to subjective well-being, Iraq 
background review, and the data, the following are some results that I expect to find.  
 
1. On average, the association between public assistance and life satisfaction is positive. 
 
In a volatile economic and security environment, public assistance may be one of few 
stable sources of income to relieve economic hardship. Related to this is that public assistance 
accounts for a sizeable portion of non-labor income in Iraq. Also, since public expenditure is 
financed predominantly through natural resource revenues (rather than taxes), it is likely to have 
an overall positive influence.   
 
2. On average, the association between public assistance and life satisfaction is more 
positive/less negative for the poor. 
 
The poor in developing countries are likely to live under dire conditions. Hence, the 
benefit of any additional income is likely to outweigh all negative contributing factors including 




3. On average, the association between public assistance and life satisfaction is more 
positive/less negative for female-headed households than male-headed households.  
 
While the poverty rate is lower for households headed by women than those headed by 
men, women have less access to economic opportunities and may therefore be more dependent 
on public assistance. Hence, the benefit of receiving any additional income outweighs all 
negative influences for female-headed households. 
 
4. On average, the association between public assistance and life satisfaction is more 
positive/less negative in the “rest of Iraq” than in the Kurdish region. 
 
Living conditions are better and security higher in the Kurdish region.11 Individuals who 
live in the Kurdish region are more satisfied with their level of income, work, and security than 
individuals who live in the rest of Iraq. Furthermore, incomes are higher and poverty levels 
lower in the Kurdish region than in the rest of the country. Therefore, additional income may not 
be as critical in the Kurdish region as it is in the “rest of Iraq.” 
 
5. On average, the association between life satisfaction and income assistance from 
private sources is negative. 
 
There may be strong stigma and disempowerment effects attached to private assistance. 
More specifically, knowing the person or community that provides this assistance may result in 
                                                 
11 Data from the 2012 household survey show that that average income is higher and poverty rates lower in the 
Kurdish region; the mean expenditure/person/month is approximately 280, 000 dinars in the Kurdish region versus 
175, 000 in the rest of the country. Furthermore, the higher security level in the Kurdish region in 2012 is confirmed 
by the Iraq Body Count which collects data on civilian casualties in different regions of Iraq and for different years. 
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strong feelings of shame. Moreover, income assistance from private sources may have 
undesirable conditions attached to it and the assistance flow may be uncertain and unreliable.  
 
6. On average, the association between capital income and life satisfaction is positive. 
 
Capital income may give a more “empowering” feeling than the sense of ”shame” or 
“dependency” that may accompany public/private assistance.  
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
 
What follows is a presentation and discussion of the results. In almost all cases, the OLS 
and ordered logit regressions show similar results in terms of both direction and significance. 
Therefore, for ease of interpretation, I present only the OLS results in the paper. Full results are 
included in Appendix 3.B (OLS) and 3.C (ordered logit).   
 
3.5.1 Assistance and Life Satisfaction  
 
A first question is whether living in a household that receives any type of assistance, 
public or private, is predictive of life satisfaction. Before answering this question, it is interesting 
to see whether the control variables are related to life satisfaction in a way that would be 
predicted by prior research. Consistent with the existing literature, per capita consumption 
expenditure (income), being a woman, married, healthy, and attending/attended school are 
related positively with life satisfaction while being unemployed is related negatively with life 
satisfaction. Across all estimations, per capita consumption expenditure, education, and 
unemployment are powerful predictors of life satisfaction in Iraq. 
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Table 3.3: Any Assistance and Life Satisfaction  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedAnyAssistance -0.139*** -0.247*** -0.124*** 0.0748*** -0.232*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0493) (0.0172) (0.0257) (0.0200) 
      
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile1 0.0228 0.154** 0.00679 -0.208** 0.121*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0782) (0.0227) (0.0818) (0.0252) 
      
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile2 0.0163 0.130** -0.000481 0.0642 0.0845*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0647) (0.0210) (0.0428) (0.0228) 
      
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile3 0.0710*** 0.0454 0.0730*** 0.000317 0.129*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0632) (0.0199) (0.0364) (0.0218) 
      
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile4 0.0122 0.114** -0.00378 -0.00406 0.0464** 
 (0.0189) (0.0535) (0.0202) (0.0332) (0.0219) 
      
Female 0.0127* 0.0246 0.0123 -0.00511 0.0150* 
 (0.00770) (0.0277) (0.00808) (0.0178) (0.00847) 
      
Age 0.00162*** 0.00192* 0.00166*** 0.00173** 0.00163*** 
 (0.000286) (0.00107) (0.000298) (0.000675) (0.000314) 
      
Married 0.0291*** 0.0649** 0.0212** 0.0546*** 0.0209** 
 (0.00848) (0.0273) (0.00922) (0.0191) (0.00943) 
      
Educated 0.0919*** 0.0990*** 0.0899*** 0.0366* 0.104*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0350) (0.0107) (0.0212) (0.0117) 
      
Healthy 0.0537*** 0.0471 0.0532*** 0.0473** 0.0570*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0331) (0.0116) (0.0224) (0.0122) 
      
Unemployed -0.111*** -0.101** -0.111*** -0.121*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0413) (0.0163) (0.0319) (0.0168) 
      
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.211*** 0.258*** 0.206*** 0.122*** 0.259*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0358) (0.0113) (0.0221) (0.0124) 
      
Household size 0.0182*** 0.0264*** 0.0173*** 0.00823*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.000894) (0.00333) (0.000929) (0.00274) (0.000947) 
      
Constant 2.153*** 1.981*** 2.176*** 2.651*** 1.415*** 
 (0.0636) (0.210) (0.0667) (0.138) (0.0692) 
      
Observations 85,606 7,700 77,906 19,513 66,093 
R-squared 0.156 0.185 0.154 0.074 0.138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: governorate dummies are included in the regression model but not presented in the table
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Moving to the main question, the analysis shows that receiving any type of assistance is, 
on average, associated negatively with life satisfaction (see Table 3.3).  In Iraq as a whole, 
individuals who live in households that receive any assistance are 0.139 points lower on the life 
satisfaction scale (which goes from 1 to 4, with 4 being very satisfied) than those who live in 
households that do not receive any assistance. However, it appears that this negative association 
is mitigated (but not fully cancelled out) in the lower income quintiles. This is especially visible 
when looking at the “rest of Iraq” sample. In this region, receiving assistance is, on average, 
associated with a 0.232 point lower life satisfaction. But for households in the lowest income 
quintile, it is associated with a 0.111 point lower life satisfaction (-0.232+ 0.121).  
Contrary to expectation, the negative association between receiving any assistance and 
life satisfaction is greater for female-headed households than male-headed households (-0.247 
versus -0.124). This is possibly because male-headed households are, on average, poorer than 
female-headed households. When the comparison is between households at the same income 
level, such as in the lowest income quintile, the negative association is, as expected, smaller in 
magnitude for female-headed households than for male-headed households. It is -0.093 (-
0.247+0.154) for female-headed households and -0.117 (-0.124 + 0.00679) for male-headed 
households.  
When contrasting regions, the regression results show that assistance and life satisfaction 
are related positively in the Kurdish region and negatively in other parts of Iraq. This finding is 
contrary to what was expected since living conditions in the Kurdish region are better than in the 
rest of the country. One explanation to this unexpected finding is that a smaller proportion of 
households in the Kurdish region receive assistance in general when compared to households in 
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other parts of the country.12  Therefore, assistance of any type may be a surprising and welcome 
addition to family income.  
3.5.2 Rations and Life Satisfaction 
 
Moving to public assistance specifically, I start with the PDS program. Table 3.4 shows 
how rations are related to life satisfaction (the full table with all control variables is in Appendix 
3.B).  As noted previously, the PDS has almost universal coverage – over 98 percent of families 
receive rations. Also, rations account for the largest component of non-labor income for families.   
 
Table 3.4: Rations and Life Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedRation -0.0320 -0.260* -0.0218 0.370*** -0.101** 
 (0.0449) (0.137) (0.0464) (0.123) (0.0474) 
      
ReceivedRation*Quintile1 0.0929*** 0.0953 0.0925*** -0.0924 0.149*** 
 (0.0330) (0.106) (0.0347) (0.0704) (0.0390) 
      
ReceivedRation*Quintile2 0.0701*** 0.0473 0.0701*** -0.0273 0.107*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0786) (0.0262) (0.0459) (0.0292) 
      
ReceivedRation*Quintile3 0.108*** -0.00604 0.121*** 0.0207 0.136*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0652) (0.0212) (0.0380) (0.0235) 
      
ReceivedRation*Quintile4 0.0734*** 0.0790 0.0708*** 0.0455 0.0840*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0489) (0.0169) (0.0280) (0.0188) 
      
Constant 1.789*** 2.122*** 1.778*** 2.314*** 1.068*** 
 (0.127) (0.395) (0.134) (0.248) (0.151) 
      
Observations 85,653 7,700 77,953 19,513 66,140 
R-squared 0.152 0.176 0.151 0.075 0.130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: governorate dummies and all control variables are included in the regression model but have not been presented in the 
table. 
                                                 
12 Based on my calculation of the 2012 survey data 
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The results show that, on average, living in a household that is the recipient of rations 
does not have a significant relationship to life satisfaction in Iraq (although the ordered logit 
result is significant and negative). However, among those who are in the lowest four income 
quintiles, the association is positive, albeit very modest.  For example, in the poorest quintile, 
receiving rations is associated with a 0.06 point higher life satisfaction. A look at the other sub-
samples (FHH, MHH, and the rest of Iraq) confirms that the negative association is either 
mitigated or becomes positive for the poorest individuals.  
Once again, the negative relationship between rations and life satisfaction is, on average, 
greater for female-headed households than for male-headed households. In fact, at -0.260, it is 
very large in magnitude for female-headed households. And surprisingly, the findings do not 
change when comparing poor female-headed households to poor male-headed households. A 
more detailed analysis shows that the results in this regression should be interpreted with 
caution. It is plausible that, since the ration program is almost universal, there are too few 
observations of female-headed households that don’t receive rations to create a valid comparison 
group. The sample data shows that, among the 7700 individuals who live in female-headed 
households, only 46 live in households that do not receive rations. Splitting them up by income 
quintile, it becomes clear that there are just too few observations within each quintile to draw any 
firm conclusions. The number of observations for the lower quintiles is around 10 and as low as 
5 for the third quintile. This means that only one or two female-headed households within each 
quintile do not receive rations.   
 The results by region show, once again, that receiving rations is associated positively 
with life satisfaction in the Kurdish region while the association is negative in the rest of Iraq. 
The reason for this is unclear. However, as discussed before, it may be explained by the fact that 
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a smaller proportion of households in the Kurdish region receive assistance. Therefore, rations 
and other types of assistance may simply be a welcome addition to family income. Another 
possible reason is rooted in the historical relations of the Kurds with the central government; 
perhaps, because the flow of assistance from Baghdad has fluctuated and depended on political 
events and other issues, receiving assistance from the central government may be viewed in a 
more positive light in this region. A final explanation is that there may be something unique in 
the way that the de-concentrated government agencies in the Kurdish region implement social 
protection programs. I leave these questions to be explored in future research.   
 
3.5.3 Pensions and Life Satisfaction 
 
The next public transfer category is pensions. I include in this analysis only households 
that have at least one member who is above the official age of retirement and households in 
which at least one resident is a widow. Table 3.5 shows the regression results.  
Overall, receiving a pension is not predictive of life satisfaction in Iraq. However, this is 
not true for the poor. For the lowest income quintile, for example, the relationship between 
receiving a pension and life satisfaction is 0.057 (-0.0006 + 0.0580).  This positive, albeit 
modest, association for the poor is visible in all the subsamples, except in the Kurdish region. 




Table 3.5: Pensions and Life Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedPension -0.000563 0.0120 -0.000724 0.0218 -0.00569 
 (0.0212) (0.0444) (0.0243) (0.0361) (0.0258) 
      
ReceivedPension*Quintile1 0.0580** 0.0442 0.0586* -0.246** 0.0739** 
 (0.0294) (0.0670) (0.0329) (0.122) (0.0333) 
      
ReceivedPension*Quintile2 0.0359 0.0794 0.0172 -0.0467 0.0434 
 (0.0268) (0.0592) (0.0300) (0.0614) (0.0306) 
      
ReceivedPension*Quintile3 0.0585** -0.161*** 0.111*** -0.00946 0.0643** 
 (0.0254) (0.0606) (0.0276) (0.0578) (0.0294) 
      
ReceivedPension*Quintile4 0.0579** 0.0260 0.0615** 0.0674* 0.0510* 
 (0.0225) (0.0460) (0.0260) (0.0394) (0.0272) 
      
Constant 2.196*** 2.216*** 2.207*** 2.529*** 1.611*** 
 (0.0895) (0.225) (0.0977) (0.191) (0.0935) 
      
Observations 40,924 6,730 34,194 8,493 32,431 
R-squared 0.153 0.187 0.150 0.098 0.128 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




There are no significant differences between female- and male-headed households in 
terms of how pensions predict life satisfaction; the result for both groups is not significant. 
Similarly, there are no differences between regions.  
  
3.5.4 Social Protection Network Transfers and Life Satisfaction 
 
 The final category of public assistance is transfers from the Social Protection 
Network. In contrast to rations and pensions, this assistance is intended for the poor specifically, 
even though the targeting has not been efficient and many non-poor families also benefit from 
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the program. On average, being a recipient household of Social Protection Network transfers is 
associated negatively with life satisfaction, irrespective of the region of residence and the gender 
of the household head (see Table 3.6).  However, as expected, the negative association is 
mitigated and sometimes fully offset in the lowest income quintile.  
  
Table 3.6: Social Protection Network Transfers and Life Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
Received_ Socprotnet -0.134*** -0.394*** -0.0638* -0.0710* -0.175*** 
 (0.0373) (0.112) (0.0329) (0.0398) (0.0631) 
      
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile1 0.0824* 0.364*** 0.00891 0.184** 0.122* 
 (0.0446) (0.126) (0.0425) (0.0765) (0.0681) 
      
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile2 0.0737* 0.559*** -0.0393 -0.124* 0.121* 
 (0.0427) (0.120) (0.0401) (0.0746) (0.0667) 
      
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile3 0.210*** 0.260* 0.187*** 0.202*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0450) (0.142) (0.0412) (0.0535) (0.0692) 
      
Received_ Socprotnet*Quintile4 0.134*** 0.415*** 0.0543 0.124** 0.151** 
 (0.0475) (0.128) (0.0467) (0.0547) (0.0742) 
      
Constant 2.090*** 2.075*** 2.106*** 2.638*** 1.484*** 
 (0.0574) (0.175) (0.0608) (0.125) (0.0590) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
R-squared 0.152 0.181 0.150 0.072 0.129 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: governorate dummies and all control variables are included in the regression model but have not been presented in the 
table.  
 
 Similar to the case of rations, the negative association between social protection transfers 
and life satisfaction is, on average, greater for female-headed households than male-headed 
households. But as expected, when comparing female- and male-headed households in the same 
income quintile, the negative association is smaller in magnitude (positive in some of the income 
97 
 
quintile) for female-headed households. Once again, the data shows that the negative relationship 
is greater in magnitude in the rest of Iraq than in the Kurdish region; -0.175 versus -0.071. 
As the results show, all categories of public assistance are, on average, associated 
negatively with life satisfaction. Depending on the public assistance program, the negative 
association is either modest and insignificant, or alternatively, significant and relatively large in 
magnitude. This may be due to differences in the quality of the programs and the way in which 
they are administered. I leave these to be explored in future research.  
 
3.5.5 Private Assistance and Life Satisfaction 
 
Having covered the different public assistance programs, it is interesting to see whether 
receiving cash and in-kind transfers from private sources is related differently to life satisfaction 
than receiving the transfers from public sources. It has been suggested that receiving help from 
other families or charities indicates care and results in more meaningful and closer relationships 
between people, and hence, may contribute to a higher satisfaction with life for recipients. 
Alternatively, the “stigma” or “disempowerment” effect may in fact be much greater if the 
recipient knows the provider of assistance on a personal level. It may lead to greater shame and 
feelings of indebtedness in comparison to public assistance which is funded by unknown tax 
payers or through natural resource revenues.   
Table 3.7 shows the relationship between life satisfaction and income assistance from 
private sources. “Private assistance” consists of zakat as well as cash and in-kind transfers from 
families inside and outside of Iraq. Similar to public assistance, private assistance is associated 
negatively with life satisfaction (except for in the Kurdish region).  On average, receiving 
assistance from private sources is associated with a 0.094 point lower life satisfaction score.  
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In contrast to public assistance, the negative association between private transfers and life 
satisfaction is not always mitigated in the poorer households. In fact, the negative association is 
even greater for those in the lowest income quintile in the full sample as well as among male-
headed households and Kurdish households. This is indicative of the strong stigma effects that 
many be attached to private transfers. 
 
Table 3.7: Private Assistance and Life Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedPrivateAssist -0.0941*** -0.135*** -0.0874*** 0.0285 -0.150*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0499) (0.0192) (0.0260) (0.0233) 
      
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile1 -0.0592** 0.0506 -0.0738*** -0.281*** 0.00697 
 (0.0260) (0.0724) (0.0280) (0.0836) (0.0305) 
      
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile2 -0.0600** 0.0729 -0.0775*** 0.00606 -0.0232 
 (0.0244) (0.0672) (0.0262) (0.0438) (0.0290) 
      
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile3 0.0536** 0.0212 0.0598*** -0.0278 0.0967*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0590) (0.0232) (0.0412) (0.0262) 
      
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile4 -0.0240 0.0697 -0.0427* -0.0508 0.00201 
 (0.0231) (0.0573) (0.0254) (0.0366) (0.0287) 
      
Constant 2.241*** 2.177*** 2.250*** 2.798*** 1.577*** 
 (0.0604) (0.208) (0.0632) (0.135) (0.0628) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
R-squared 0.156 0.177 0.154 0.073 0.135 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




As was found with other types of assistance, the negative association between private 
assistance and life satisfaction is of greater magnitude for female-headed households than for 
male-headed households. And again, the association is reversed when female- and male-headed 
household in the same income quintile are compared to each other. Consistent with previous 
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findings, the life satisfaction of those who live in the rest of Iraq is associated negatively with 
private assistance while this is not the case in the Kurdish region.  
 
3.5.6 Capital Income and Life Satisfaction 
 
As a point of contrast, it is informative to see how capital income is predictive of life 
satisfaction vis-à-vis public and private transfers. Assuming that people feel more self-reliant and 
“empowered” through income from their own assets and property, it should have positive 
consequences for subjective well-being. 
As expected, the relationship between life satisfaction and capital income is positive (see 
Table 3.8). On average, individuals in households that receive capital income are likely to be 
0.08 points more satisfied with life. The positive association is visible in all sub-samples but is 
particularly strong for female-headed households where receiving income from property 
ownership and assets is linked to a 0.16 point higher life satisfaction score.   
The positive association between capital income and life satisfaction is slightly greater 
for those in the lower income quintiles. This holds for some sub-samples (such as MHH and the 
rest of Iraq) but not others (such as FHH and the Kurdish Region). This inconsistency is 
possibility due to the fact that poor households are less likely to have capital income, and when 
they do, the amount is very small and insignificant in relation to total household income. As 
noted in the background section, capital income accounts for only 1.5 percent of total family 
income for the lowest income decile.   
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Table 3.8: Capital Income and Life Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedCapital 0.0812*** 0.163*** 0.0701*** 0.0687** 0.0878*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0531) (0.0189) (0.0290) (0.0217) 
      
ReceivedCapital*Quintile1 0.0324 -0.0830 0.0477* -0.115 0.0380 
 (0.0245) (0.0817) (0.0258) (0.0720) (0.0285) 
      
ReceivedCapital*Quintile2 0.0238 -0.0739 0.0351* -0.0249 0.0224 
 (0.0195) (0.0634) (0.0206) (0.0410) (0.0227) 
      
ReceivedCapital*Quintile3 0.0669*** -0.0864 0.0853*** 0.0570* 0.0607*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0536) (0.0178) (0.0342) (0.0196) 
      
ReceivedCapital*Quintile4 0.0522*** -0.0104 0.0597*** 0.0775*** 0.0377** 
 (0.0146) (0.0447) (0.0155) (0.0268) (0.0173) 
      
Constant 1.985*** 2.253*** 1.958*** 2.600*** 1.371*** 
 (0.0833) (0.250) (0.0886) (0.172) (0.0940) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
R-squared 0.155 0.178 0.154 0.076 0.133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




On average, female-headed households appear to benefit more from capital income than 
male-headed households. And people who live in the “rest of Iraq” benefit slightly more than 
people who live in the Kurdish region. 
 
3.5.7 Summary of Findings and Discussion 
 
After reviewing the results, it is evident that some of the original hypotheses are 
supported while others are rejected. First, public assistance is, on average, associated negatively 
with life satisfaction in Iraq. Sometimes the negative association is modest and insignificant, and 
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other times, significant and relatively large in magnitude, depending on the type of public 
assistance. And with the exception of the Kurdish region, this finding holds in all sub-samples 
and for all types of public assistance. Therefore, the hypothesis that public assistance has a 
positive relationship with life satisfaction is rejected. Seemingly, “stigma” and/or 
“disempowerment” effects of public assistance are strong, even in a conflict-affected, natural 
resource-rich developing country like Iraq. This finding supports the procedural utility 
hypothesis (discussed in the first paper) which promotes the idea that individuals are not only 
concerned with outcomes but also procedures that lead to the particular outcome.  
The second hypothesis concerned the association between public assistance and life 
satisfaction for the relatively poor vis-à-vis the relatively rich. The assumption was that the 
association between the two variables would be more positive (or less negative) for the poor.  
This assumption is supported by the data for all public assistance categories including rations, 
pension, and social protection network transfers.  
The third hypothesis was that the association between public assistance and life 
satisfaction would be more positive (or less negative) for female-headed households than for 
male-headed households. Surprisingly, the association between rations as well as social 
protection network transfers and life satisfaction is actually more negative for households headed 
by women than households headed by men. This could be explained by the fact that male-headed 
households are, on average, poorer than female-headed households. This idea is confirmed when 
female- and male-headed households in the same income quintile are compared to each other. 
For example, when comparing female- and male-headed households in the poorest income 
quintile, the association between life satisfaction and public assistance is more positive/less 
negative for female-headed households. Hence, the original hypothesis is partly supported and 
102 
 
partly rejected; the association between public assistance and life satisfaction is more 
positive/less negative for female-headed households, but only when the comparison is between 
households at a similar income level.  
The fourth hypothesis was that the association between public assistance and life 
satisfaction is more positive/less negative in the “rest of Iraq” than in the Kurdish region. This 
assumption was based on the fact that living conditions and the security situation is relatively 
worse in the “rest of Iraq” than in the Kurdish region. The analysis rejects this hypothesis. While 
public assistance is, on average, associated negatively with life satisfaction in the rest of Iraq, 
this is not always the case in the Kurdish region.  In fact, the association is generally either 
positive or less negative in the Kurdish region than found elsewhere in the country.  
The fifth hypothesis, that life satisfaction is related negatively to income assistance from 
private sources, is supported by the data. With the exception of the Kurdish region, assistance 
from private sources is, on average, associated negatively to life satisfaction in all sub-samples. 
The magnitude of this negative association is greater than that found for rations and pensions but 
not for social protection network transfers. And interestingly, this negative association is not 
always mitigated for the poorest families. 
Finally, in contrast to income assistance, capital income is positively associated with life 
satisfaction. As expected, it appears that individuals may feel more empowered, proud, and 
fulfilled by this type of income than public and private transfers. Hence, the final hypothesis is 
confirmed and the procedural utility hypothesis is further supported.  
As with any research method, there are some weaknesses in my method as well.  One 
issue is that of causality. Since the data is not over time, it is not possible to see how changes in 
one variable affect another. Also, one may wonder if there are issues of reverse causality, i.e. that 
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life satisfaction determines whether an individual or family receives assistance. Certainly, it is 
plausible that a person who is not content with life communicates this to friends, relatives, and/or 
the local mosque and is thus helped financially. Similarly, a person who is happy may have more 
enthusiasm and energy to engage in income-generating activities such as renting out property. 
Reverse causality may be a valid concern for the private assistance and capital income analyses 
but it is unlikely to be the case for public assistance. Receiving public assistance is based on 
certain income criteria and not on whether people have expressed satisfaction with life. And 
programs such as the PDS do not have any income requirements.  
Another issue is the lack of information about cases where individuals/families are denied 
assistance. For example, receiving assistance may contribute to an individual feeling less positive 
about his/her life overall. However, being in need of, and not receiving assistance, is possibly an 
even worse and more frustrating situation. Therefore, in this scenario, receiving public transfers 
may actually be beneficial to life satisfaction in comparison to a situation where a person is in 
dire need of but denied aid.  
Finally, one may wonder whether analyzing these relationships on all household 
members, rather than the direct recipient, is an accurate representation of the relationship 
between the two variables. While this is a valid point, the counter argument is that including the 
direct recipient alone would not allow for full use of the rich life satisfaction data in the survey. 
Moreover, while the association between any type of income and life satisfaction may be 
strongest and most visible for the direct recipient, it is unlikely to be insignificant for other 
household members. In a community-based culture like that in Iraq and many other developing 
countries, additions to family income tend to benefit other family members as well, maybe even 
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as much as the direct recipient. Therefore, assuming that additional income to the family affects 
all family members in some way is a logical assumption.  
 
3.6 Policy Implications 
 
These research findings have implications for social protection policies in Iraq. The 
recommendations here are more relevant/applicable to times characterized by greater stability in 
Iraq. In current times, when instability, food insecurity and other issues have left the Iraqi 
population heavily dependent on government assistance, any changes to the social protection 
system may result in serious humanitarian and political crises.   
As the Government of Iraq aims to reform the social protection system and its various 
programs in the future, a few considerations will be of particular significance. First, since self-
generated income is more conducive to life satisfaction than income assistance, the government 
should intensify its efforts to create jobs and promote entrepreneurship. Furthermore, it should 
ensure stronger enforcement of land and property rights laws, particularly since income from 
assets and property ownership is predictive of life satisfaction in Iraq.  
In reforming the social protection system specifically, the best approach for the 
government is to invest in non-stigmatizing forms of income support. Social protection and 
poverty alleviation interventions should emphasize self-reliance rather than dependency. In 
striking a balance between addressing the dire needs of the poor and promoting programs that 
emphasize self-reliance, the government has a few options. The first option is to implement 
programs that combine “livelihood-protection” and “livelihood-promotion” components. These 
are, for example, programs that combine income transfers with a second component such as 
skills training. Another option is to roll out different programs for different income groups. For 
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example, cash and in-kind transfer programs for the poorest individuals/families and 
employment and training programs for middle- and high-income earners.  
In considering different options, it is important to keep in mind the highly politicized 
nature of social protection programs in Iraq (Alzobaidee, 2015). The suspension of any program 
will have heavy political implications, particularly because the programs are viewed as 
entitlements and people have benefited from them over long periods of time. Consequently, the 
best approach in terminating any social protection program is to replace it with another scheme, 
even if the latter is of a temporary nature. For example, if the Government wishes to move 
toward a more targeted PDS, it should consider replacing the program for middle- and high-
income earners with another intervention such as skills training. 
Finally, as the Government of Iraq aims to maximize the benefits of its social 
protection/poverty alleviation interventions, it should consider including subjective well-being 
alongside objective well-being in its program design and evaluation framework. This is to inform 
policy in terms of programs that can achieve the greatest and most sustainable impact without 




 Subjective and objective well-being are complementary measures of development. As 
this research concludes, subjective and objective well-being do not always move in the same 
direction. For example, additions to income (regardless of the source) contribute positively to 
individuals’ objective well-being. But this is not always the case with subjective well-being. The 
source of income is an important predictor of subjective well-being, even in a conflict-affected 
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and natural resource-rich developing country like Iraq. Self-generated income is more conducive 
to life satisfaction than income transfers from public and private sources. 
This study finds evidence in support of both the public choice and welfare economics 
theories. On average, public spending on social protection is associated negatively with life 
satisfaction, possibly due to an overall sense of loss of autonomy, self-worth, and creativity for 
recipients (as the public choice theory and the critics of the welfare state would predict). But for 
the poor, public spending on social protection is generally positive (as the welfare economics 
view and the proponents of the welfare state would predict). These findings underline the need to 
design policies and implement social protection programs that protect the poor while 
emphasizing self-reliance rather than dependency. 
As the Government of Iraq attempts to reform its social protection system, the findings of 
this and future research are very important. They inform policy by providing insight into the 
types of social protection programs that are most conducive to the subjective well-being of 
different cohorts in Iraq. They further shed light on the political feasibility of different social 
spending policies, something that is of great importance in all countries but even more so in 







I use World Values Survey (WVS) and Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID)13 data from 1981 through 
2014 to show how the national-level Gini index is associated with life satisfaction across country income groups. I use OLS and 
ordered logit and control for a variety of factors that are generally included in standard models of subjective well-being. The empirical 
model is: 
Yict = α + β1Xict + βnRict + C + T + εict  
where Y is life satisfaction (individual level); X is Gini Index (national level); R is a vector of control variables for individual 
characteristics including sex, age, health status, marital status, income, education level, and unemployment status (all individual level); 
C is the country dummy; T is the year dummy; and ε is the error term.  Lower case letters signify individual i living in country c in 
year t. The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size 
variability. I run the regressions with data from Wave 3 of the World Values Survey (covering 54 countries over the 1994-1999 time 
period – see Appendix 2.C for a list of countries) since this is the wave I will use for my main research questions. However, since the 
Wave 3 countries, split by country income group, do not allow for much variation in the national-level Gini index, I also analyze the 
                                                 
13 SWIID is better suited to cross-national research on income inequality than previously available sources: it offers greater coverage than other income 
inequality datasets and its record of comparability is three to eight times better than those of alternate datasets (SWIID Website). 
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association using a sample with data from all six waves of the World Values Surveys (covering 100 countries over the 1981-2014 time 
period—see Appendix 2.C for a list of countries).  The regression results for both samples can be seen in the following tables.   
 
NATIONAL-LEVEL GINI INDEX (SWIID) 
ALL WVS WAVES (Wave 1 through 6) 













(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LIC LMI UMI HIC 
    
0.304*** 0.0205 0.0388 0.00863 
(0.0752) (0.0770) (0.0322) (0.0278) 
    
-5.131* 4.142 6.103*** 7.793*** 
(2.596) (2.498) (1.380) (0.872) 
    
33,208 62,998 49,236 56,725 
0.253 0.258 0.191 0.218 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LIC LMI UMI HIC 
    
0.246*** 0.0199 0.0204 0.0275 
(0.0703) (0.0607) (0.0299) (0.0371) 
    
    
    
    
33,208 62,998 49,236 56,725 
 
WVS WAVE 3 













(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LIC LMI UMI HIC 
    
0.160*** 3.101*** 0.414*** 0.00434 
(0.0219) (0.161) (0.0250) (0.00400) 
    
-1.268 -133.1*** -11.18*** 6.619*** 
(1.745) (7.009) (1.168) (0.201) 
    
10,367 20,780 9,965 11,136 
0.271 0.311 0.185 0.196 
 
(1)   (4) 
LIC   HIC 
    
0.130***   0.0145*** 
(0.0162)   (0.00394) 
    
    
 
 
   
10,367   11,136 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 
time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability.  





I use the same methodology described in Appendix 2.A to examine the association between national-level public expenditures 
and life satisfaction across country income groups. 
 
 
OBJECTIVE NATIONAL-LEVEL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE VARIABLES (WDI) 
ALL WVS WAVES (Wave 1 through 6) 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 




(0.0222) (0.0571) (0.0698) (0.0541) (0.0336) 
     
5.930*** 7.583*** 7.566*** 8.284*** 8.391*** 
(0.306) (1.247) (0.868) (1.061) (0.586) 
     
235,153 36,049 75,637 63,784 59,683 
0.269 0.249 0.260 0.192 0.213 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0346* -0.0741 -0.175*** -0.0968** -0.0211 
(0.0193) (0.0476) (0.0582) (0.0404) (0.0458) 
     
     
     
     













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.142* -0.304*** 0.266** -0.480* -0.358*** 
(0.0730) (0.00379) (0.125) (0.272) (0.114) 
     
5.793*** 7.671*** 5.683*** 7.157*** 8.256*** 
(0.351) (0.367) (0.643) (0.354) (0.182) 
     
161,395 21,799 47,762 40,029 51,805 
0.279 0.252 0.285 0.187 0.218 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.118* -0.266*** 0.220** -0.358 -0.521*** 
(0.0666) (0.0132) (0.0876) (0.291) (0.115) 
     
     
     
     








Health Spending  








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.170** -0.531*** -0.601*** -0.0158 -0.249** 
(0.0692) (0.0133) (0.0754) (0.104) (0.115) 
     
5.482*** 6.171*** 7.212*** 6.258*** 7.828*** 
(0.271) (0.277) (0.357) (0.488) (0.345) 
     
219,763 31,958 73,655 55,616 58,534 
0.269 0.251 0.261 0.193 0.206 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.160*** -0.457*** -0.460*** 0.0172 -0.296** 
(0.0580) (0.0250) (0.0743) (0.0974) (0.145) 
     
     
     
     














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0367 -1.242 0.615** -0.0506 0.0176 
(0.0648) (1.081) (0.233) (0.188) (0.0782) 
     
5.608*** 9.961*** 1.755 6.926*** 7.993*** 
(0.278) (3.287) (1.141) (1.427) (0.298) 
     
233,054 36,255 73,231 63,963 59,605 
0.266 0.247 0.254 0.185 0.206 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0171 -1.216 0.455** 0.0112 0.0746 
(0.0544) (0.907) (0.185) (0.131) (0.100) 
     
     
     
     
233,054 36,255 73,231 63,963 59,605 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 
time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability.  
 
WVS WAVE 3 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0142*** -0.441*** 0.0765*** -2.196*** -0.0131** 
(0.00427) (0.0604) (0.00365) (0.133) (0.00503) 
     
6.670*** 11.66*** 3.996*** 36.00*** 7.886*** 
(0.122) (0.376) (0.143) (1.742) (0.202) 
     
52,697 10,367 21,948 9,965 10,417 
0.325 0.271 0.299 0.185 0.189 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0230*** -0.359*** 0.0555*** -2.271*** -
0.0305*** 
(0.00363) (0.0445) (0.00369) (0.119) (0.00545) 
     
     
     
     















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0520*** -0.0406 0.667*** -0.349*** -0.217** 
(0.0159) (0.0593) (0.0355) (0.0264) (0.0833) 
     
7.759*** 6.971*** 3.962*** 8.131*** 8.761*** 
(0.274) (0.987) (0.113) (0.455) (0.483) 
     
45,733 8,738 18,879 7,699 10,417 
0.326 0.273 0.313 0.159 0.189 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0748*** 0.0279 0.491*** -0.275*** -0.505*** 
(0.0135) (0.0440) (0.0356) (0.0311) (0.0902) 
     
     
     
     





Health Spending  








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
1.144*** 1.155*** 1.158*** -0.385*** 0.0333** 
(0.0151) (0.158) (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0128) 
     
4.744*** 5.515*** 0.648*** 8.604*** 7.493*** 
(0.128) (0.860) (0.197) (0.323) (0.167) 
     
52,659 10,367 22,938 8,937 10,417 
0.315 0.271 0.287 0.169 0.189 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.870*** 0.940*** 0.864*** -0.399*** 0.0777*** 
(0.0254) (0.117) (0.0368) (0.0228) (0.0139) 
     
     
     
     














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0670*** 0.236*** 0.822*** -0.290*** 0.0249** 
(0.0193) (0.0324) (0.0392) (0.0190) (0.00957) 
     
6.690*** 6.174*** 2.113*** 7.121*** 7.600*** 
(0.127) (0.779) (0.108) (0.317) (0.164) 
     
51,669 10,367 21,948 8,937 10,417 
0.322 0.271 0.299 0.169 0.189 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.101*** 0.192*** 0.596*** -0.302*** 0.0580*** 
(0.0166) (0.0239) (0.0397) (0.0172) (0.0104) 
     
     
     
     
51,669 10,367 21,948 8,937 10,417 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 


















Albania 999 1.3  Moldova 984 1.28 
Azerbaijan 2,002 2.6  Montenegro 240 0.31 
Argentina 1,079 1.4  New Zealand 1,201 1.56 
Australia 2,048 2.66  Nigeria 1,996 2.59 
Bangladesh 1,525 1.98  Norway 1,127 1.46 
Armenia 2,000 2.59  Pakistan 733 0.95 
Bulgaria 1,072 1.39  Peru 1,211 1.57 
Belarus 2,092 2.71  Philippines 1,200 1.56 
Chile 1,000 1.3  Poland 1,153 1.49 
China 1,500 1.94  Puerto Rico 1,164 1.51 
Taiwan 780 1.01  Romania 1,239 1.61 
Colombia 6,025 7.81  Russia 2,040 2.64 
Croatia 1,196 1.55  Serbia 1,280 1.66 
Czech Rep. 1,147 1.49  Slovakia 1,095 1.42 
Dominican Rep. 417 0.54  Slovenia 1,007 1.31 
El Salvador 1,254 1.63  South Africa 2,935 3.81 
Estonia 1,021 1.32  Spain 1,211 1.57 
Finland 987 1.28  Sweden 1,009 1.31 
Georgia 2,008 2.6  Switzerland 1,212 1.57 
Germany 2,026 2.63  Turkey 1,907 2.47 
Hungary 650 0.84  Ukraine 2,811 3.64 
India 2,040 2.64  Macedonia 995 1.29 
Japan 1,054 1.37  Great Britain 1,093 1.42 
South Korea 1,249 1.62  United States 1,542 2 
Latvia 1,200 1.56  Uruguay 1,000 1.3 
Lithuania 1,009 1.31  Venezuela 1,200 1.56 
Mexico 2,364 3.06  Bosnia 800 1.04 
         
        Total: 77,129 100 
113 
 


























Albania 1,999 0.59   X X   
Algeria 2,482 0.73    X  X 
Andorra 1,003 0.29     X  
Azerbaijan 3,004 0.88   X   X 
Argentina 6,398 1.87 X X X X X X 
Australia 6,174 1.81 X  X  X X 
Bahrain 1,200 0.35      X 
Bangladesh 3,025 0.89   X X   
Armenia 3,100 0.91   X   X 
Bosnia 1,200 0.35    X   
Brazil 4,768 1.4  X   X X 
Bulgaria 2,073 0.61   X  X  
Belarus 4,642 1.36  X X   X 
Canada 4,095 1.2    X X  
Chile 5,700 1.67  X X X X X 
China 7,791 2.28  X X X X X 
Taiwan 3,245 0.95   X  X X 
Colombia 10,562 3.09   X  X X 
Croatia 1,196 0.35   X    
Cyprus 2,050 0.6     X X 
Czech Rep. 2,071 0.61  X X    
Dominican 
Rep. 417 0.12   X    
Ecuador 1,202 0.35      X 
El Salvador 1,254 0.37   X    
Ethiopia 1,500 0.44     X  
Estonia 2,554 0.75   X   X 
Finland 3,004 0.88 X  X  X  
France 1,001 0.29     X  
Georgia 4,710 1.38   X  X X 
Palestine 1,000 0.29      X 
Germany 6,136 1.8   X  X X 
Ghana 3,086 0.9     X X 
Guatemala 1,000 0.29     X  
Hong Kong 2,252 0.66     X X 



























India 10,124 2.97  X X X X X 
Indonesia 3,015 0.88    X X  
Iran 5,199 1.52    X X  
Iraq 6,226 1.82    X X X 
Israel 1,199 0.35    X   
Italy 1,012 0.3     X  
Japan 8,170 2.39 X X X X X X 
Kazakhstan 1,500 0.44      X 
Jordan 3,623 1.06    X X X 
South Korea 7,070 2.07 X X X X X X 
Kuwait 1,303 0.38      X 
Kyrgyzstan 2,543 0.75    X  X 
Lebanon 1,200 0.35      X 
Latvia 1,200 0.35   X    
Libya 2,131 0.62      X 
Lithuania 1,009 0.3   X    
Malaysia 2,501 0.73     X X 
Mali 1,534 0.45     X  
Mexico 10,827 3.17 X X X X X X 
Moldova 3,038 0.89   X X X  
Montenegro 1,300 0.38   X X   
Morocco 3,651 1.07    X X X 
Netherlands 2,952 0.87     X X 
New Zealand 2,996 0.88   X  X X 
Nigeria 6,778 1.99  X X X  X 
Norway 2,152 0.63   X  X  
Pakistan 3,933 1.15   X X  X 
Peru 5,422 1.59   X X X X 
Philippines 3,600 1.05   X X  X 
Poland 4,057 1.19  X X  X X 
Puerto Rico 1,884 0.55   X X   
Qatar 1,060 0.31      X 
Romania 4,518 1.32   X  X X 
Russia 8,534 2.5  X X  X X 
Rwanda 3,034 0.89     X X 
Saudi Arabia 1,502 0.44    X   
Serbia 2,480 0.73   X X   
Singapore 3,484 1.02    X  X 



























Viet Nam 2,495 0.73    X X  
Slovenia 3,113 0.91   X  X X 
South Africa 16,786 4.92 X X X X X X 
Zimbabwe 2,502 0.73    X  X 
Spain 6,319 1.85  X X X X X 
Sweden 3,218 0.94   X  X X 
Switzerland 3,853 1.13  X X  X  
Thailand 2,734 0.8     X X 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 2,001 0.59     X X 
Tunisia 1,205 0.35      X 
Turkey 9,289 2.72  X X X X X 
Uganda 1,002 0.29    X   
Ukraine 5,311 1.56   X  X X 
Macedonia 2,050 0.6   X X   
Egypt 7,574 2.22    X X X 
Great Britain 2,134 0.63   X  X  
Tanzania 1,171 0.34    X   
United States 6,223 1.82   X X X X 
Burkina Faso 1,534 0.45     X  
Uruguay 3,000 0.88   X  X X 
Uzbekistan 1,500 0.44      X 
Venezuela 2,400 0.7   X X   
Yemen 1,000 0.29      X 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 1,220 0.36     X  
Zambia 1,500 0.44     X  
Bosnia 800 0.23   X    





Dependent and Control Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source Description or Question Values 
Satisfaction with Life 
(A170) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
74367 6.36 2.54 1 10 WVS Question: “All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days?”  
1-10; 1-Dissatisfied, 10-Satisfied 
Satisfaction with Life 
(A170) 
 
- All Waves Sample 
 
335809 6.61 2.41 1 10 WVS Question: “All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days?”  
1-10; 1-Dissatisfied, 10-Satisfied 
Sex (X001) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
77053 1.52 0.50 1 2 WVS Sex 1-2; 1-Male, 2-Female 
Sex (X001)  
 
-All Waves Sample 
 
336531 1.51 0.50 1 2 WVS Sex 1-2; 1-Male, 2-Female 
Age (X003)  
 
-Wave 3 Sample 
76950 41.24 16.04 15 95 WVS Age Continuous 
Age (X003) 
 
-All Waves Sample 
 
337058 40.96 16.19 13 99 WVS Age Continuous 
Marital Status (X007) 
  
- Wave 3 Sample 
73947 0.66 0.47 0 1 WVS Marital Status 0-1; 1-Married or Living together 
as married 
Marital Status (X007)  
 
-All Waves Sample 
 





 - Wave 3 Sample 
 






- All Waves Sample 
 




- Wave 3 Sample 




- All Waves Sample 
 
329450 0.09 0.29 0 1 WVS Employment Status 0-1; 1-Unemployed 
Health Status (A009) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
72816 2.33 0.94 1 5 WVS Question: "All in all, how would you 
describe your state of health these days?" 
1-5; 1-very good, 2-good, 3-fair, 
4-poor, 5-very poor 
Health Status (A009) 
 
 - All Waves Sample 
 
330606 2.20 0.89 1 5 WVS Question: "All in all, how would you 
describe your state of health these days?" 
1-5; 1-very good, 2-good, 3-fair, 








66818 4.58 2.58 1 10 WVS Question: "Here is a scale of incomes. We 
would like to know in what group your 
household is, counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other incomes that come in. 
Just give the letter of the group your 
household falls into, before taxes and other 
deductions."   
1-10; 1 being the lowest decile 
and 10 being the highest decile.   
Note: The deciles are income 
brackets based on the income 
distribution in each country. 
Respondents are asked to place 
themselves in the decile that 
describes where they are in the 
income distribution (listed in 









308298 4.63 2.33 1 10 WVS Question: "Here is a scale of incomes. We 
would like to know in what group your 
household is, counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other incomes that come in. 
Just give the letter of the group your 
household falls into, before taxes and other 
deductions."   
1-10; 1 being the lowest decile 
and 10 being the highest decile.   
Note: The deciles are income 
brackets based on the income 
distribution in each country. 
Respondents are asked to place 
themselves in the decile that 
describes where they are in the 
income distribution (listed in 
local currency).  
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Inequality/ Social Class Variables (Independent Variables) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source Description or Question Values 
GINI-Net (SWIID) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
 





- All Waves Sample 
 
284896 37.00 9.10 17.63 57.40 Swiid Inequality in net (post-tax, post-transfer) 
income, 
0-100; continuous 
Social class (X045)  
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
74002 2.67 0.94 1 5 WVS Question: "Would you describe yourself as 
belonging to the: Upper class,  Upper middle 
class, Lower middle class, Working class, 
Lower class" 
1-5; 1- Lower class,  2-working 
class,  3-Lower middle class ,  4-
Upper Middle Class, 5-Upper 
class  
Social class (X045)  
 
- All Waves Sample 
284337 2.68 0.98 1 5 WVS Question: "Would you describe yourself as 
belonging to the: Upper class,  Upper middle 
class, Lower middle class, Working class, 
Lower class" 
1-5; 1- Lower class,  2-working 
class,  3-Lower middle class ,  4-
Upper Middle Class, 5-Upper 
class  
Hard work and 
success (E040) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
67175 4.42 2.88 1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Agreement: Hard work brings 
success" 
1-10; 1-In the long run, hard work 
usually brings a better life, 10-
hard work doesn't generally bring 
success- it's more a matter of luck 
and connections 
Hard work and 
success (E040) 
 
- All Waves Sample 
250683 4.34 2.86 1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Agreement: Hard work brings 
success" 
1-10; 1-In the long run, hard work 
usually brings a better life, 10-
hard work doesn't generally bring 




Society (E131)  
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
 
62228 0.69 0.46 0 1 WVS Question: "Why, in your opinion, are there 
people in this country who live in need?" 
0-1;0- poor because of laziness 
and lack of willpower, 1-poor 
because of an unfair society 
Poverty and 
Laziness/Unfair 
Society (E131)  
 
- All Waves Sample  
 
62228 0.69 0.46 0 1 WVS Question: "Why, in your opinion, are there 
people in this country who live in need?" 
0-1;0- poor because of laziness 
and lack of willpower, 1-poor 
because of an unfair society 
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Chance of escaping 
poverty (E132)  
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
 
65065 0.60 0.49 0 1 WVS Question: "In your opinion, do most poor 
people in this country have a chance of 
escaping from poverty, or is there very little 
of chance escaping?" 
0-1; 0-have a chance, 1-very little 
chance 
Chance of escaping 
poverty (E132)  
 
- All Waves Sample 
 
65065 0.60 0.49 0 1 WVS Question: "In your opinion, do most poor 
people in this country have a chance of 
escaping from poverty, or is there very little 
of chance escaping?" 
0-1; 0-have a chance, 1-very little 
chance 
Incomes should 
become more equal 
(E035)  
 
-Wave 3 Sample 
 
70748 5.27 2.96 1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Sentences: Incomes should be 
made more equal vs We need larger income 
differences as incentives" 
1-10; 1-we need larger income 
differences to provide incentives, 
10- incomes should be made more 
equal. 
Incomes should 
become more equal 
(E035)  
 
- All Waves Sample 
 
313927 5.19 2.98 1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Sentences: Incomes should be 
made more equal vs We need larger income 
differences as incentives" 
1-10; 1-we need larger income 
differences to provide incentives, 





- Wave 3 Sample 
 
64154 4.63 2.79 1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Agreement: Wealth 
accumulation." 
1-10; 1-wealth can grow so there 
is enough for everyone, 10- 
people can only get rich at the 
















242605 4.65 2.74 1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Agreement: Wealth 
accumulation." 
1-10; 1-wealth can grow so there 
is enough for everyone, 10- 
people can only get rich at the 
expense of others,  
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Government Welfare Effort/Public Expenditure Variables (Independent Variables) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source Description or Question Values 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
75309 15.72 5.43 4.73 27.10 WDI General government final consumption 
expenditure includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services (including compensation of 
employees). It also includes most 
expenditures on national defense and 
security, but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government 
capital formation. 
Percent, continuous  
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
 
- All Waves Sample 
319763 15.43 5.08 3.32 27.11 WDI 
 
Percent, continuous  
Government 
expenditure on 
education (% of 
GDP) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
 
63094 4.25 1.68 1.23 9.90 WDI  Percent, continuous  
Government 
expenditure on 
education (% of 
GDP) 
 
-All Waves Sample 
 
212793 4.41 1.47 1.23 9.90 WDI  Percent, continuous  
Government 
expenditure on health 
(% of GDP) 
 
-Wave 3 Sample 
 




expenditure on health 
(% of GDP) 
 
- All Waves Sample 
 
280940 3.93 2.04 0.59 10.09 WDI  Percent, continuous  
Military Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
74145 2.13 1.35 0.50 8.19 WDI  Percent, continuous 
Military Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
 
-All Waves Sample 
305753 2.20 1.44 0.42 8.74 WDI  Percent, continuous 
Government doing 
enough for poor 
(E133)  
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
64614 0.27 0.44 0 1 WVS Question: Do you think that what the 
government is doing for people in poverty in 
this country is about the right amount, too 
much, or too little? 
0-1;  0-Too little, 1-About the 
right amount or too much 
Government doing 
enough for poor 
(E133)  
 
- All Waves Sample 
 
64614 0.27 0.44 0 1 WVS Question: Do you think that what the 
government is doing for people in poverty in 
this country is about the right amount, too 
much, or too little? 
0-1;  0-Too little, 1-About the 
right amount or too much 
Government 
Responsibility (E037)  
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
70452 4.66 3.00 1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Sentences: People should take 
more responsibility to provide for themselves 
vs The government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for" 
1-10;  1 government should take 
more responsibility, 10-
Individuals should take more 
responsibility, 
Government 
Responsibility (E037)  
 





315301 4.75 2.97  1 10 WVS Question: "How would you place your views 
on this scale? Sentences: People should take 
more responsibility to provide for themselves 
vs The government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for" 
 
1-10;  1 government should take 
more responsibility, 10-










- Wave 3 Sample 
69700 2.78 0.87 1 4 WVS Question: "I am going to name a number of 
organisations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them:  
Parliament" 
1-4; 1-A great deal, 2-Quite a lot, 





- All Waves Sample 
306726 2.70 0.93 1 4 WVS Question: "I am going to name a number of 
organisations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them:  
Parliament" 
1-4; 1-A great deal, 2-Quite a lot, 





- Wave 3 Sample 
67779 2.67 0.89 1 4 WVS Question: "I am going to name a number of 
organisations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them: 
Government" 
1-4; 1-A great deal, 2-Quite a lot, 





-All Waves Sample 
289619 2.59 0.93 1 4 WVS Question: "I am going to name a number of 
organisations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them: 
Government" 
1-4; 1-A great deal, 2-Quite a lot, 
3- Not very much, 4-None at all 
Confidence in Justice 
System (E069_17) 
 
 - Wave 3 Sample 
71903 2.54 0.87 1 4 WVS Question: "I am going to name a number of 
organisations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them:  
Justice System" 
1-4; 1-A great deal, 2-Quite a lot, 
3- Not very much, 4-None at all 
Confidence in Justice 
System (E069_17)  
 
-All Waves Sample 
260785 2.46 0.91 1 4 WVS Question: "I am going to name a number of 
organisations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them:  
Justice System" 
1-4; 1-A great deal, 2-Quite a lot, 
3- Not very much, 4-None at all 
Satisfaction with 
people in national 
office (E125) 
 
- Wave 3 Sample 
66028 2.88 0.81 1 4 WVS Question: How satisfied are you with the 
way the people now in national office are 
handling the country's affairs?  
1-4; 1-Very Satisfied, 2-Fairly 
Satisfied, 3-Fairly Dissatisfied, 4- 
Very Dissatisfied 
Satisfaction with 
people in national 
office (E125) 
 
- All Waves Sample 
117533 2.75 0.85 1 4 WVS Question: How satisfied are you with the 
way the people now in national office are 
handling the country's affairs?  
1-4; 1-Very Satisfied, 2-Fairly 








WVS WAVE 3: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL INCOME/SOCIAL CLASS/PERCEIVED INEQUALITY 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.132*** 0.180* 0.161*** 0.142*** 0.0540** 
(0.0157) (0.0752) (0.0177) (0.0252) (0.0173) 
     
6.688*** 6.338*** 5.237*** 6.688*** 6.741*** 
(0.172) (0.760) (0.228) (0.285) (0.251) 
     
54,406 10,367 22,938 9,965 11,136 
0.315 0.271 0.287 0.185 0.196 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.104*** 0.137** 0.130*** 0.109*** 0.0440*** 
(0.0130) (0.0609) (0.0177) (0.0193) (0.0166) 
     
     
     
     















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.372*** 0.494*** 0.432*** 0.276** 0.216*** 
(0.0383) (0.109) (0.0481) (0.105) (0.0512) 
     
     
6.060*** 5.531*** 4.532*** 6.358*** 6.371*** 
(0.162) (0.493) (0.248) (0.345) (0.300) 
     
52,521 10,105 22,302 9,722 10,392 
0.327 0.296 0.302 0.189 0.200 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.323*** 0.394*** 0.367*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 
(0.0325) (0.0917) (0.0479) (0.0813) (0.0539) 
     
     
     
     
     
52,521 10,105 22,302 9,722 10,392 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income (only for the perceived social 
class analysis), and health status. Country and time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for 
country sample size variability. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0427*** -0.0223 -0.0507*** -0.0401* -0.0553*** 
(0.00566) (0.0159) (0.00737) (0.0179) (0.00901) 
     
     
6.858*** 6.396*** 5.400*** 6.908*** 7.026*** 
(0.175) (0.730) (0.237) (0.288) (0.281) 
     
50,230 10,143 19,316 9,803 10,968 
0.307 0.269 0.238 0.186 0.202 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0383*** -0.0203* -0.0422*** -0.0372** -0.0605*** 
(0.00518) (0.0118) (0.00666) (0.0166) (0.00991) 
     
     
     
     
     















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.463*** -0.661*** -0.587*** -0.291*** -0.219*** 
(0.0577) (0.161) (0.0997) (0.0712) (0.0419) 
     
     
7.269*** 7.372*** 6.220*** 7.319*** 6.975*** 
(0.195) (0.916) (0.248) (0.250) (0.314) 
     
47,029 9,240 20,625 8,849 8,315 
0.317 0.285 0.298 0.187 0.193 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.377*** -0.502*** -0.466*** -0.236*** -0.229*** 
(0.0452) (0.109) (0.0816) (0.0659) (0.0422) 
     
     
     
     
     















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.454*** -0.627*** -0.542*** -0.366*** -0.266*** 
(0.0552) (0.159) (0.100) (0.0900) (0.0335) 
     
     
7.144*** 7.347*** 6.123*** 7.249*** 7.026*** 
(0.185) (0.903) (0.233) (0.351) (0.248) 
     
49,659 9,578 20,732 9,546 9,803 
0.315 0.284 0.284 0.184 0.191 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.383*** -0.464*** -0.448*** -0.324*** -0.270*** 
(0.0447) (0.132) (0.0801) (0.0877) (0.0346) 
     
     
     
     
     
49,659 9,578 20,732 9,546 9,803 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 
time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability. 
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Incomes should be 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0621*** -0.0534** -0.0596*** -0.0796*** -0.0472*** 
(0.00843) (0.0210) (0.0154) (0.0123) (0.0103) 
     
     
7.055*** 6.610*** 5.520*** 7.195*** 7.028*** 
(0.179) (0.821) (0.252) (0.220) (0.230) 
     
52,819 9,865 22,178 9,813 10,963 
0.318 0.275 0.287 0.195 0.200 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0537*** -0.0400** -0.0504*** -0.0705*** -0.0454*** 
(0.00752) (0.0176) (0.0132) (0.0114) (0.0108) 
     
     
     
     
     





People only rich at 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0692*** -0.0510* -0.0621*** -0.0885*** -0.0721*** 
(0.00719) (0.0230) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.00576) 
     
     
6.887*** 6.637*** 5.318*** 7.055*** 7.044*** 
(0.180) (0.819) (0.244) (0.282) (0.259) 
     
47,996 9,664 17,944 9,615 10,773 
0.311 0.276 0.221 0.192 0.202 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0636*** -0.0429** -0.0524*** -0.0832*** -0.0784*** 
(0.00694) (0.0182) (0.0105) (0.0133) (0.00795) 
     
     
     
     
     
47,996 9,664 17,944 9,615 10,773 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 
time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability. 
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WVS ALL WAVES (1-6): INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL INCOME/SOCIAL CLASS/PERCEIVED INEQUALITY 
 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.176*** 0.237*** 0.241*** 0.157*** 0.105*** 
(0.0123) (0.0278) (0.0178) (0.0233) (0.0142) 
     
5.464*** 6.089*** 4.723*** 6.505*** 7.596*** 
(0.208) (0.281) (0.117) (0.135) (0.150) 
     
250,589 37,182 81,185 65,660 66,562 
0.263 0.245 0.252 0.189 0.201 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.146*** 0.204*** 0.193*** 0.127*** 0.101*** 
(0.0109) (0.0278) (0.0169) (0.0214) (0.0146) 
     
     
     
     














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.260*** 0.244*** 0.315*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 
(0.0183) (0.0560) (0.0336) (0.0242) (0.0367) 
     
4.937*** 5.483*** 4.310*** 5.812*** 6.491*** 
(0.190) (0.229) (0.130) (0.155) (0.186) 
     
226,098 33,445 75,263 57,452 59,938 
0.272 0.257 0.249 0.194 0.205 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.230*** 0.197*** 0.253*** 0.198*** 0.245*** 
(0.0160) (0.0476) (0.0301) (0.0193) (0.0372) 
     
     
     
     
226,098 33,445 75,263 57,452 59,938 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income (only for the perceived social 
class analysis), and health status. Country and time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for 
country sample size variability. 
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Hard work does 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0382*** -0.0391*** -0.0292*** -0.0342*** -0.0555*** 
(0.00395) (0.0125) (0.00742) (0.00760) (0.00593) 
     
     
5.329*** 8.008*** 7.220*** 6.560*** 7.348*** 
(0.386) (0.354) (0.135) (0.150) (0.139) 
     
194,970 25,414 52,599 59,139 57,818 
0.266 0.246 0.270 0.195 0.206 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0376*** -0.0361*** -0.0258*** -0.0321*** -0.0624*** 
(0.00380) (0.0105) (0.00604) (0.00660) (0.00707) 
     
     
     
     
     















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.463*** -0.661*** -0.587*** -0.291*** -0.219*** 
(0.0577) (0.161) (0.0997) (0.0712) (0.0419) 
     
     
7.269*** 7.372*** 6.220*** 7.319*** 6.975*** 
(0.195) (0.916) (0.248) (0.250) (0.314) 
     
47,029 9,240 20,625 8,849 8,315 
0.317 0.285 0.298 0.187 0.193 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.377*** -0.502*** -0.466*** -0.236*** -0.229*** 
(0.0452) (0.109) (0.0816) (0.0659) (0.0422) 
     
     
     
     
     
47,029 9,240 20,625 8,849 8,315 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.454*** -0.627*** -0.542*** -0.366*** -0.266*** 
(0.0552) (0.159) (0.100) (0.0900) (0.0335) 
     
     
7.144*** 7.347*** 6.123*** 7.249*** 7.026*** 
(0.185) (0.903) (0.233) (0.351) (0.248) 
     
49,659 9,578 20,732 9,546 9,803 
0.315 0.284 0.284 0.184 0.191 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.383*** -0.464*** -0.448*** -0.324*** -0.270*** 
(0.0447) (0.132) (0.0801) (0.0877) (0.0346) 
     
     
     
     
     
49,659 9,578 20,732 9,546 9,803 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 
time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0444*** -0.0367*** -0.0527*** -0.0416*** -0.0408*** 
(0.00438) (0.00883) (0.00799) (0.00627) (0.00553) 
     
     
5.541*** 6.303*** 5.132*** 6.703*** 7.097*** 
(0.252) (0.293) (0.122) (0.113) (0.144) 
     
243,415 35,760 78,923 64,307 64,425 
0.263 0.244 0.253 0.193 0.202 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0399*** -0.0299*** -0.0446*** -0.0379*** -0.0423*** 
(0.00393) (0.00797) (0.00630) (0.00581) (0.00577) 
     
     
     
     
     





People only rich 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0528*** -0.0458*** -0.0601*** -0.0532*** -0.0573*** 
(0.00436) (0.0110) (0.00901) (0.00881) (0.00587) 
     
     
5.517*** 8.100*** 7.402*** 6.743*** 7.290*** 
(0.386) (0.393) (0.133) (0.144) (0.148) 
     
189,655 24,473 50,469 57,980 56,733 
0.268 0.251 0.270 0.197 0.203 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
-0.0530*** -0.0429*** -0.0526*** -0.0531*** -0.0667*** 
(0.00423) (0.0105) (0.00769) (0.00782) (0.00621) 
     
     
     
     
     
189,655 24,473 50,469 57,980 56,733 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 








WVS WAVE 3: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PERCEIVED GOVERNMENT WELFARE EFFORT 
VARIABLES 




Govt doing enough/ 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.316*** 0.311* 0.557*** 0.235* 0.112** 
(0.0551) (0.150) (0.0970) (0.116) (0.0472) 
     
     
6.578*** 6.346*** 5.091*** 6.637*** 6.775*** 
(0.180) (0.764) (0.242) (0.271) (0.300) 
     
49,823 9,637 21,026 9,531 9,629 
0.314 0.275 0.284 0.179 0.190 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.254*** 0.249** 0.452*** 0.167* 0.108** 
(0.0460) (0.110) (0.0835) (0.0981) (0.0472) 
     
     
     
     
     





People should take 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0626*** 0.0573 0.0595*** 0.0635** 0.0626*** 
(0.0104) (0.0313) (0.0173) (0.0196) (0.0140) 
     
     
6.373*** 6.113*** 4.986*** 6.430*** 6.442*** 
(0.172) (0.670) (0.238) (0.358) (0.296) 
     
53,355 10,143 22,430 9,795 10,987 
0.319 0.273 0.289 0.190 0.203 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0562*** 0.0508* 0.0518*** 0.0523*** 0.0683*** 
(0.00926) (0.0265) (0.0148) (0.0174) (0.0143) 
     
     
     
     
     
53,355 10,143 22,430 9,795 10,987 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 
time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability. 
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WVS ALL WAVES: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PERCEIVED GOVERNMENT WELFARE EFFORT 
VARIABLES 
 
 OLS ORDERED LOGIT 
 
 
Govt doing enough/ too 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.316*** 0.311* 0.557*** 0.235* 0.112** 
(0.0551) (0.150) (0.0970) (0.116) (0.0472) 
     
     
6.578*** 6.346*** 5.091*** 6.637*** 6.775*** 
(0.180) (0.764) (0.242) (0.271) (0.300) 
     
49,823 9,637 21,026 9,531 9,629 
0.314 0.275 0.284 0.179 0.190 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.254*** 0.249** 0.452*** 0.167* 0.108** 
(0.0460) (0.110) (0.0835) (0.0981) (0.0472) 
     
     
     
 
 
    















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0453*** 0.0433*** 0.0505*** 0.0357*** 0.0420*** 
(0.00422) (0.0136) (0.00651) (0.00703) (0.00689) 
     
     
5.025*** 5.875*** 4.521*** 6.364*** 6.676*** 
(0.250) (0.275) (0.121) (0.143) (0.160) 
     
244,993 36,180 79,570 64,573 64,670 
0.264 0.246 0.254 0.192 0.203 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All LIC LMI UMI HIC 
     
0.0396*** 0.0371*** 0.0407*** 0.0306*** 0.0442*** 
(0.00407) (0.0120) (0.00555) (0.00588) (0.00849) 
     
     
     
     
     
244,993 36,180 79,570 64,573 64,670 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 









Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
Poor because of unfair society -0.440*** -0.392*** -0.448*** -0.381*** -0.484*** -0.370*** -0.440*** -0.326*** 
  (0.0629) (0.0653) (0.0532) (0.0742) 0.0613 (0.0645) (0.0692) (0.0613) 
                  
Observations 27,577 16,183 23,560 17,912 23,452 21,158 29,913 13,473 
R-squared 0.335 0.299 0.328 0.29 0.333 0.305 0.334 0.225 
LIC 
  
Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
 
Poor because of unfair society 
-0.754*** -0.516* -0.650*** -0.568** -0.800** -0.459* -0.760*** -0.400 
  (0.163) (0.203) (0.136) (0.219) (0.201) (0.196) (0.123) (0.216) 
                  
Observations 3,671 3,806 3,370 4,231 3,687 4,010 4,950 2,548 
R-squared 0.318 0.239 0.337 0.233 0.309 0.233 0.289 0.155 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 





Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
Poor because of unfair society -0.510*** -0.435*** -0.510*** -0.440*** -0.525*** -0.440*** -0.490*** -0.388*** 
  (0.0752) (0.0796) (0.0637) (0.0883) (0.0734) (0.0779) (0.0829) (0.0752) 
                  
Observations 22,332 13,305 18,239 15,050 19,301 17,112 25,294 9,957 
R-squared 0.321 0.276 0.3 0.265 0.325 0.278 0.314 0.206 
HIC 
  
Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
Poor because of unfair society -0.204** -0.180** -0.256*** -0.100 -0.300*** -0.124* -0.219*** -0.144 
  (0.0641) (0.0741) (0.0595) (0.0632) (0.0674) (0.054) (0.0395) (0.106) 
                  
Observations 5,245 2,878 5,321 2,862 4,151 4,046 4,619 3,516 
R-squared 0.196 0.185 0.19 0.197 0.201 0.173 0.202 0.161 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 






  Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
 
Poor because of unfair society 
-0.359*** -0.327*** -0.364*** -0.316*** -0.390*** -0.309*** -0.356*** -0.292*** 
  (0.0504) (0.0506) (0.0415) (0.0594) (0.0497) (0.0512) (0.0539) (0.0514) 
                  
Observations 27,577 16,183 23,560 17,912 23,452 21,158 29,913 13,473 
LIC 
  Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
 
Poor because of unfair society 
-0.588*** -0.388*** -0.498*** -0.447*** -0.623*** -0.344*** -0.559*** -0.344** 
  (0.119) (0.131) (0.0978) (0.152) (0.157) (0.121) (0.0762) (0.168) 
                  
Observations 3,671 3,806 3,370 4,231 3,687 4,010 4,950 2,548 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 




  Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
Poor because of unfair society -0.402*** -0.349*** -0.399*** -0.352*** -0.409*** -0.353*** -0.389*** -0.321*** 
  (0.0599) (0.0614) (0.0494) (0.0701) (0.059) (0.0602) (0.0635) (0.0614) 
                  
Observations 22,332 13,305 18,239 15,050 19,301 17,112 25,294 9,957 
HIC 
  Confidence in Parliament Confidence in Government Confidence in Justice System 
Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH Not Satisfied Satisfied 
Poor because of unfair society -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.257*** -0.131*** -0.295*** -0.152** -0.198*** -0.210** 
  (0.0697) (0.0511) (0.0643) (0.0493) (0.0661) (0.0619) (0.0485) (0.0992) 
                 
Observations 5,245 2,878 5,321 2,862 4,151 4,046 4,619 3,516 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is life satisfaction and the control variables are sex, age, education level, marital status, employment status, income, and health status. Country and 
time dummies are included.  The robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and weights are introduced to account for country sample size variability.  
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Appendix 3.A – Description of Variables 
Dependent Variable Notes 
Life satisfaction Survey question: “In general, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with your life overall?”  
 
*Household members aged 15+  
*386 responses out of 100 968 were “do not know/no answer” These were imputed as 
missing. 
Independent Variables Notes 
Received Any Assistance Based on the survey question “Has this household received assistance (cash or other than 
cash), during the past 12 months?” 
Received Rations Based on question that asked if household received rations.  
 
*Rations items include wheat flour, rice, sugar, vegetable oil, vegetable fat, and infant 
formula. 
Received Pension  
 
Based on a question that asked if anyone in the household received a pension. 
 
 
Received Social Protection 
Network transfer  
 
Based on question that asked if anyone in the household received a transfer from the 




Based on question that asked if anyone in the household received income from any of the 
“private assistance” categories. 
 
*The private assistance category includes zakat as well as gifts, cash assistance, and in-
kind aid from other families inside and outside of Iraq. 
 
Received Capital Income  
 
Based on question that asked if anyone in the household received income from any of the 
“capital income” categories. 
 
*The capital income category includes income from renting vacant and agricultural land; 
renting residential and non-residential buildings; renting machinery or equipment or 
means of transportation; agricultural land cooperative system; profits from shares or from 
cooperative companies; interests on bonds and trusts; and property rights and 
publications. 
 
Control Variables Notes 
Gender Gender of household members 
 
Age  Age of household members 
 
Marital Status Based on survey question about marital status. The response options are “married,” “never 
married,” “divorced,” “separated,” and “widow.” 
 
*Marital Status of all household members aged 12+ 
Health Status Based on survey question: “Do you suffer from any medically diagnosed chronic illness?” 
the response options are “yes” and “no” 
 
*Health status of all household members 
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Education Status Based on survey question: “Have you ever attended school?” The response options are 
“yes, in the past,” “yes, currently attending,” and “no, I did not attend previously.” 
 
*Education status of household members aged 6+ 
 
Employment Status Based on two survey questions that define unemployment in accordance with ILO criteria. 
The first question asks how many hours household members worked during the past 
week. And the second question is: “Are you looking for work/more work whatever is the 
type?”  The response options to this second question are “yes” and “no” 
 
Unemployed is a person who worked 0 hours the past week and is looking for work. 
 




(person/month in thousand 
dinars) 
Average consumption expenditure/month/household member 
Log of Household 
Consumption Expenditure 
Log of the above 




Appendix 3.B: Results (OLS) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedAnyAssistance -0.139*** -0.247*** -0.124*** 0.0748*** -0.232*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0493) (0.0172) (0.0257) (0.0200) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile1 0.0228 0.154** 0.00679 -0.208** 0.121*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0782) (0.0227) (0.0818) (0.0252) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile2 0.0163 0.130** -0.000481 0.0642 0.0845*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0647) (0.0210) (0.0428) (0.0228) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile3 0.0710*** 0.0454 0.0730*** 0.000317 0.129*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0632) (0.0199) (0.0364) (0.0218) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile4 0.0122 0.114** -0.00378 -0.00406 0.0464** 
 (0.0189) (0.0535) (0.0202) (0.0332) (0.0219) 
Female 0.0127* 0.0246 0.0123 -0.00511 0.0150* 
 (0.00770) (0.0277) (0.00808) (0.0178) (0.00847) 
Age 0.00162*** 0.00192* 0.00166*** 0.00173** 0.00163*** 
 (0.000286) (0.00107) (0.000298) (0.000675) (0.000314) 
Married 0.0291*** 0.0649** 0.0212** 0.0546*** 0.0209** 
 (0.00848) (0.0273) (0.00922) (0.0191) (0.00943) 
Educated 0.0919*** 0.0990*** 0.0899*** 0.0366* 0.104*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0350) (0.0107) (0.0212) (0.0117) 
Healthy 0.0537*** 0.0471 0.0532*** 0.0473** 0.0570*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0331) (0.0116) (0.0224) (0.0122) 
Unemployed -0.111*** -0.101** -0.111*** -0.121*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0413) (0.0163) (0.0319) (0.0168) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.211*** 0.258*** 0.206*** 0.122*** 0.259*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0358) (0.0113) (0.0221) (0.0124) 
Household size 0.0182*** 0.0264*** 0.0173*** 0.00823*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.000894) (0.00333) (0.000929) (0.00274) (0.000947) 
      
Constant 2.153*** 1.981*** 2.176*** 2.651*** 1.415*** 
 (0.0636) (0.210) (0.0667) (0.138) (0.0692) 
      
Observations 85,606 7,700 77,906 19,513 66,093 
R-squared 0.156 0.185 0.154 0.074 0.138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: governorate dummies are included in the regression model but not presented in the table
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedRation -0.0320 -0.260* -0.0218 0.370*** -0.101** 
 (0.0449) (0.137) (0.0464) (0.123) (0.0474) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile1 0.0929*** 0.0953 0.0925*** -0.0924 0.149*** 
 (0.0330) (0.106) (0.0347) (0.0704) (0.0390) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile2 0.0701*** 0.0473 0.0701*** -0.0273 0.107*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0786) (0.0262) (0.0459) (0.0292) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile3 0.108*** -0.00604 0.121*** 0.0207 0.136*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0652) (0.0212) (0.0380) (0.0235) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile4 0.0734*** 0.0790 0.0708*** 0.0455 0.0840*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0489) (0.0169) (0.0280) (0.0188) 
Female 0.0119 0.0220 0.0118 -0.00420 0.0143* 
 (0.00773) (0.0281) (0.00810) (0.0177) (0.00853) 
Age 0.00164*** 0.00200* 0.00168*** 0.00158** 0.00164*** 
 (0.000287) (0.00108) (0.000298) (0.000672) (0.000315) 
Married 0.0300*** 0.0636** 0.0210** 0.0587*** 0.0219** 
 (0.00852) (0.0278) (0.00926) (0.0192) (0.00948) 
Educated 0.0910*** 0.111*** 0.0880*** 0.0415* 0.104*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0354) (0.0108) (0.0212) (0.0118) 
Healthy 0.0560*** 0.0453 0.0553*** 0.0443** 0.0594*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0334) (0.0116) (0.0224) (0.0123) 
Unemployed -0.114*** -0.108*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.115*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0414) (0.0163) (0.0320) (0.0168) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.261*** 0.246*** 0.262*** 0.125*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0633) (0.0228) (0.0363) (0.0262) 
Household size 0.0189*** 0.0273*** 0.0178*** 0.00643** 0.0201*** 
 (0.000906) (0.00347) (0.000939) (0.00274) (0.000961) 
      
Constant 1.789*** 2.122*** 1.778*** 2.314*** 1.068*** 
 (0.127) (0.395) (0.134) (0.248) (0.151) 
      
Observations 85,653 7,700 77,953 19,513 66,140 
R-squared 0.152 0.176 0.151 0.075 0.130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedPension -0.000563 0.0120 -0.000724 0.0218 -0.00569 
 (0.0212) (0.0444) (0.0243) (0.0361) (0.0258) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile1 0.0580** 0.0442 0.0586* -0.246** 0.0739** 
 (0.0294) (0.0670) (0.0329) (0.122) (0.0333) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile2 0.0359 0.0794 0.0172 -0.0467 0.0434 
 (0.0268) (0.0592) (0.0300) (0.0614) (0.0306) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile3 0.0585** -0.161*** 0.111*** -0.00946 0.0643** 
 (0.0254) (0.0606) (0.0276) (0.0578) (0.0294) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile4 0.0579** 0.0260 0.0615** 0.0674* 0.0510* 
 (0.0225) (0.0460) (0.0260) (0.0394) (0.0272) 
Female 0.00710 0.0241 0.00542 0.0264 0.00432 
 (0.0108) (0.0293) (0.0117) (0.0272) (0.0117) 
Age 0.00122*** 0.00162 0.00105*** 0.00245*** 0.00102*** 
 (0.000355) (0.00114) (0.000373) (0.000892) (0.000386) 
Married 0.0362*** 0.0326 0.0268** 0.0835*** 0.0265** 
 (0.0111) (0.0301) (0.0121) (0.0277) (0.0121) 
Educated 0.0865*** 0.107*** 0.0782*** 0.0752** 0.0917*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0386) (0.0148) (0.0324) (0.0154) 
Healthy 0.0291** 0.0594* 0.0181 0.0366 0.0290* 
 (0.0143) (0.0354) (0.0156) (0.0308) (0.0159) 
Unemployed -0.0793*** -0.0894** -0.0747*** -0.0652 -0.0844*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0414) (0.0246) (0.0504) (0.0232) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.207*** 0.198*** 0.209*** 0.136*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0385) (0.0170) (0.0315) (0.0175) 
Household size 0.0157*** 0.0261*** 0.0142*** 0.0125*** 0.0160*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00353) (0.00118) (0.00372) (0.00118) 
      
Constant 2.196*** 2.216*** 2.207*** 2.529*** 1.611*** 
 (0.0895) (0.225) (0.0977) (0.191) (0.0935) 
      
Observations 40,924 6,730 34,194 8,493 32,431 
R-squared 0.153 0.187 0.150 0.098 0.128 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
Received_ Socprotnet -0.134*** -0.394*** -0.0638* -0.0710* -0.175*** 
 (0.0373) (0.112) (0.0329) (0.0398) (0.0631) 
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile1 0.0824* 0.364*** 0.00891 0.184** 0.122* 
 (0.0446) (0.126) (0.0425) (0.0765) (0.0681) 
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile2 0.0737* 0.559*** -0.0393 -0.124* 0.121* 
 (0.0427) (0.120) (0.0401) (0.0746) (0.0667) 
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile3 0.210*** 0.260* 0.187*** 0.202*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0450) (0.142) (0.0412) (0.0535) (0.0692) 
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile4 0.134*** 0.415*** 0.0543 0.124** 0.151** 
 (0.0475) (0.128) (0.0467) (0.0547) (0.0742) 
Female 0.0119 0.0216 0.0119 -0.00471 0.0144* 
 (0.00773) (0.0279) (0.00811) (0.0178) (0.00853) 
Age 0.00163*** 0.00195* 0.00167*** 0.00158** 0.00162*** 
 (0.000287) (0.00107) (0.000299) (0.000679) (0.000316) 
Married 0.0290*** 0.0638** 0.0207** 0.0560*** 0.0217** 
 (0.00853) (0.0279) (0.00929) (0.0191) (0.00950) 
Educated 0.0907*** 0.100*** 0.0885*** 0.0385* 0.104*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0352) (0.0108) (0.0212) (0.0118) 
Healthy 0.0560*** 0.0509 0.0553*** 0.0446** 0.0596*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0332) (0.0117) (0.0225) (0.0124) 
Unemployed -0.114*** -0.107*** -0.114*** -0.121*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0411) (0.0163) (0.0320) (0.0168) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.209*** 0.222*** 0.207*** 0.133*** 0.224*** 
 (0.00946) (0.0286) (0.0100) (0.0196) (0.0107) 
Household size 0.0192*** 0.0255*** 0.0181*** 0.00747*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.000903) (0.00345) (0.000936) (0.00277) (0.000958) 
      
Constant 2.090*** 2.075*** 2.106*** 2.638*** 1.484*** 
 (0.0574) (0.175) (0.0608) (0.125) (0.0590) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
R-squared 0.152 0.181 0.150 0.072 0.129 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedPrivateAssist -0.0941*** -0.135*** -0.0874*** 0.0285 -0.150*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0499) (0.0192) (0.0260) (0.0233) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile1 -0.0592** 0.0506 -0.0738*** -0.281*** 0.00697 
 (0.0260) (0.0724) (0.0280) (0.0836) (0.0305) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile2 -0.0600** 0.0729 -0.0775*** 0.00606 -0.0232 
 (0.0244) (0.0672) (0.0262) (0.0438) (0.0290) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile3 0.0536** 0.0212 0.0598*** -0.0278 0.0967*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0590) (0.0232) (0.0412) (0.0262) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile4 -0.0240 0.0697 -0.0427* -0.0508 0.00201 
 (0.0231) (0.0573) (0.0254) (0.0366) (0.0287) 
Female 0.0142* 0.0294 0.0130 -0.00388 0.0169** 
 (0.00772) (0.0283) (0.00809) (0.0178) (0.00851) 
Age 0.00160*** 0.00192* 0.00164*** 0.00173** 0.00159*** 
 (0.000286) (0.00108) (0.000298) (0.000672) (0.000315) 
Married 0.0288*** 0.0653** 0.0224** 0.0532*** 0.0213** 
 (0.00850) (0.0281) (0.00922) (0.0191) (0.00947) 
Educated 0.0919*** 0.104*** 0.0896*** 0.0400* 0.104*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0355) (0.0108) (0.0212) (0.0117) 
Healthy 0.0520*** 0.0458 0.0516*** 0.0450** 0.0548*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0335) (0.0116) (0.0225) (0.0123) 
Unemployed -0.110*** -0.102** -0.111*** -0.124*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0413) (0.0163) (0.0319) (0.0168) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.192*** 0.211*** 0.191*** 0.104*** 0.217*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0348) (0.0106) (0.0215) (0.0114) 
Household size 0.0176*** 0.0245*** 0.0168*** 0.00739*** 0.0187*** 
 (0.000886) (0.00346) (0.000919) (0.00274) (0.000939) 
      
Constant 2.241*** 2.177*** 2.250*** 2.798*** 1.577*** 
 (0.0604) (0.208) (0.0632) (0.135) (0.0628) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
R-squared 0.156 0.177 0.154 0.073 0.135 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedCapital 0.0812*** 0.163*** 0.0701*** 0.0687** 0.0878*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0531) (0.0189) (0.0290) (0.0217) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile1 0.0324 -0.0830 0.0477* -0.115 0.0380 
 (0.0245) (0.0817) (0.0258) (0.0720) (0.0285) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile2 0.0238 -0.0739 0.0351* -0.0249 0.0224 
 (0.0195) (0.0634) (0.0206) (0.0410) (0.0227) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile3 0.0669*** -0.0864 0.0853*** 0.0570* 0.0607*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0536) (0.0178) (0.0342) (0.0196) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile4 0.0522*** -0.0104 0.0597*** 0.0775*** 0.0377** 
 (0.0146) (0.0447) (0.0155) (0.0268) (0.0173) 
Female 0.0118 0.0239 0.0118 -0.00378 0.0143* 
 (0.00771) (0.0281) (0.00809) (0.0177) (0.00851) 
Age 0.00151*** 0.00196* 0.00154*** 0.00153** 0.00152*** 
 (0.000286) (0.00108) (0.000298) (0.000669) (0.000315) 
Married 0.0323*** 0.0597** 0.0237** 0.0598*** 0.0241** 
 (0.00850) (0.0278) (0.00926) (0.0191) (0.00946) 
Educated 0.0921*** 0.113*** 0.0885*** 0.0412* 0.106*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0352) (0.0108) (0.0211) (0.0118) 
Healthy 0.0558*** 0.0512 0.0550*** 0.0443** 0.0597*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0336) (0.0116) (0.0225) (0.0123) 
Unemployed -0.112*** -0.115*** -0.111*** -0.119*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0409) (0.0163) (0.0320) (0.0167) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.213*** 0.160*** 0.220*** 0.128*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0453) (0.0165) (0.0291) (0.0184) 
Household size 0.0173*** 0.0269*** 0.0161*** 0.00550** 0.0185*** 
 (0.000905) (0.00352) (0.000934) (0.00272) (0.000962) 
      
Constant 1.985*** 2.253*** 1.958*** 2.600*** 1.371*** 
 (0.0833) (0.250) (0.0886) (0.172) (0.0940) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
R-squared 0.155 0.178 0.154 0.076 0.133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Appendix 3.C: Results (Ordered Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedAnyAssistance -0.370*** -0.707*** -0.326*** 0.281*** -0.668*** 
 (0.0461) (0.137) (0.0489) (0.0723) (0.0559) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile1 0.0277 0.510** -0.0248 -0.694*** 0.334*** 
 (0.0621) (0.217) (0.0649) (0.218) (0.0715) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile2 0.00970 0.400** -0.0429 0.193 0.221*** 
 (0.0561) (0.178) (0.0592) (0.127) (0.0640) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile3 0.185*** 0.176 0.185*** -0.0507 0.374*** 
 (0.0535) (0.173) (0.0563) (0.106) (0.0615) 
ReceivedAnyAssistance*Quintile4 0.00610 0.317** -0.0402 -0.0516 0.118* 
 (0.0521) (0.150) (0.0557) (0.0937) (0.0604) 
Female 0.0295 0.0456 0.0291 -0.0144 0.0370 
 (0.0216) (0.0786) (0.0226) (0.0499) (0.0239) 
Age 0.00442*** 0.00582* 0.00444*** 0.00502*** 0.00448*** 
 (0.000803) (0.00306) (0.000837) (0.00190) (0.000887) 
Married 0.0894*** 0.159** 0.0714*** 0.146*** 0.0682*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0776) (0.0257) (0.0534) (0.0264) 
Educated 0.250*** 0.281*** 0.243*** 0.101* 0.285*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0990) (0.0301) (0.0576) (0.0328) 
Healthy 0.158*** 0.159* 0.154*** 0.146** 0.167*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0959) (0.0318) (0.0615) (0.0340) 
Unemployed -0.285*** -0.272** -0.283*** -0.311*** -0.282*** 
 (0.0402) (0.113) (0.0433) (0.0801) (0.0452) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.635*** 0.769*** 0.623*** 0.316*** 0.803*** 
 (0.0318) (0.105) (0.0334) (0.0636) (0.0368) 
Household size 0.0534*** 0.0715*** 0.0512*** 0.0201** 0.0585*** 
 (0.00261) (0.00963) (0.00271) (0.00846) (0.00282) 
      
Constant cut1 -1.285*** -0.977 -1.332*** -2.421*** 1.458*** 
 (0.184) (0.617) (0.193) (0.403) (0.202) 
Constant cut2 0.246 0.529 0.205 -0.957** 2.998*** 
 (0.184) (0.621) (0.193) (0.396) (0.202) 
Constant cut3 3.500*** 3.843*** 3.458*** 1.705*** 6.371*** 
 (0.186) (0.623) (0.195) (0.394) (0.206) 
      
Observations 85,606 7,700 77,906 19,513 66,093 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedRation -0.221* -0.926** -0.186 0.794** -0.405*** 
 (0.120) (0.411) (0.123) (0.325) (0.127) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile1 0.256*** 0.386 0.246** -0.296 0.437*** 
 (0.0921) (0.296) (0.0970) (0.194) (0.106) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile2 0.189*** 0.192 0.184** -0.102 0.308*** 
 (0.0691) (0.217) (0.0730) (0.131) (0.0795) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile3 0.307*** 0.0534 0.335*** 0.0422 0.400*** 
 (0.0561) (0.179) (0.0592) (0.108) (0.0645) 
ReceivedRation*Quintile4 0.210*** 0.255* 0.201*** 0.0996 0.252*** 
 (0.0444) (0.136) (0.0470) (0.0785) (0.0519) 
Female 0.0272 0.0427 0.0276 -0.0100 0.0348 
 (0.0216) (0.0788) (0.0226) (0.0499) (0.0240) 
Age 0.00444*** 0.00598* 0.00445*** 0.00467** 0.00443*** 
 (0.000805) (0.00308) (0.000839) (0.00190) (0.000890) 
Married 0.0905*** 0.152* 0.0699*** 0.156*** 0.0703*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0782) (0.0258) (0.0536) (0.0265) 
Educated 0.247*** 0.309*** 0.237*** 0.117** 0.284*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0987) (0.0301) (0.0579) (0.0329) 
Healthy 0.162*** 0.157 0.158*** 0.139** 0.171*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0962) (0.0318) (0.0619) (0.0341) 
Unemployed -0.294*** -0.294*** -0.292*** -0.298*** -0.297*** 
 (0.0402) (0.111) (0.0433) (0.0808) (0.0451) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.780*** 0.761*** 0.783*** 0.311*** 0.941*** 
 (0.0602) (0.179) (0.0640) (0.106) (0.0712) 
Household size 0.0551*** 0.0738*** 0.0526*** 0.0152* 0.0600*** 
 (0.00264) (0.00996) (0.00274) (0.00844) (0.00285) 
      
Constant cut1 -0.346 -1.356 -0.307 -1.815** 2.390*** 
 (0.355) (1.105) (0.375) (0.716) (0.412) 
Constant cut2 1.179*** 0.138 1.225*** -0.349 3.920*** 
 (0.355) (1.108) (0.375) (0.707) (0.412) 
Constant cut3 4.424*** 3.430*** 4.469*** 2.310*** 7.271*** 
 (0.356) (1.106) (0.376) (0.705) (0.414) 
      
Observations 85,653 7,700 77,953 19,513 66,140 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedPension -0.0140 -0.0191 -0.00413 0.0451 -0.0256 
 (0.0619) (0.130) (0.0710) (0.100) (0.0747) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile1 0.169* 0.128 0.168* -0.730** 0.224** 
 (0.0866) (0.197) (0.0975) (0.339) (0.0982) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile2 0.117 0.275 0.0531 -0.129 0.141 
 (0.0785) (0.178) (0.0882) (0.176) (0.0901) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile3 0.188** -0.389** 0.324*** 0.0106 0.206** 
 (0.0745) (0.172) (0.0830) (0.173) (0.0857) 
ReceivedPension*Quintile4 0.139** 0.0470 0.149* 0.201* 0.109 
 (0.0669) (0.139) (0.0771) (0.117) (0.0801) 
Female 0.00976 0.0515 0.00683 0.0653 0.00204 
 (0.0316) (0.0848) (0.0344) (0.0768) (0.0347) 
Age 0.00379*** 0.00475 0.00330*** 0.00734*** 0.00316*** 
 (0.00104) (0.00337) (0.00110) (0.00251) (0.00114) 
Married 0.104*** 0.0620 0.0823** 0.224*** 0.0774** 
 (0.0320) (0.0870) (0.0354) (0.0772) (0.0353) 
Educated 0.247*** 0.296*** 0.224*** 0.203** 0.265*** 
 (0.0401) (0.110) (0.0427) (0.0885) (0.0447) 
Healthy 0.100** 0.196* 0.0680 0.152* 0.0932** 
 (0.0418) (0.105) (0.0455) (0.0894) (0.0467) 
Unemployed -0.217*** -0.263** -0.198*** -0.155 -0.236*** 
 (0.0595) (0.118) (0.0692) (0.138) (0.0654) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.655*** 0.595*** 0.671*** 0.367*** 0.712*** 
 (0.0450) (0.113) (0.0493) (0.0935) (0.0509) 
Household size 0.0471*** 0.0722*** 0.0437*** 0.0358*** 0.0495*** 
 (0.00340) (0.0104) (0.00361) (0.0123) (0.00364) 
      
Constant cut1 -1.338*** -1.829*** -1.294*** -2.006*** 1.044*** 
 (0.255) (0.658) (0.277) (0.576) (0.272) 
Constant cut2 0.206 -0.285 0.259 -0.528 2.592*** 
 (0.256) (0.657) (0.279) (0.567) (0.273) 
Constant cut3 3.551*** 3.084*** 3.620*** 2.116*** 6.045*** 
 (0.260) (0.660) (0.284) (0.563) (0.279) 
      
Observations 40,924 6,730 34,194 8,493 32,431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
Received_ Socprotnet -0.380*** -1.112*** -0.219** -0.207** -0.463*** 
 (0.102) (0.332) (0.0912) (0.0982) (0.175) 
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile1 0.215* 1.046*** 0.0395 0.367 0.290 
 (0.122) (0.370) (0.117) (0.245) (0.189) 
Received_ Socprotnet*Quintile2 0.173 1.594*** -0.116 -0.259 0.261 
 (0.118) (0.360) (0.112) (0.195) (0.186) 
Received_ Socprotnet*Quintile3 0.638*** 0.761* 0.604*** 0.616*** 0.695*** 
 (0.124) (0.401) (0.116) (0.156) (0.193) 
Received_ Socprotnet *Quintile4 0.419*** 1.240*** 0.222* 0.376*** 0.439** 
 (0.132) (0.389) (0.129) (0.139) (0.209) 
Female 0.0272 0.0442 0.0277 -0.0108 0.0348 
 (0.0216) (0.0787) (0.0226) (0.0499) (0.0240) 
Age 0.00439*** 0.00609** 0.00441*** 0.00459** 0.00436*** 
 (0.000806) (0.00307) (0.000841) (0.00192) (0.000890) 
Married 0.0897*** 0.156** 0.0700*** 0.151*** 0.0716*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0787) (0.0259) (0.0539) (0.0265) 
Educated 0.246*** 0.284*** 0.237*** 0.113* 0.284*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0987) (0.0301) (0.0579) (0.0329) 
Healthy 0.163*** 0.173* 0.158*** 0.140** 0.171*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0960) (0.0318) (0.0619) (0.0341) 
Unemployed -0.293*** -0.288*** -0.290*** -0.311*** -0.295*** 
 (0.0402) (0.111) (0.0432) (0.0802) (0.0450) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.639*** 0.628*** 0.639*** 0.354*** 0.699*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0812) (0.0283) (0.0570) (0.0301) 
Household size 0.0558*** 0.0694*** 0.0532*** 0.0177** 0.0610*** 
 (0.00263) (0.0100) (0.00273) (0.00845) (0.00284) 
      
Constant cut1 -1.037*** -1.414*** -1.045*** -2.347*** 1.273*** 
 (0.159) (0.505) (0.168) (0.365) (0.166) 
Constant cut2 0.487*** 0.0883 0.485*** -0.884** 2.801*** 
 (0.160) (0.505) (0.169) (0.359) (0.167) 
Constant cut3 3.731*** 3.391*** 3.729*** 1.771*** 6.150*** 
 (0.163) (0.511) (0.172) (0.357) (0.171) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedPrivateAssist -0.227*** -0.392*** -0.201*** 0.125* -0.399*** 
 (0.0505) (0.138) (0.0549) (0.0726) (0.0646) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile1 -0.187*** 0.202 -0.236*** -0.815*** 0.00765 
 (0.0715) (0.200) (0.0773) (0.222) (0.0838) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile2 -0.195*** 0.164 -0.244*** 0.0424 -0.0878 
 (0.0666) (0.184) (0.0719) (0.128) (0.0788) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile3 0.120** 0.0712 0.133** -0.107 0.253*** 
 (0.0606) (0.162) (0.0659) (0.121) (0.0730) 
ReceivedPrivateAssist*Quintile4 -0.0934 0.199 -0.152** -0.178* -0.00791 
 (0.0640) (0.160) (0.0705) (0.101) (0.0783) 
Female 0.0336 0.0637 0.0309 -0.00987 0.0422* 
 (0.0216) (0.0793) (0.0227) (0.0499) (0.0240) 
Age 0.00436*** 0.00570* 0.00439*** 0.00499*** 0.00433*** 
 (0.000806) (0.00309) (0.000841) (0.00189) (0.000892) 
Married 0.0878*** 0.150* 0.0742*** 0.143*** 0.0683** 
 (0.0237) (0.0786) (0.0258) (0.0533) (0.0265) 
Educated 0.249*** 0.289*** 0.241*** 0.112* 0.283*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0986) (0.0301) (0.0576) (0.0328) 
Healthy 0.154*** 0.161* 0.150*** 0.142** 0.160*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0967) (0.0319) (0.0617) (0.0341) 
Unemployed -0.287*** -0.284** -0.285*** -0.320*** -0.285*** 
 (0.0402) (0.112) (0.0432) (0.0800) (0.0451) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.590*** 0.609*** 0.590*** 0.273*** 0.680*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0985) (0.0302) (0.0620) (0.0326) 
Household size 0.0515*** 0.0660*** 0.0497*** 0.0181** 0.0561*** 
 (0.00259) (0.00991) (0.00269) (0.00846) (0.00279) 
      
Constant cut1 -1.483*** -1.659*** -1.475*** -2.785*** 1.010*** 
 (0.170) (0.593) (0.178) (0.396) (0.180) 
Constant cut2 0.0472 -0.165 0.0619 -1.320*** 2.546*** 
 (0.170) (0.591) (0.179) (0.388) (0.180) 
Constant cut3 3.299*** 3.130*** 3.313*** 1.337*** 5.907*** 
 (0.173) (0.597) (0.181) (0.387) (0.184) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All FHH MHH Kurdish Region Rest of Iraq 
      
ReceivedCapital 0.238*** 0.469*** 0.206*** 0.220*** 0.242*** 
 (0.0496) (0.146) (0.0528) (0.0817) (0.0594) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile1 0.0724 -0.254 0.115 -0.396** 0.110 
 (0.0682) (0.225) (0.0719) (0.194) (0.0785) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile2 0.0498 -0.227 0.0806 -0.103 0.0617 
 (0.0545) (0.176) (0.0576) (0.117) (0.0628) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile3 0.174*** -0.263* 0.227*** 0.120 0.173*** 
 (0.0475) (0.149) (0.0503) (0.0979) (0.0549) 
ReceivedCapital*Quintile4 0.142*** -0.0555 0.166*** 0.177** 0.113** 
 (0.0412) (0.127) (0.0437) (0.0752) (0.0488) 
Female 0.0267 0.0506 0.0270 -0.00783 0.0343 
 (0.0216) (0.0790) (0.0226) (0.0499) (0.0240) 
Age 0.00408*** 0.00580* 0.00407*** 0.00444** 0.00409*** 
 (0.000806) (0.00308) (0.000839) (0.00189) (0.000891) 
Married 0.0971*** 0.139* 0.0775*** 0.163*** 0.0759*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0783) (0.0258) (0.0535) (0.0265) 
Educated 0.251*** 0.317*** 0.239*** 0.119** 0.291*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0980) (0.0301) (0.0578) (0.0329) 
Healthy 0.163*** 0.175* 0.158*** 0.137** 0.173*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0969) (0.0317) (0.0619) (0.0340) 
Unemployed -0.287*** -0.320*** -0.281*** -0.307*** -0.290*** 
 (0.0401) (0.111) (0.0431) (0.0805) (0.0449) 
Consumption Expenditure (log) 0.641*** 0.452*** 0.666*** 0.314*** 0.715*** 
 (0.0425) (0.128) (0.0453) (0.0844) (0.0497) 
Household size 0.0505*** 0.0732*** 0.0477*** 0.0114 0.0555*** 
 (0.00264) (0.0100) (0.00273) (0.00834) (0.00285) 
      
Constant cut1 -0.800*** -1.939*** -0.692*** -2.414*** 1.602*** 
 (0.229) (0.719) (0.242) (0.504) (0.255) 
Constant cut2 0.729*** -0.442 0.842*** -0.947* 3.135*** 
 (0.229) (0.719) (0.243) (0.494) (0.256) 
Constant cut3 3.982*** 2.855*** 4.095*** 1.717*** 6.493*** 
 (0.231) (0.719) (0.245) (0.493) (0.258) 
      
Observations 85,655 7,700 77,955 19,513 66,142 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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